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Abstract
Abstract for a thesis submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree
of Ph.D. by Geoff M. J. Stevenson, and titled The Ontology of Repeatable
Artefacts.
August, 2010
Many of those artefacts with which we are so familiar  including, for example,
works of music, photographs, novels, essays, ﬁlms, television adverts, and graphic
designs  share a common ontological nature. I argue in this thesis that they are
all repeatable, and set out to provide an ontological account of these entities that
explains the phenomenon of repeatability. In a fruitful meeting of aesthetics and
metaphysics, a great deal has been written recently on the ontological nature of
musical works. More encompassing enquiries have sought to understand the on-
tology of artworks in general. I will be responding to and engaging with this body
of literature insofar as it also oﬀers accounts of the entities I describe as repeat-
able. However, my approach gives metaphysical concerns and the phenomenon
of repeatability primacy over aesthetic concerns.
Here I argue that repeatable artefacts fall into the ontological category of kinds.
I develop an account of repeatable artefacts as kinds that has two key components.
Firstly, on my view kinds are physical rather than abstract. Secondly, I argue
that repeatable artefacts, as kinds, have essences that are purely relational and
historical.
The thesis begins with a discussion of method. The methodological issue has
grown in prominence in recent years, as theorists have sought some higher level
arbitration on the expanding number of theories and approaches being oﬀered
in response to ontological puzzles. Drawing on the work of Amie Thomasson,
I defend a methodology according to which we should develop an ontological
account using careful conceptual analysis that assesses our intuitions about the
application of referring terms. This commitment to conceptual analysis is then
defended from misunderstandings and objections.
I apply this method in giving an ontological explanation for the phenomenon
of repeatability. I argue that repeatable artefacts are kinds. Kinds are strongly
individuated by their essences, which are the conditions that must be satisﬁed for
the kind to be instanced. I then develop an account of kinds as physical multiply
located entities, that exist when and where they have instances. This stands in
contrast to the prevailing view according to which kinds are abstract.
I then set out to give an account of the essences of paradigmatic repeatable
artefacts. I argue that this can be done if we are willing to reject the default view
according to which essences are at least partly structural, and replace it with
an account of purely relational and historical essences. The essences of many
paradigmatic repeatable artefacts, I claim, involve causal historical processes of
copying.
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Introduction
Suppose we ask What is a novel? There are a number of things we might be asking
with such a question. We might want to know what a novel is in contrast to a poem, or
what a novel is in contrast to a scientiﬁc work, or what a novel is in contrast to a ﬁlm.
The question I address in this thesis might be similarly clariﬁed as: what is a novel in
contrast to a copy of a novel?
The puzzle is immediately interesting for philosophers, because here we have things
which seem familiar and commonplace yet when we look only a little beneath the surface
what we are talking about is not so obvious at all. The work Ulysses is not my copy
of it, as Richard Wollheim has stressed (Wollheim, 1980, p.5). The novel has been read
many times by many diﬀerent people, but the same is not true of my copy. Nor is
the work the original manuscript penned by Joyce. The manuscript could be lost or
destroyed without the work being lost or destroyed. The manuscript could be worn and
faded so that it is hard to read, or locked away so that it is impossible to read, but any
diﬃculty one might have reading the work itself is not of this kind.
It would be equally implausible to say that the novel was identical with every copy
of it, as Wolterstorﬀ shows with a brief consideration of the transitivity of identity
(Wolterstorﬀ, 1980, p.35). Since any two copies are non-identical, they cannot both be
identical with some third thing. The novel is not the same as any copy or all the copies,
but what then is the novel?
It can be seen, I think, that the question thus put is not speciﬁc to novels. The
question of what a novel is, in comparison to a copy of a novel, arguably has nothing
to do with being a novel as such. We could similarly ask `What is a poem in contrast
to a copy of a poem?' and reasonably be taken to be asking the same question. The
question being raised is no respecter of literary genre.
One of the premises of this thesis is that the puzzle is much broader still. We can
extend it from literary works to text based artefacts in general: what is an academic
essay in relation to a copy of that academic essay? What is this thesis in relation the
copy of this thesis that you are holding now? Novel, poem or essay, it seems that the
same kind of relationship is emerging. There can be many copies of a single novel, many
copies of single poem, and many copies of a single essay, so what is this novel, poem or
essay? What is its ontological nature?
Can the question be extended further beyond text-based artefacts? I believe it can.
There is something strikingly similar about the puzzling relationship between a text-
based artefact and its copies and the relationship between a photograph and its prints.
There can be many prints of a single photograph. The photograph appears not to be
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identical to any of its prints, but what then is the photograph and how is it related to
its prints? Again a photograph may be a work of art, but it seems the puzzle holds
independently of aesthetic properties. I suggest we can just as easily ask: what is a
company logo in contrast to the many copies or prints of that logo?
Once the pattern is recognised, it can be spotted elsewhere with ease. The puzzle
seems to equally apply to songs, ﬁlms and plays, and even to such things as words,
jokes and stories. In each case we have an artefact which appears identiﬁable and
singular, and yet is encountered through its many copies, performances, showings and
prints  what we can collectively call its instances. We can further call all those things
that seem to share this relationship with instances repeatable things. Those repetable
things that I am interested in here I will describe loosly as artefacts. What I am not
interested in doing is oﬀering any tight analysis of the notion of an artefact. Rather, I
will use the term as a broad and intuitive place holder, and operate for the most part
with paradigmatic examples of the entities I am interested in (novels, essays, poems,
photographs, logos, plays etc.). Thus in asking our original question  What is a novel?
 we are asking about the ontological nature of repeatable artefacts.1
There are two points that emerge out of this initial presentation of the question.
The ﬁrst is that the question begins by collecting together a broad group of entities
under what appears to be the same phenomenon, and setting out to provide an account
of those entities. This is in contrast to an approach that picks some more speciﬁc
kind of entity as the focus of an ontological enquiry. The recent relevant literature is
dominated by discussions of the ontological status of works of music, and sometimes
even more speciﬁcally, fully scored classical works in the western tradition (Levinson,
1980, p.6). Such approaches clearly have merit. The subject matter is precisely deﬁned
and the ontologist can work with a clear focus without having to continually consider
broad examples. Moreover, it is much less likely that the subject matter will turn out
to be ontologically diverse, not admitting of a single ontological theory.
However, taking the broader perspective adopted here has its own distinct advantages.
If successful it will provide a theory with wider applicability and far greater explanatory
power than a more focussed approach. Furthermore, the broader perspective lends
itself more easily to spotting trends and categorical demarcations. By taking repeatable
artefacts in general as the subject matter, we concern ourselves with entities that share
an ontological predicament as Guy Rohrbaugh has put it (2003, p.177).
The second point to note is that the question being asked does not rely on any
distinction between those artefacts that are considered works of art, and those that are
not. Though many of the examples that I will use in discussing repeatable artefacts will
be entities typically seen as works of art (broadly construed) the focus here is not on
their status as art, but on their ontological nature. Thus the question is ﬁrmly one of
metaphysics rather than aesthetics. As such I will be engaging, to a signiﬁcant degree,
with debates in the ontology of art, but it should be understood that my general theory
1The use of `repeatable' here thus involves a slight extension from our ordinary application of the
term, which is usually reserved only for `event-like' entities such as plays, ﬁlms and songs.
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is more encompassing. What I provide will stand as a direct competitor to ontological
theories aimed speciﬁcally at repeatable works of art, though my theory includes, rather
than is limited to, those things.
Others have developed ontological accounts according to which an artwork's onto-
logical nature and its status as art are intimately connected.2 Accordingly, being a
work of art in some way contributes to or speciﬁes the ontological nature of the entity
in question. This type of approach has fostered the study of the ontology of art as a
unique sub-discipline crossing the boundaries between metaphysics and aesthetics.
However, while I don't want to downplay the signiﬁcance of aesthetic considerations,
the approach I adopt holds that ontological distinctions are orthogonal to aesthetic ones.
My reasons for thinking this are essentially the same as those oﬀered by Andrew Harrison
(1967). Harrison notes that we can distinguish two general approaches to the question
of what is a work of art, one entering the subject by way of the idea of judgement,
one by way of the idea of an object (1967, p.105). According to the former approach
[o]bjects of aesthetic judgement are seen, as it were, bracketed oﬀ from the rest of
experience (1967, p.105). However, this approach risks overplaying the signiﬁcance of
aesthetic judgement to ontology. Since, as Harrison notes, virtually anything may be
contemplated aesthetically (1967, p.106), I think we should be suspicious of the idea
that aesthetic judgement picks out an ontological category.3
Instead, though approaching works of art as objects may be the more mundane ap-
proach (Harrison, 1967, p.107) it seems more suited to ontological investigation. Rather
than pick out entities that are all attended to aesthetically, the focus here is the phe-
nomenon of repeatability itself. That some of those things are considered to be art is,
on this view, not ontologically relevant.4
The question to be addressed, then, is the question of the ontological nature of re-
peatable artefacts. Much summarised, the answer that I will articulate and defend in
this thesis is that repeatable artefacts are copied kinds. Kinds, I will argue, are physical
multiply locatable entities that exist when and where they have instances. A kind has
an essence, where this is the set of conditions that something must satisfy to be an in-
stance of the kind. I will defend the view that the essences of many repeatable artefacts
involve historical and relational properties: the property required for something to be
an instance of a novel, for examlpe, is that it be a suitable copy of a previous instance
of that novel.
The thesis divides into three parts, with two chapters devoted to each part. In Part I,
2In particular, see Currie (1989) and Davies (2004). Peter Lamarque (2002) adopts an approach
that focusses on works (broadly construed) but allows that within this category there is ontological
diversity, with some works being `particulars' and some being `types'.
3Robert Howell has similarly argued that literary works do not carve a single ontological category, but
are ontologically various (Howell, 2002a, p.68). He argues that too many diﬀerent sorts of thing
are described as literary works and, like works of art in general, we should not expect ontological
unity (2002, p.77). Amie Thomasson (2006) similarly compares the term `art' with the term `gift',
which appears not to be category speciﬁc since a gift may be a trip to the beach, a T-shirt, or a
poem, for example (2006, p.250).
4This point is contentious. We will return to this subject in 1.1 when I consider David Davies'
methodological approach.
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I discuss the issue of the correct methodology, a subject that has grown in prominence in
recent years in this area. In Part II, I apply that methodology and develop an account
of repeatable artefacts as kinds. In Part III, I tackle the question of the essences of
repeatable artefacts.
Method
Before addressing the primary question head on, a signiﬁcant portion of the thesis will
be given over to the methodological question. That is, before providing an account of
the nature of repeatable artefacts I will look at the issue of how one should go about
providing such an account.
We have a question, but how are we to know if we are looking for answers in the right
place, and what constitutes a good answer? How can we know if we've got it right? To
put it bluntly, why think that the ontological proposal set out here is going to be any
more likely to hit the mark than any of the numerous others in the vicinity?
There are two reasons in particular for devoting this much attention to method.
Firstly, and most simply, the methodological issue is extremely interesting. In asking
how we should go about answering our ontological question we have to take a step
back from repeatable artefacts and assess what it is that philosophers in this ﬁeld are
and should be doing. Secondly, the methodological issue has commanded a signiﬁcant
amount of attention in the recent literature,5 and a full engagement with the existing
ontological debates requires that the methodological issues be addressed.
One of the reasons for this growth in the interest in methodology is the large and ex-
panding number of alternative ontological proposals that have been oﬀered in response
to what appears to be the same or similar questions. Amie Thomasson, a recent cham-
pion of the methodological issue, has described the variety of positions in the ontology
of art as an embarrassment of riches (Thomasson, 2005, p.221) but it might as easily
appear, as David Davies describes it, as a philosophical badlands, a realm populated
by entities as diverse as norm-kinds, indicated structures, action-types, continuants,
and performances (Davies, 2009, p.159).6 When a question is asked, such as `what
is the ontological nature of a work of music?', and such an array of answers is oﬀered
as can be found in the recent literature, it is natural to suppose that there might be
nearly as much variation in how the question is being answered as there is in the an-
swers themselves. Unsurprisingly, then, questions of method are becoming increasingly
important.
I begin the discussion of methodology in Chapter 1 by framing the question in terms
of the relationship between our pre-theoretical beliefs or folk theories, and philosophical
theory. The question to be asked is: to what extent, if at all, should ontological theory
be beholden to our folk theories and beliefs? The responses not at all and entirely
5See, for example, Thomasson (2005), Thomasson (2006), Kania (2008), Davies (2009), Steckner
(2009) and Walton (2007).
6Though perhaps one would have to be in a rather cynical mood to agree with Kania that what we
have here is a collection of burnt-out wrecks on the ontological sea (Kania, 2008, p.427).
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are both implausible. Instead, we must look for some justiﬁed middle ground between
these extremes. I consider and discuss Kendall Walton's position on philosophy as
theory construction based on the relevant data (Walton, 2007). While there is a great
deal of sense in this, I will argue that for the ontologist, how we should decide what
counts as data is far from clear, and a methodological problem still remains. I then
consider David Davies' methodological approach which places special emphasis on our
critical and appreciative practices (Davies, 2009). I argue that Davies' methodology is
at best unsuited to our project and at worst unsuitable even for his own.
I then introduce Amie Thomasson's methodological contribution. I believe that there
is a great deal that is is right in Thomasson's work, but that her account, which is
eﬀectively a defence of conceptual analysis based on semantic considerations, needs
developing in certain key areas. The remaining half of Chapter 1 and the whole of
Chapter 2 are then given over to elaborating on and defending this account. Brieﬂy, I
will argue that we should proceed in answering our ontological question using careful
analysis of our intuitions regarding the application of the terms for those entities we are
interested in. I will defend the view that language communities must associate terms
with a tacit understanding of how those terms are correctly applied in possible scenarios
if that term is to have a stable and determinate reference. As such it is these considered
intuitions that provide a constraint on ontological theorising, if the ontologist is to avoid
changing the subject.
Kinds
With a methodology set out and defended, I then turn to the ontological question
proper. There are two general introductory points that need to be made here. The ﬁrst
concerns a broad assumption that I will be making in this thesis  that anti-realism
about repeatable artefacts is false  while the second concerns terminological choices.
It is certainly possible to adopt one of numerous forms of anti-realism concerning
repeatable artefacts. Challenges to the existence of speciﬁc kinds of repeatable artefact
are quite rare,7 presumably because anti-realists of various stripes will regard their
arguments as being more widely relevant, yet there is still plenty that could be said in
response to anti-realist worries. Nevertheless, I will say very little, and eﬀectively take
the falsity of anti-realism as an assumption of this thesis. A philosopher must pick his
or her ﬁghts, and this in one ﬁght that I choose to leave to others.
My reasons for this are as follows. Firstly, it would be quite possible to dedicate
a whole thesis to assessing anti-realist arguments (including, for example, versions of
ﬁctionalism, nihilism and nominalism about repeatable things) and realist responses,
but I take that to be a distinct undertaking from the one set out here. This is in
part because most of the relevant arguments will not be speciﬁc to repeatable artefacts,
and instead will depend on broader metaphysical and meta-metaphysical positioning.
7Though see Cameron (2008) for a defence of the view that musical works do not strictly speaking
exist, and see Predelli (2009) for a reply. Kania (2008) has also defended a form of ﬁctionalism for
musical works.
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As such, embarking on that journey would detract from an assessment of the positive
proposal set out here.
Secondly, it appears to me that the default position should be realism. It at least
seems there are such things as novels, works of music, ﬁlms and essays, and unless one
speciﬁcally sets out to engage with arguments to the contrary, we have perfectly valid
grounds for oﬀering a theory to explain what sorts of things these are.
Finally, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Given that, as I will argue, we
can provide a methodologically sound and coherent account of the ontological nature of
repeatables  one that puts them in a broad ontological category with many other things
 many of the reasons to doubt their existence, based on inconsistency and incoherence,
for example, are undermined. I therefore begin my account of the nature of repeatable
artefacts taking the fact that they exist and we refer to them as a given.
The second introductory point involves terminology. Anyone familiar with the liter-
ature will know that the most popular move in explaining the nature of words, novels
and works of music involves an appeal to `types'. A work of music or a novel, it is said,
is a `type', and the performances of the music and the copies of the novel are called
the `tokens' of that type. The terminology is borrowed from C. S. Peirce (Peirce, 1933,
p.243) who introduces it to draw a distinction between a word as a thing that can be
repeated  the word type  and a word as a particular instance  the word token.
Now, when put to use as a semantic distinction Peirce's terminology is invaluable.
It helps clear up an ambiguity inherent in our talk about what a word is. It makes
explicit a distinction that we are all fully aware of, or at least willing to accept once
it is pointed out, but that has escaped clariﬁcation in pre-theoretical language. If we
accept that words represent the same ontological phenomenon that we encounter with
novels and copies of novels, and plays and performances of plays, the semantic use of
the type/token distinction can then be rolled out further. We would then express the
diﬀerence between a novel and a copy of and novel by speaking of novel types on the
one hand and novel tokens on the other hand.
However, the numerous attempts to put ontological ﬂesh onto the bones of the dis-
tinction have varied signiﬁcantly. Peirce himself seemed to regard types as abstract
Forms though he says also that a type does not exist and that it is impossible that
the type should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is
not a Single thing or Single event (Peirce, 1933, p.243). Though exactly what Peirce
means here is rather obscure to a modern reader, there has been a strong tradition
of following Peirce in holding that types are abstracta, (a notable exception is Eddy
Zemach) but there has been little consensus as to what this exactly means. For some
they are timeless abstract `universals' (Dodd, 2002; Kivy, 1993) though for others they
are abstract but creatable (Levinson, 1980; Howell, 2002).
Theories have not only oﬀered diﬀerent accounts of the nature of types, but also dif-
ferent takes on what should be properly called a type. Thus, for example, Jay Bachrach
insists that the type/token scheme only applies to linguistic elements and should be
used for the express purpose of designating physical objects as meaningful units in a
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language (Bachrach, 1971, p.416). This, by his lights, rules out a type/token analysis
for most works of art. Richard Wollheim, on the other hand, suggests that we postulate
types...where we can correlate a class of particulars with a piece of human invention
(Wollheim, 1980, p.78), and more recently Charles Nussbaum has put forward a view
of types as only those things that involve a process of historical reproduction (Nuss-
baum, 2003, p.275). Other theories that appeal to types, such as Julian Dodd's, have a
thinner and as such broader conception of what a type is (Dodd, 2007, pp.8-19). Given
this variation it can be a challenge to distinguish signiﬁcant metaphysical diﬀerences in
type theories from mere terminological diﬀerences.
As such, rather than leap into debates about whether repeatable artefacts are or are
not types, I will avoid the type/token terminology as it applies to theories altogether,
and retain it only as a handy semantic distinction between `words' as those things that
are repeated (types), and `words' as individual occurrences (tokens). Instead, the theory
I develop will describe repeatable artefacts as kinds. The choice here is partly cosmetic,
and it would be possible, though somewhat tedious, to translate the theory oﬀered here
from one of kinds and their instances to one of types and their tokens.8 However, as
well as avoiding some of the ambiguities discussed above, the advantage of appealing
to kinds is that it allows for a straightforward link with the natural kinds of science, a
link that will prove to be signiﬁcant for the theory developed here. In particular, it will
help to emphasise the breadth and wide applicability of the ontological category into
which I place repeatable artefacts (I will argue that repeatable artefacts belong in the
same ontological category as gold and water, for example).
I will begin in Chapter 3 with a careful assessment of the phenomenon of repeatability
as it arises out of our practices of identifying repeatable artefacts. It is at this stage
that the methodology defended in Part I is put into practice. I will argue that the
phenomenon is marked by the recognition of the identity of the repeatable entity despite
the distinctness of instances. After rejecting two possible solutions to explain this (a
set hypothesis , and a `scattered object' hypothesis), I appeal to kinds as entities that
can have multiple instances, and are thus intrinsically repeatable. The notion of a kind
that I develop is rooted in our ordinary notion of things being of the same kind, type or
sort. In particular, I argue that kinds are instanced whenever the essence of the kind
is satisﬁed, where the essence is understood as a set of conditions, or properties, that
are necessary and suﬃcient for something to be an instance of that kind. I accept the
common assumption that the essence of the kind is modally essential to that kind.
In Chapter 4, I develop the metaphysics of kinds in more detail. My aim here is to
propose an alternative to the entrenched belief that kinds are abstract, which I call kind
Physicalism. I argue that we can coherently develop an account of kinds as physical
multiply locatable entities that are co-present with their instances. On this view kinds
exist when and where their instances exist. I will argue that this view ultimately
8One prominent theory that uses the terminology of kinds and instances is Wolterstorﬀ's (1980).
Wolterstorﬀ suggests he would be equally comfortable with either terminological choice (1980,
p.194).
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provides a more satisfactory account of the nature kinds than appeal to abstracta.
Essences
In the ﬁnal part of the thesis I take up the challenge of providing an account of the
essences of repeatable artefacts. This is not just a matter of ﬁlling in the details,
however. The viability of the ontological theory proposed depends, to a degree, on
the possibility of articulating reasonable essences for the kinds in question. If every
repeatable artefact is individuated by an essence  the set of conditions that something
must meet to be an instance of that artefact  then we had better be able to say, at
least roughly, what those essences are.
The dominant view in the literature is that the conditions laid down are at least
partly structural. This is unsurprising given that for many repeatable artefacts, it is
the structure of the instances that we are most interested in: we value a novel for the
word structure chosen by the author; we value a piece of music for its sonic features;
and we value good photography at least in part for its visual structure. Structure is
also clearly relevant to the identiﬁcation of repeatable artefacts. All copies of the novel
Emma have the same word structure, and we can tell (usually) that a print is a print
of a certain photograph by how the print looks. However, in Chapter 5 I consider this
view and argue that it suﬀers number of diﬃculties which together provide good reason
to doubt that essences of repeatable artefacts are in fact structural.
If the essences of repeatable artefacts are not at least partly structural, what else could
they be? The rejection of structural essences might seem to be tantamount to rejection
of essences, and thus a rejection of kinds, entirely (Rohrbaugh, 2003). However, in
Chapter 6 I argue that non-structural essences can be provided for repeatable artefacts
and that these non-structural essences do a better job of accounting for repeatable
artefacts, including the seemingly central role of structure, than structural essences
themselves. I will argue that repeatable artefacts are copied kinds with purely relational
essences.
The position is inspired by accounts of relational essences for biological species, where
the absence of structural essences has been apparent for some time. In what is an
ongoing debate, the absence of structural essences has led some to reject the view
that species are kinds. It has been responded, however, that a kind theory can be
maintained (and thus that the rejection is an over-reaction) once we accept that the
essences of species are relational and historical. What is required to be a member
of a species is not that an organism have a certain structure, but that it emanate
from the right historical lineage. I will argue that a similar view can be developed for
repeatable artefacts. On the view defended, then, repeatable artefacts have a great deal
in common with biological species. Both have essences that depend on processes of
historical `reproduction', the latter being biological, the former involving our cultural
practices of making `copies' (broadly understood) of that which we value, admire, or
just ﬁnd useful.
14
Introduction
That concludes the introductory overview of what lies ahead. It remains to say just
that though the speciﬁc question being addressed in this thesis is interesting in its own
right, it is clear that much of the philosophical value of asking such a question lies in the
methods and techniques that must be considered and employed in asking and answering
that question. Hopefully in what follows there will be as much of worth in the process
of this enquiry as in the outcome itself.
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1. The Search for Methodological
Guidance
If the ﬁrst order ontological question about repeatable things asks what sort of thing
an essay or a work of music or a logo is, then the methodological (or metaontological)
question asks more generally how we should go about answering that ﬁrst order ques-
tion about essays, works of music, or logos. I have discussed the need to address this
methodological issue in the Introduction. To recap, the ontological proposals oﬀered
to account for what appear to be the same entities are many and varied and there has
been a growing feeling that if progress is to be made we must examine more closely the
methods employed in reaching those conclusions. In heed of that, I do not want to add
just another ontological theory to the pile. Instead I begin with a detailed assessment of
the methodological questions that have been raised and answers that have been oﬀered
 an assessment that will take up these ﬁrst two chapters.
In this chapter I assess the methodological state of play in the ontology of art and
identify the proposal I take to be most promising. In the next chapter I will defend that
proposal in greater depth. The position to be defended argues that ontology should
proceed by careful conceptual analysis, where this amounts to an analysis of our un-
derstanding of the application and co-application conditions associated with a referring
term. It is this understanding that determines (in the way to be explained) what our
terms refer to, and so if we want to provide an ontology of what we ordinarily mean by
`novel' and `poem', for example, we must oﬀer an ontology in line with that analysis. We
will see that a methodological approach of this sort provides methodological guidance
while still leaving room for ontological theorising.
I start, in 1.1, by framing the question in terms of the relationship between philo-
sophical theory and pre-theoretical intuitions and beliefs, or more generally our folk
theory.1 We can ask: how many, if any, of our folk beliefs about an entity should be
respected by an ontological theory for that entity? The answers all and none are re-
jected. I then assess a proposal oﬀered by Kendal Walton that suggests, roughly, that a
philosophical theory should be constrained only by the data it seeks to explain. I argue
that given the diﬃculties of separating theory from data, a methodological puzzle still
remains. A more exact solution has been oﬀered by David Davies. Davies' account is
steered by the belief that an ontology of art should be constrained principally by our
aesthetic critical and appreciative practices. I argue, however, that Davies' proposal is
1I accept that this is a somewhat archaic term, but it is commonly enough used to make it worth
adopting. It should be noted that for the most part `the folk' are just us.
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at best unsuitable for the ontological project undertaken here, and at worst unsuitable
for his own project.
In 1.2 I give an account of Amie Thomasson's methodological argument. I outline
how her proposal promises to succeed in answering the methodological question where
Davies' failed. Thomasson claims that a consideration of how reference is ﬁxed, and in
particular a rejection of a `pure causal theory' of reference, gives us reason to believe that
reference is at least partly determined by certain elements of the conceptual content of
language users. As such an analysis of that content must guide an ontology if we wish to
provide an account of what the folk are talking about, and not inadvertently change the
subject. Finally, a detailed analysis is undertaken of one of the key steps in Thomasson's
argument (1.3). I argue that the details of her rejection of a causal theory depend for
their validity on precisely what kind of causal theory is up for rejection. In particular,
I argue that Thomasson fails to distinguish between crucially diﬀerent kinds of causal
theory, and furthermore fails to distinguish metaphysical from epistemic indeterminacy
in reference.
1.1. The Methodological Constraint in the Ontology of Art
The methodological debate in the ontology of artworks can helpfully be understood as
tackling the following question: to what extent, if at all, can an ontological proposal con-
cerning the nature of some entity contradict pre-theoretical beliefs about those entities?
(Or, to what extent can folk theories constrain an ontological proposal?) The question
suggests a scale with the following extremes. On the one hand, what Amie Thomasson
has (critically) called the `discovery model' claims that while the folk theory may point
an investigation in the right direction, ultimately any or even all of that folk theory may
be discovered to be false under the bright lights of philosophical enquiry. An ontological
account oﬀered for some kind of entity may therefore be highly revisionary, in the sense
that it may claim that any or even all previous assumptions or beliefs should be revised
(Thomasson, 2005, pp.222-224). The metaphysician in this case would be constrained
only by the more familiar theoretical virtues, such as simplicity, explanatory power,
and parsimony, and perhaps what Andrew Kania has called metaphysical respectability
(Kania, 2008, p.436).
At the other extreme lies a position that has been called descriptivism. According
to descriptivism the role of the ontologist, in this ﬁeld at least, is merely to describe,
in as much detail as possible, our existing conceptions of some entity.2 On this view,
surprising or revisionary answers will always be suspect and suggest either a failure to
understand existing concepts, or a misunderstanding of the role of the ontologist.
Intuitively, there is something wrong with both of these extremes. Of the two, the
former position is perhaps more familiar to modern metaphysics, where we have grown
accustomed to surprising and revisionary claims regarding the fundamental nature of
2Descriptivism is discussed in Kania (2008, pp.434-438).
18
1. The Search for Methodological Guidance
the world. However, if a line of enquiry is aimed at a certain kind of entity of which we
already have some grasp (as, for example, in the ontology of art) and the philosopher is
willing, along the way, to reject all our initial beliefs, then we might reasonably ask why
we should believe that the resultant theory is still a theory of those original entities.
It seems the philosopher would be in the same position as the biographer who sets
out to write about a well known London-based artist from the 1950's, and turns out
a book which describes a Spanish monk from the 15th Century. We would conclude
that somewhere along the way they had changed the subject of enquiry. This does
not constitute an argument, but is an indication of what strikes us as wrong about
this unfettered revisionism. I doubt that any ontologist has or would locate themselves
entirely at this end of the scale. Note that even if a theory is guided primarily by
explanatory power, there is normally some pre-established phenomenon or data that
the theory is supposed to be explaining.
The latter extreme faces even more obvious diﬃculties. If we set out to describe a
particular kind of entity, merely describing our existing conceptions seems to miss the
point. Surely we are interested in the entities themselves, not just what we happen to
think about them? Our conceptions are sometimes inconsistent and often incomplete
and we normally think that we can be mistaken about at least some of what we believe
about the entities around us.3 Nevertheless, descriptivism of this sort has received some
attention in the literature. An indication of why one might want to adopt this view is
given by Andrew Kania. With a focus on the ontology of music, Kania suggests that
[i]f we truly embrace descriptivism, we embrace the idea that when we do
musical ontology, what we describe is our conceptions of musical works,
rather than the things themselves. There is a certain irony in the idea
that if we take descriptivism, and thus our conceptions of musical works
seriously, we should conclude that those works have no existence beyond
those conceptions of them. But this irony is counterbalanced by the security
our conceptions of musical works gain against revisionist attacks. (Kania,
2008, p.441)
There are a few things we can note about this. Firstly, there is a puzzling ambiguity in
Kania's account. On the one hand he suggests embracing descriptivism involves describ-
ing our conceptions rather than the things themselves, while on the other hand he speaks
of works of music as having no existence beyond those conceptions. Perhaps Kania is
best interpreted as equating descriptivism with a broad and controversial metaphysical
position that, at least as far as works of music go, appears to be a form of anti-realism.
As I have said in the introduction, arguing against such a position is outside the scope
of this thesis (except insofar as the plausibility of the positive proposal set out here
counts as a reason not to adopt an anti-realist stance). It is enough to note that the
view being associated with descriptivism is distinctly at odds with the metaphysical
project that we thought we were engaging in.
3See, e.g. Devitt and Sterelny (1987, p.235).
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Further, adopting such a position would require a signiﬁcant amount of metaphysical
and ontological argument. We should not slide into anti-realism (and thereby justify
descriptivism) out of either a desire to avoid revisionary theories or because of the
general sentiment that our folk conceptions play some important role. Kania suggests
that an advantage of descriptivism is that our conceptions are secure from `revisionist
attacks'. But this gets the direction of argument backwards. The question of whether or
not we should avoid revisionary theories (and what the subsequent ontological account
should be) should depend on a worked out methodology, not vice versa.
Walton on Theory Construction
Both extremes of the scale described above are unattractive. There appears to be
something wrong with a rejection of all our pre-theoretical beliefs, but equally, merely
describing our conceptions seems to either miss the point or else rely on a substan-
tial theoretical claim that itself amounts to a metaphysical stance that is signiﬁcantly
controversial. If some middle ground is needed, the challenge becomes one of clariﬁ-
cation and justiﬁcation. Where between the two extremes should we locate ourselves
and why? Kendall Walton's recent discussion of methodology in aesthetics promises to
provide some guidance on the relationship between folk theory and ontological theory
(Walton, 2007). It should be noted that Walton is interested in very general method-
ological questions, and is not uniquely focussed on ontological issues. However, it seems
admissible to interpret his discussion as at least encompassing the latter. Walton states
a preference for viewing the philosopher's work as the work of theory construction:
What philosophers do, on this conception, is pretty much what scientists do
after the data are in: organizing the data in a perspicuous manner, devising
conceptual structures, constructing theories, to clarify and explain the data.
(Walton, 2007, p.151)
Walton's take on conceptual analysis (and more generally the assessment of intuitions)
is that it is to be used as a tool to reveal one such competing theory  the folk theory.
We should be interested in pre-philosophical intuitions and beliefs just as far as they
reveal the implicit folk theory. Moreover, we should respect the folk theory to a degree,
Walton suggests, as it must have some merit to have evolved and become established as
it has. However, it is far from sacrosanct and the job of the philosopher is to scrutinise
and test this theory against competitors. If it is found wanting, rejection and revision
are called for (Walton, 2007, p.155).
Walton also identiﬁes a distinct activity that the philosopher may be engaged in,
which is to theorise about the folk theory. Here the folk theory itself is the subject of
the philosopher's enquiry (Walton, 2007, p.154). In this case, conceptual analysis, as
Walton understands it, takes a central role; this is conceptual analysis more or less
for its own sake (Walton, 2007, p.155). Because the folk theory itself is the subject
of analysis, revision here is not acceptable as it would amount to a distortion of that
which is being analysed.
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The distinction Walton makes between these two kinds of viable activity allows him
to rule out two further kinds of methodological approach. Firstly, he objects to an
approach which aims to take the folk theory and clean it up around the edges. The
explanation oﬀered is quite simple: either we are interested in assessing the folk theory
in and of itself, in which case any adjustments amount to falsifying of data; or our aim
is to understand what the folk theory aims to understand in which case we should be
prepared to replace the folk theory with a better theory if necessary. Taking the folk
theory and tinkering with it is to take an unhappy middle ground between these two
reasonable activities (Walton, 2007, p.155).
Secondly, Walton's distinction allows him to rule out a methodological approach that
generates theories that are so radically revisionary that they don't even succeed in
usefully explaining anything the folk might have originally been interested in. Nelson
Goodman's notorious theory of musical notation and performance is guilty of this,
Walton suggests (Walton, 2007, p.155).4 Walton argues that Goodman's account of
what it is to perform a musical work radically overthrows our normal understanding of
performance, but fails, in its place, to oﬀer anything that helps to explain or illuminate
listeners' experiences. According to Walton, Goodman is guilty of rejecting too much
of the data and in doing so only succeeds in changing the subject.
On the face of it, Walton's advice seems quite clear then: the philosopher must know
what kind of project she is engaged in. If she aims to understand the folk's theory and
concepts, she should not oﬀer suggestions to amend or revise aspects of that theory.
Such a project would justify the kind of descriptivism discussed above, but would not
normally be understood as ordinary ontological or metaphysical enquiry. This proposal
is not in conﬂict with an alternative and more revisionary methodology because it is
a diﬀerent kind of undertaking altogether. On the other hand, if the aim is to provide
the best explanation of the data that the folk seem to be interested in, the philosopher
should be willing to look for and adopt the best available theory, however revisionary it
may be. This revisionary project is constrained merely by a desire to ensure that one is
still explaining the relevant data. Unfettered revision is therefore avoided, and we have
some (quite minimal) constraint to allow us to establish a middle ground.
However, despite the fact that Walton's position appears sensible, it can be seen
that things are not so simple in practice. The most pressing worry is that, as Walton
himself realises, distinguishing data from theory is no easy task (Walton, 2007, p.152).
What counts as data to be explained for one philosopher may be merely a product
of folk theory for another. As such, the point at which a revisionary theory ceases
to address the relevant data may diﬀer from one theorist to the next. Claims about
the entanglement of theory and data, at least to some extent, are familiar and widely
accepted in the philosophy of science, and it seems similar insights apply here.5 This
is most easily made clear by considering actual examples in the literature. Jerrold
4For Goodman's theory see Goodman (1968).
5Seminal works in the philosophy of science discussing this issue include Hanson (1958) and Kuhn
(1996).
21
1. The Search for Methodological Guidance
Levinson, in a well known paper (Levinson, 1980), has insisted that one of the pieces of
data that an ontology of musical works should explain is that musical works are created,
where this is understood as being brought into existence. He puts this in terms of a
creatability requirement :
(Cre) Musical works must be such that they do not exist prior to the com-
poser's compositional activity, but are brought into existence by that activ-
ity. (Levinson, 1980, p.9)
Levinson does not insist on (Cre) without argument, but the arguments are all based
on our ordinary pre-philosophical beliefs and intuitions. However, why might we not
say that this belief, however strong it may be, and however integral it may be to our
normal appreciation of musical works, is merely a product of our implicit folk theory,
and therefore subject to rejection if a better theory is found? In other words, why
think that what Levinson takes to be something that requires an explanation and that
cannot be rejected by any philosophical theory is not in fact an erroneous aspect of
our folk theory? Peter Kivy and Julian Dodd, who both defend accounts of musical
works as eternally existing (and thus uncreated) entities, make responses of this sort to
Levinson.6 Dodd, for example, argues that the best theory of musical works shows that
despite what we thought they are not literally created. Moreover, we can explain away
the intuition about creatability in terms of creative discovery (Dodd, 2007, pp.112-121).
The details of these arguments are not relevant here (there will be space to engage with
them in later chapters). What is important is that what one philosopher takes as data
to be explained, another can take as misguided theory to be overturned.
We can carry this line of thought further, however. For in order to reject the creata-
bility of musical works on the grounds that it is overruled by theory (and thus reject
it as data to be explained), both Dodd and Kivy must have some additional data that
they take to be addressed by their theories. David Davies suggests, rightly I think, that
Dodd's work aims primarily to explain the repeatability and audibility of works of mu-
sic (Davies, 2009, p.162). However, the same question asked of Levinson's creatability
requirement could be asked again here. How are we to be sure that repeatability and
audibility are not themselves mere products of a folk theory, to be rejected if a better
theory is found? It might seem surprising to the uninitiated that even the repeatability
and audibility of works of music could be rejected in light of new theory, but that is
precisely the move that has been made by Davies. Davies has thoroughly defended a
theory of all art works, including works of music, as being compositional action-tokens.
The work itself is an unrepeatable `generative performance' (Davies, 2004, p.152) which
gives rise to the thing that we normally identify as the work, which itself is in fact just
the `focus of appreciation' (Davies, 2004, p.26) or what he also calls the `work product'
(Davies, 2004, p.97).
To reach this conclusion, it is clear that Davies must reject much of what Dodd and
Kivy take as data to be explained, and in turn replace it with further information that
6See e.g. Dodd (2000), Dodd (2007) and Kivy (1993).
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provides the focus of the enquiry. Davies is actually quite explicit about this, and his
methodological suggestion will be discussed in more depth shortly. Again, though, what
is directly relevant here is that Walton's suggestion that we construct theories that best
explain the data appears to be subject to serious disagreement about what counts as
the relevant data. If we are to know how to move forward, it seems a signiﬁcant amount
of further methodological guidance is needed.
One way to make the most of Walton's advice might be to ask that philosophers
are completely explicit about the data they take themselves to be explaining. With
the data made explicit we might then ﬁnd that theories that appeared to be at odds
were really just theories that addressed diﬀerent phenomena. However, things are not
so straightforward when what are being proposed are ontological accounts of familiar
entities. Though the above theories lean on diﬀerent data as basic and in need of
explanation, they all purport to oﬀer ontological accounts of the same (or overlapping)
subject matter. Thus Walton's proposal is complicated further, for the ontologist is
engaged in a two-step process. The subject matter is ﬁrst speciﬁed, and then decisions
are made as to what is most central, and thus what counts as `data', for an ontological
account of such entities. The fact that all of the above theories are intended as theories
that account for works of music means that the theories cannot simply be reconciled as
being explanations of diﬀerent data. Of course, no theorist wishes to `change the subject'
(even Goodman, presumably, took himself to be explaining something that he saw as of
central importance to musical notation), and all take themselves to be explaining what
they suppose is most central, or most important to our ordinary concept. The problem
arises because there is signiﬁcant disagreement about what is in fact most central or
most important. There is disagreement about what is data and what is folk theory.
Davies on the Pragmatic Constraint
I have already made reference to Davies' theory of artworks as compositional action-
tokens and suggested that in arriving at such a theory, Davies is making assumptions
about what is to be taken as `data' that diﬀer from other theorists such as Dodd. Davies
is quite explicit about this, and I will now turn to considering Davies' methodological
claims in more detail. Signiﬁcantly, Davies provides reasons for thinking that his under-
standing of the relevant data is correct. Thus if Walton's proposal still leaves us with
the question of what counts as data and what counts as folk theory, Davies' methodol-
ogy can be seen as oﬀering an answer. However, I will argue that Davies' constraint is
at best irrelevant to the ontological project of this thesis, and at worst ill suited even
for Davies' own purposes.
Initially, Davies' claims to be guided primarily by what he calls the Pragmatic Con-
straint (PC):
Artworks must be entities that can bear the sorts of properties rightly as-
cribed to what are termed `works' in our reﬂective critical and appreciative
practice; that are individuated in the way such `works' are or would be indi-
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viduated, and that have the modal properties that are reasonably ascribed
to `works' in that practice. (Davies, 2004, p.18)
Davies takes this to be at least the beginnings of a constraint on what we should take
as the relevant data in need of explanation by an ontological proposal. He later writes
that [t]o oﬀer an ontology of art not subject to the pragmatic constraint would be to
change the subject, rather than answer the questions that motivate philosophical aes-
thetics (Davies, 2004, p.21). At ﬁrst blush, there are two things that we can note about
this proposal. The ﬁrst is that appealing to what is rightly ascribed and reasonably
ascribed to works of art leaves plenty of room still for disagreement and manoeuvre.
How are we to know what properties it is right or reasonable to ascribe, and what
considerations should weigh in on this? Moreover, might it not be that what counts
as a rightly ascribed property depends itself on the correct ontology? In other words,
the diﬃculty of distinguishing theory from data encountered above is still very much
present. Secondly, we might wonder what the questions are that motivate philosoph-
ical aesthetics, and why the relevant question is not merely of the form `what is the
ontological nature of . . . .?'
Looking for answers to these questions we can turn to a more recent paper by Davies
(Davies, 2009). Here Davies argues more explicitly that it is our practice as a whole
(2009, p.162) and our practice taken holistically (2009, p.163) that should constrain
our ontology:
[I]t is our practice that has primacy and that must be foundational for our
ontological endeavours, because it is practice that determines what kinds of
properties, in general, artworks must have. (Davies, 2009, p.162)
So far, however, we are no closer to an answer to the puzzle raised by Walton's view.
Are we to take all of our `practice' as data to be explained? What if the best theory
of certain aspects of our practice overturns other aspects of our practice? Davies' own
theory, as he is well aware, is incompatible with some of this practice. He notes, for
example, that a commitment to the repeatability of musical works is implicit in our
comparative assessment of diﬀerent performances of a work (Davies, 2009, p.163).
Davies is quite willing to reject this practice in the light of his theory, and one might
well wonder why other practice (that which leads him to conclude that works of music
are non-repeatable action-tokens) takes precedence here. If the pragmatic constraint
leaves us merely explaining some practice and rejecting other practice in light of theory,
it seems we are no better oﬀ in choosing between data and folk theory than we were
after Walton's proposal. The pragmatic constraint as stated is too broad and open to
interpretation to oﬀer any detailed methodological guidance.
However, Davies' choice is not entirely un-principled. Of all the beliefs and practices
surrounding works of art, Davies stresses in particular our critical and appreciative
engagement with works (Davies, 2009, p.163). Davies therefore focuses on our prac-
tices of aesthetic appreciation and criticism at the expense of our normal beliefs about
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identifying and picking out works of art. Andrew Kania has noticed this, remarking
that Davies leaves out of his constraint any reference to our pre-theoretical views about
the ontology of artworks (Kania, 2008, p.431).7 In other words, the data that Davies
regards as being in need of explanation is our ordinary aesthetically-oriented practice of
appreciating artworks as works of art. Why is this of particular importance? Because,
Davies argues, our philosophical interest in artworks arises out of, and is an attempt to
better understand, that practice (Davies, 2009, p.163).8 As such, Davies argues, no
acceptable ontology can require that we revise the basic conception of artistic appreci-
ation to be found in that practice, for it is only by reference to this conception that we
can get any ﬁrm grip on the very subject of the ontology of art (Davies, 2009, p.163).
In light of this, I suggest a more accurate interpretation of Davies' approach would be
not as a pragmatic constraint, but as an aesthetic constraint, which might be something
like the following:
(AC) Artworks must be entities that can bear all or many of the properties we reason-
ably attribute to `works' in the process of aesthetic criticism and appreciation,
because it is this aesthetic practice that motivates our interest as philosophers.
If this is a sensible clariﬁcation of Davies' methodology (though note that there is still
a lack of clarity in the notion of `reasonable attribution'), then we are in a position to
more accurately assess the merits of Davies' approach. Davies assumes that the data
to be explained by Walton's philosophical theory construction is, in the ontology art,
the speciﬁcally aesthetic data. After all, Davies might say, isn't this what made us
interested the ontology of art in the ﬁrst place? Davies seems to be saying that it is
this aesthetic practice that, speaking loosely, deﬁnes the subject matter.
One response available here is to emphasise the fact that the ontological enquiry un-
dertaken in this thesis is not principally motivated by aesthetic concerns. The ontologi-
cal enquiry undertaken in this thesis is motivated by the puzzle of artefact repeatability.
Consequently, even if Davies can show that when artists and critics make aesthetic
claims they are actually, all things considered, talking about the compositional action
tokens of artists, there will still be an ontological puzzle about repeatability left to be
solved, because Davies will not have shown that there are no repeatable entities.
Digressing to non-repetables for a moment, note that in arguing that all artworks
are action tokens Davies is not making the extraordinary claim that the physical object
that we normally call a painting does not exist. Davies would merely regard such an
item as the `focus of appreciation' rather than the work itself. But whatever it is that
is made of canvas and paint and hangs in the gallery, even if it turns out it should not
be called the `artwork', still calls for a place in our ontology, and presumably would
fall under the ontology of created ordinary physical objects along with tables, houses
and jam jars. In a parallel manner, the puzzling ontology of repeatable artefacts still
calls for an account whatever one thinks of Davies' location of the artwork in artists'
7See also Stecker (2009, p.337) for a similar point.
8See also Davies (2004, p.21).
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generative actions.
The upshot of arguing in this way is that even if Davies' methodological constraint
is acceptable for his project, it oﬀers no help to the ontological investigation carried
out here. However, I think even this concedes too much to Davies. The reason is
that while Davies is perfectly free to stipulate that his aim is to explain our aesthetic
practice, or even to locate the object of proper artistic appreciation, it is far less clear
that in doing so he can claim to be describing the true nature of those entities that
we normally take to be works of art  those pieces of music, novels, and photographs
with which we are so familiar. One reason for thinking this is that the fact that artists
and critics have aesthetic views about certain objects seems, at least sometimes, to be
accidental to those objects. Suppose a stone tablet is unearthed in an archaeological
dig. The artefact may be the subject of a great deal of discussion before art historians
start considering it as art and attending to it aesthetically. It would be surprising if, as
soon as this happened, the subject of the investigation was redeﬁned by their aesthetic
criticism and appreciation. More importantly, however, having a primary interest in
aesthetic practice does not, it seems, provide a good enough argument for thinking that
the entity referred to by the name `Emma' or `Beethoven's Fifth' or `Les Demoiselles
d'Avignon' is ﬁxed by that aesthetic practice alone. There is simply too much other
practice (practice that directly contradicts Davies own ontological conclusion) that can
lay claim to being ontologically relevant.
To conclude this section, it seems that Davies' argument is ultimately unsuccessful
in solving the puzzle raised by Walton's account of theory construction, and so unsuc-
cessful in establishing a principled middle ground between unfettered revisionism and
descriptivism. An interest in aesthetic practice is not enough to establish the claim that
aesthetic practice alone must guide an ontology. Of course, the nail in the coﬃn for
Davies' methodological constraint would be an argument that showed that it is precisely
data other than the critical and appreciative aesthetic practice that must be accounted
for by an ontological proposal. Just such an argument has been put forward by Amie
Thomasson. In the rest of this chapter and the whole of the next, I will argue that
Thomasson's argument succeeds where Davies' argument fails.
1.2. Thomasson's Methodological Argument
In a number of recent articles and chapters, Amie Thomasson has sought to provide
guidance on the methodological issue by appealing to the mechanisms of reference ﬁxing.
Thomasson argues that if we think about how it is that a term for some kind of entity
comes to refer to that entity, we will see that there are certain aspects of the conceptions
of ordinary language users about which they cannot be shown to be in error. According
to this view, what we must account for as philosophers is not necessarily that which
is most central or most important to the folk concept, but rather the aspects of that
concept that determine the reference of the terms the folk use. The argument, taken
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principally from her (2005) and (2006), can be summarised as follows.9
Thomasson begins by suggesting that, either implicitly or explicitly, many ontologists
have adopted the discovery view of ontological investigation (Thomasson, 2005, p.221).
Accordingly, any proposition concerning a particular entity is available to be discovered
to be either true or false. Thomasson suggests that such a view is bolstered by causal
theories of reference which allow us to become acquainted with entities so that we
may go on to investigate their true nature, which may turn out to be at odds with our
concepts or initial presuppositions (Thomasson, 2005, p.222). However, this view of
how our terms come to refer as they do faces what has been called the qua problem.
Appealing to the work of Devitt and Sterelny (1987), Thomasson argues that the qua
problem shows that a term cannot come to refer determinately just in virtue of causal
acquaintance because for any act in which a name is given to that object, there will
always be numerous kinds of entity present. Which of these actually does become
the object of reference, Thomasson argues, must therefore depend on the language user
having a conception of what sort of thing they intend to pick out. Thomasson writes that
external context alone is inadequate to determine what our terms refer to (Thomasson,
2006, p.258) and elsewhere that without some disambiguating concept specifying the
sort of kind to be picked out, we cannot unambiguously ground reference to any kind
(Thomasson, 2005, p.222). Thus instead of a pure causal theory, Thomasson promotes
a hybrid theory of reference (Thomasson, 2007b, p.38). Reference is ﬁxed partly
by causal relationships and partly by `competent grounders' having some knowledge
of what sort of thing they intend to refer to. The methodological consequences that
Thomasson draws from this are best described in the following passage:
As a result, at least a background concept of the ontology of the work of art
is needed to establish the reference of terms like `painting' or `symphony.'
Such concepts determine the ontological kind, if any, picked out by the
term, and so the ontology of the work of art must be something we learn
about through conceptual analysis of the associated concepts of people who
competently ground (and reground) the reference of terms like `symphony'
and `painting,' not something we can seek to discover through investigations
into mind-independent reality. Moreover, competent grounders cannot (as
a whole) be massively ignorant of or in error about the ontological nature
of the art-kind they refer to since their concepts are determinative of this.
(Thomasson, 2005, p.223)
The phrase `background concept of the ontology' in the above quote is potentially mis-
leading, and should not be taken to imply that ordinary language users have an explicit
ontological theory in mind when they use a term to refer. Elsewhere Thomasson is
clearer about what it means to have an associated concept. According to Thomas-
son, the associated concept that ﬁxes the reference of a term is a `categorical concept'
that may be tacitly held (Thomasson, 2007b, p.43). Having a categorical concept that
9Similar versions of this argument also appear in her (2004), (2007a) and (2007b) Chapter 2.
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disambiguates reference involves having a tacit understanding of application conditions
for the term and co-application conditions for the term. The application conditions
are conditions conceptually relevant to the proper application of the term in various
scenarios  i.e. the conditions in which one might correctly identify the referent. The
co-application conditions, on the other hand, specify under what conditions the term
would be applied again to one and the same entity (Thomasson, 2007b, pp.39-40).
As I have indicated, I am broadly sympathetic to Thomasson's argument here. How-
ever, the issues raised are complex and controversial and deserve close scrutiny. For the
rest of this chapter my aim will be to draw out some of the crucial points of Thomas-
son's account and expand the argument in key areas.10 Before doing that, however,
it is worth making explicit how Thomasson's proposal promises to provide the needed
constraint on the data to be explained by an ontological proposal. The problem we
found with Walton's appeal to theory construction was that we still need some further
way of deciding what counts as data to be explained by a philosophical theory, and
what counts as an aspect of the folk theory which may later be rejected. This problem
is exacerbated by ontological projects that take themselves to be constructing theories
of the ontological nature of some pre-established entity or kind of entity. Here we need
to know what counts as the relevant data for an ontological theory that aims to account
for those speciﬁc entities. Thomasson's proposal seeks to answer this by showing that
if we have some speciﬁc entity in mind about which we wish to provide an ontology, the
relevant data is the conceptual content of language users that itself ﬁxes the reference of
those terms to those entities. More precisely, it is the tacit knowledge of the application
and co-application conditions for the terms.
If this account is right then any proposal that overrides these application and co-
application conditions will be guilty of literally changing the subject. Davies' ontological
theory of works of art provides a likely example. According to Davies' theory, `Les
Demoiselles d'Avignon' can only be correctly applied to a compositional action in the
past. If so, the conditions under which it is right to apply and re-apply the name
change radically. For a start it will never be possible to walk into a gallery, point at a
canvas covered in paint, and say `That is Les Demoiselles d'Avignon.' Ordinarily, I
assume, we take it that that is exactly the kind of scenario in which one might correctly
apply the name. For it to be a correct use of the name other facts must also obtain,
of course. Davies may try to respond by saying that the only relevant fact is just
whether or not the ostended object is Les Demoiselles d'Avignon. However, if
10Note that there is an aspect of Thomasson's metaphysical approach that I am not adopting here.
Thomasson argues in a number of places that we can draw ontological conclusions only to the extent
that they are settled by conceptual analysis, and that questions that are not settled by this process
are unanswerable and are `ontologically shallow' (Thomasson, 2005, p.227). I agree with Thomasson
that some of the questions she mentions, such as what percentage of the paint in a painting may
be replaced in restoration while preserving the same painting, are unanswerable. I do not think
that ontological theorising can artiﬁcially remove such indeterminacy. However, on my view there
is still room for ontological theory to provide some answers beyond conceptual analysis by drawing
on broader theory and principles, and by looking to provide ontological explanation. My account
of the persistence of repeatable artefacts in 4.7 is an example of this.
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Thomasson's argument is right then that rejoinder is unavailable, for the term `Les
Demoiselles d'Avignon' only has the reference it does have because of tacit knowledge
of what criteria are relevant to applying the term. This criterion cannot itself appeal to
which object is Les Demoiselles d'Avignon without the criteria of reference being
circular. Thus, if this is right, Davies' theory cannot be an accurate theory of the
ontological nature of Les Demoiselles d'Avignon. At best he can argue that the
entities he describes are what art critics should be (or even, on occasion, are) interested
in. He cannot say that the compositional action token is what we have been referring
in all along when we use a name such as `Les Demoiselles d'Avignon'. When critical
and referential practices conﬂict, the methodological account defended here argues that
referential practice wins out.
We are therefore steered away from the end of the scale that allows highly revisionary
theories, where that revision involves large scale changes to the actual and hypothetical
use of terms. However, the constraint has important limitations, allowing plenty of
room still for ontological manoeuvre. For example, we can expect that there may often
be multiple ontological theories compatible with the same careful analysis of application
and co-application conditions. In this case, facing the metaphysical equivalent to the
problem of under-determination in science, other factors such simplicity, explanatory
power, coherence, and ﬁt with other theories will be especially relevant. Furthermore,
it is entirely possible that a theory compatible with the conceptual analysis defended
here will yield additional results that are surprising or unexpected, if only because they
had never been given much prior thought.
Thomasson's account promises a signiﬁcant result, then. Rather than philosophers
merely defending their theories on the grounds that those theories explain what they
take to be most central or most important, or even on the grounds that they succeed in
accounting for more of the folk beliefs than competing theories, what we have here is
an independent argument for why one particular aspect of our folk conceptual content
must be accounted for by ontological theory.
It is worth noting from the start that the way Thomasson sets up her methodological
position runs the risk of targeting a straw man. Thomasson argues that many philoso-
phers have implicitly adopted the discovery view of ontological investigation. As we
saw above, however, very few are likely to accept entirely unfettered revisionism. Put
in terms of Walton's theory construction, a quick survey of the ontological oﬀerings
suggests that most, if not all, philosophers take themselves to be constructing theories
that account for or explain some existing phenomenon or data. The problem, as we saw,
is that there seems to be little agreement about what this data should be. However,
this should not detract from the important result of Thomasson's argument. What is
important is not the general point that some pre-theoretical data must be accommo-
dated by an ontological theory, but that there is an argument rooted in semantics and
reference which clariﬁes why this is the case and at the same time tells what the relevant
data is.
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1.3. The Qua Problem and Causal Theories
With Thomasson's argument set out, and the case for its contribution to the method-
ological debate made, I now want to assess key parts of the argument in further detail
and defend the general position against objections. That task begins by looking at
causal theories of reference and the qua problem. Thomasson's argument moves very
quickly from the potential problems of a casual theory of reference to a `hybrid the-
ory', which itself underpins her account of the conceptual content that ﬁxes reference.
However, the speed at which the argument moves obscures some of the subtleties of
the issues raised, and the plausibility of the argument rests on drawing these out. In
particular I will argue that more care needs to be taken to understand the relevance of
the qua problem to causal theories. The cogency of the argument depends signiﬁcantly
on how we understand the notion of a causal theory being challenged. In what follows
I will set out four diﬀerent interpretations of the role of causal chains in reference and
assess ﬁrstly the extent to which they provide any obstacle to the kind of conceptual
analysis that Thomasson proposes, and secondly the extent to which the qua-problem
constitutes an eﬀective counter argument.
One of the key points to make in the following discussion involves the distinction be-
tween epistemic determination of reference and metaphsyical determination of reference.
Epistemic determination of reference concerns our ability to know, to some degree, what
we are referring to. Metaphysical determination, on the other hand, is determination in
the more usual sense of what makes it the case that we refer as we do. Thomasson seems
to be concerned primarily with metaphysical determination and the interplay between
causal theories and conceptual content. Her argument, much abridged, is that causal
theories alone cannot (metaphysically) determine reference, so some reliable conceptual
content is needed, or in other words, that without reliable conceptual content, reference
is not determined. However, once we make the distinction between metaphysical and
epistemic determination, we will see that what is needed for conceptual analysis is a
commitment to conceptual content that epistemically determines reference. The qua
problem is then only relevant and eﬀective when understood in that context.
The reason that epistemic determination matters to conceptual analysis more than
metaphysical determination can be put as follows. What conceptual analysis of this
sort is committed to is the claim that language users have a tacit understanding of
the application and co-application conditions for their terms. Language users must
therefore be able to `know' something about the referent of their terms.11 They must
then have conceptual content that epistemically determines the referent. Whether this
conceptual content also metaphysically determines the referent, is a distinct, though
related, question.
The interpretations of the causal theory divide into two groups. On the one hand a
causal theory can be understood as claiming that reference is metaphysically determined
11The kind of knowledge mentioned here should be understood broadly. It is not, of course, proposi-
tional knowledge about the referent.
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by real causal chains, and thus not determined by the conceptual content of language
users. This category can then be further divided into two. Firstly (1) such causal
chains can be taken to operate independently of any knowledge or ability on the part
of language users, so that not only is conceptual content metaphysically irrelevant,
but also epistemically irrelevant. Secondly, (2) the causal chains can be interpreted as
metaphysically determining reference by being causally responsible for language users
possessing certain discriminating knowledge of the referent.
On the other hand, the idea that reference is metaphysically determined by causal
chains may be rejected in place of the view that reference is metaphysically determined
at least in part by the conceptual content of language users. Here the causal chains are
brought in elsewhere. They may be (3) thought of as simply bringing it about that a
term refers as it does, though the causal chains are not what reference itself consists in,
in the same way that an accident may bring it about that I have a bruise, though the
accident is not what having the bruise consists in. Or they may be (4) included as part
of the reference determining conceptual content of language users.
Account (1) is the account most similar to the causal theory that Thomasson sets
herself up against. However, we will see that the qua problem as used by Thomasson
does not constitute an eﬀective argument against this kind of causal theory. If this
theory is to be rejected as part of a defence of conceptual analysis, a further argument
is needed. I will outline such an argument.
Accounts (2) and (3), on the other hand, do not pose a threat to conceptual analysis
and so the relevance of the qua problem is immaterial. Finally, account (4) is both
a problem for conceptual analysis and is a position against which the qua problem
constitutes an eﬀective argument.
(1) Pure Externalism
The ﬁrst account of a causal theory to be considered has it that many of our terms refer
just in virtue of some mind-independent external causal links connecting the term with
the object referred to. Here what it is for a term to refer is for certain causal chains
to obtain, and reference occurs independently of any conceptual content, knowledge,
or ability of competent language users. The following quote from Thomasson suggests
that this is the kind of causal theory she has in mind:
[C]ausal theories of reference, at least in their pure form, have led many to
hope that the meanings of terms can be understood as determined not at all
by the concepts of competent speakers, but rather purely by a real causal
relationship to things in the world...(Thomasson, 2007b, p.38)
A similar account is sometimes suggested in the literature. Describing a causal theory,
Harrison suggests it implies a connection that runs directly from expression to object
(Harrison, 1979, p.160). Assertions to this eﬀect are often made in conjunction with a
disavowal of a description theory of reference ﬁxing (according to which a term refers
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to whatever ﬁts some associated description), as if the failure of that theory implied
that reference must therefore be ﬁxed in this mind-independent way. For example,
Hilary Kornblith claims that it is now widely accepted that proper names and natural
kind terms do not refer in virtue of associated deﬁnite descriptions; rather, these terms
refer in virtue of some real connection between the user of the terms and an individual
or kind of stuﬀ (Kornblith, 1980, p.109). Devitt and Sterelny similarly write that
the basic idea of causal theories of reference . . . is that a term refers to whatever is
causally linked to it in a certain way, a way that does not require the speaker to have
identifying knowledge of the referent (Devitt and Sterelny, 1987, p.55). Call this view
`pure externalism'.
It is clear that pure externalism would not allow any kind of reliable a priori analysis
of conceptual content. On this view all such conceptual content reﬂects merely our
fallible beliefs about an entity. Exactly which entity these beliefs are about is settled
independently. It seems plausible, therefore, in conjunction with the quote above, that
Thomasson takes herself to be arguing against just such a theory.
Thomasson's account responds to such a theory by appealing to the qua problem.
According to the kind of causal theory suggested, what makes it the case that `Moses'
refers to Moses is that there is a causal-historical chain running back from our use of the
term to the ﬁrst uses of the term when the name was `grounded' on that actual person
referred to. The qua problem is then supposed to challenge this view by pointing out
that whenever a new term is given to an entity in a process of `grounding' or `baptism'
there will always be numerous diﬀerent kinds of entity present. Hence every instance
of causal contact with Moses is both too broad and too narrow to independently ﬁx
reference to Moses. It is too broad because every case of contact with Moses will also
be a case of contact with many other things, including parts of Moses, events, states of
aﬀairs and fusions of matter. Why is the name not `grounded' in any of these things
instead? Causal contact is also too narrow, because, for example, any encounter with
Moses is a direct encounter with only a time slice of Moses. How does the name refer
to Moses qua whole object rather than just to a time slice of Moses?12 The qua
problem thus calls into question the causal theory by claiming that the causal theory
leaves reference radically indeterminate.
Thomasson's response to this, following Devitt and Sterelny, is to conclude that when
a term is `grounded' to an object, the speaker must have some very basic concept of
what sort of thing (broadly speaking) they intend to refer to (Thomasson, 2007b, p.64).
Thus `Moses' is grounded on Moses-the-whole-person rather than on a time slice of
Moses or on Moses' torso because the grounders of the term had a basic concept of what
sort of thing they intended to name (as displayed in their understanding of application
and co-application conditions of `Moses'). Reference determination is therefore a hybrid
with both an external causal element and a conceptual element.
12See Devitt and Sterelny (1987, p.63).
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I agree with Thomasson that this kind of causal theory should be rejected. I will
discuss the reasons for this shortly. What I want to argue ﬁrst, however, is that the qua
problem as appealed to by Thomasson does not constitute an argument against pure
externalism. To see why, recall that the qua problem states that when a person gives
a name to an entity, there will always be numerous kinds of entity present, and so the
argument is made that the causal theory alone leaves reference indeterminate. On the
pure externalist view just set out, however, the fact that there are many kinds of entity
present at any act of baptism or grounding need not be a cause for concern. According
to this theory, the term refers just in virtue of external causal links. The presence of
many potential causal sources does not jeopardise there being one actual causal source
any more than there being many balloons in a room causes a problem for the claim that
the piece of string I am holding is tied to just one of them.
The pure externalist can respond to the qua problem then by saying that it doesn't
matter that there are a great number of potential causal links available, since as a matter
of fact, the term refers as it does just in virtue of the one that is actual causal link. Nor
does it matter that the grounder of the term failed to specify which was to be the relevant
causal link when the term was grounded, since reference, on this view, is something that
obtains independently of the language users' knowledge or ability. The argument from
the qua problem goes wrong, it could be conjectured, in that it mistakes epistemic
uncertainty with metaphysical uncertainty. According to pure extenalism, reference is
metaphysically determined by causal chains, and all the qua problem highlights is an
epistemic indeterminacy. When asked how it is that `Moses' refers to Moses and not
to a time slice of Moses, the pure externlist can shrug their shoulders and say that if
`Moses' refers to Moses as a whole person, it is in virtue of (i.e. it is metaphysically
determined by) external links between the name and `Moses' and the whole person -
end of story.13
Thus we have a causal account that Thomasson clearly needs to reject to defend
her claims, and which she seems to be targeting, but against which the qua problem,
as it has been put by Thomasson and prior to that by Devitt and Sterelny, is not a
suﬃcient argument. If this is the kind of causal theory Thomasson has in mind, then
her argument from the qua problem is unsound.
If we are to arrive at Thomasson's conclusions, we need an alternative argument
against pure externalism. Fortunately, however, there are other good reasons for re-
jecting this pure externalist theory. I will argue that the pure externalist theory should
be rejected because by entirely separating conceptual content from reference, it make
reference radically epistemically inscrutable. Though it claims metaphysical determi-
nacy, by suggesting radical epistemic inscrutability it makes reference impossible. To
see this, note that if what a word refers to is a fact that obtains independently of any
knowledge or ability of language users, we would be in a situation in which we would
never know or be able to ﬁnd out what our terms refer to. The problem is not just that
13Of course, it cannot actually be the end of the story, as I argue below.
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we could not know a priori, but that we could not come to know anything at all. This
is because to gain any a posteriori knowledge about a subject that we take ourselves
to be referring to, we need some reliable place to start. Without any kind of initial
knowledge or ability, broadly speaking, with regard to a referring term, any a posteriori
search for knowledge about the subject would be unguided, and would be as likely to
lead us to false information as to true information.
It might be responded that we could uncover the referent of a term by investigating
the relevant causal-historical chains. Couldn't we just `follow the string back to the
relevant balloon', to pick up on a previous analogy? In some cases this might seem
plausible. After all, don't we sometimes ﬁnd out who a name refers to by looking into
the history of the name? However, if we take the claims of pure externalism seriously,
even this would be impossible, the trouble being that we would never know what counted
as the correct causal history, and so never know that we had followed the chain back to
the right entity. We cannot appeal to the knowledge or intentions of previous language
users to guide the investigation, because they may be wholly mistaken, according to
this view. Note that even if we were present at the initial grounding of the term onto
the entity, we would still not know what the term had been grounded on because we
would still not know which causal chain was relevant.
As such, on this view, a whole language community may be universally and system-
atically mistaken about what a term in their language refers to and how and when the
term should be used. For all we could know according to this view, `red' may refer to
the colour blue, and `blue' to the colour red. Thus in practice, all our referring terms
would be useless as we would never know which proposition a sentence containing them
expressed. That the pure externalist theory looks, in this light, so highly implausible
is not a consequence of how I have described it (except insofar as I have drawn out the
commitments), but a consequence of the fact that it so seriously mis-characterises how
it is that terms in our language relate to objects in the world.
I said that qua problem as described is unsuccessful here, but it worth noting that a
close cousin of the qua-problem is relevant. This is because we may run a version of the
qua problem as an epistemic problem rather than a problem about what metaphysically
determines reference. Even here, though, the crucial step in the argument is not the
epistemic qua problem, but the claim that complete epistemic indeterminacy is deeply
problematic for a theory of reference. I think this epistemic problem is quite distinct
from the problem of indeterminacy that Thomasson actually appeals to. The pure
externalist theory can and should be rejected, but if Thomasson had such a theory in
mind, she chose an argument unﬁt for the purpose.
(2) Causal Chains and Reliable Content
The above view had it that reference is metaphysically determined by external causal
chains, but is radically epistemically indeterminate. An alternative view may be adopted,
however, according to which reference is similarly metaphysically determined by exter-
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nal causal chains, but which holds that what lies at the `eﬀect' end of such causal chains
is not just that the term refers, but that we have certain discriminating knowledge or
ability with respect to the referent.
A theory of this sort is suggested by Richard Miller (1992) as part of an attempt to
give a purely causal solution to the qua problem. His claim is that the sample upon
which the term is grounded causes the reliable ability to discriminate the kind in virtue
of its membership in that kind itself. He formulates this more precisely as:
The speaker S can use his perceptual contact with x to ground `N' on the
kind Q if x qua Q causes S to acquire the reliable ability to discriminate Qs.
(Miller, 1992, p.429)
Miller takes it that entities themselves, qua entities of one sort or another, have unique
causal powers that can determine reference. As such we can walk away from a grounding
situation referring to kangaroos rather than marsupials, to use one of Miller's examples,
because the kangaroo qua kangaroo caused the reliable ability to discriminate kanga-
roos. Similarly, we refer to Moses rather than a time slice of Moses because the causal
powers of Moses qua whole person caused our ability to reliably discriminate Moses.
Miller indicates that he believes that reference to Q consists not in the reliable ability
but in the causal chains themselves. If so, we have a view according to which reference
is determined by causal chains, but where causal reference always goes hand in hand
with language users having some `discriminating ability'. What is it to have a reliable
discriminating ability? It can't be that one is never or even nearly never mistaken in
using a term. This simply doesn't stand up to real world examples. A farmer can
name a lamb with unusual markings and use those markings to identify the lamb on
future occasions, even if unbeknownst to him a lamb with nearly identical markings
from a nearby farm has wandered into his ﬁelds. He will misidentify his own lamb as
much as half the time yet refer to it nevertheless. More plausibly the relevant kind
of discriminating knowledge might be taken to be something very much like Thomas-
son's understanding of application and co-application conditions  roughly speaking, an
understanding of what counts, or would count, as using the term correctly.
Miller heads towards this view later in the paper. He considers the now familiar
`disjunction problem' which is also a problem for his view.14 The disjunction problem
arises because it seems that what is gained is not a reliable ability to discriminate
kangaroos, but a reliable ability to discriminate the disjunctive class of kangaroos and
things that look like kangaroos. How then does `kangaroo' not refer to this larger class?
Miller suggests that here we pick out the right causal chain counterfactually (Miller,
1992, p.433). In other words, we appeal to what we would say given certain situations.
Moreover, our recognitional capacity includes the disposition to explore the object
thoroughly and use our full perceptual resources to check and cross check our initial
impressions (Miller, 1992, p.434). Thus the kind of conceptual ability associated with
14The disjunction problem has been raised for early accounts of this sort, such as Dretske (1981), and
Fodor (1990). Miller's account is clearly heavily indebted to these views.
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referring is, on Miller's account, quite substantive. In any case, this view is committed
to some reliable ability or knowledge relating language users to the entities they refer
to.
What is important is that this view does not attempt to open up a gap between the
reference ﬁxing mechanisms and the knowledge or ability of competent language users,
at least broadly understood. One could hold a theory of reference of this sort and yet
still agree that an ontology must be guided by an analysis of conceptual content on
the grounds that that content is a causal product of referring to that entity  it is an
epistemtically reliable guide to what is referred to, even if the content itself doesn't
metaphysically determine reference. The position Thomasson is interested in defending
holds that conceptual content determines reference, and an analysis of that content
must therefore guide an ontology if the account is to avoid changing the subject. But
clearly epistemic determination is suﬃcient for this argument to work. This is a point
that Thomasson has either failed to pick up on, or has failed to make clear. Miller has
therefore oﬀered a causal solution to the qua problem that still has a central place for
conceptual content. In fact, I have signiﬁcant doubts about the plausibility of Miller's
account of what it is to refer, but those doubts need not be addressed here because the
accuracy or inaccuracy of Miller's suggestion has no bearing on the role of conceptual
analysis.15 At the most, if Miller is right he can object to Thomasson's claim that
conceptual content metaphysically determines reference. What he cannot object to
is the claim that it epistemically determines reference. As far as conceptual analysis
is concerned, metaphysical reference determination is beside the point; what matters
is whether or not a given theory of reference accommodates epistemic determination
(and as we saw with the ﬁrst theory, any theory that rejects epistemic determination is
unworkable).
(3) Causal Chains with a Metasemantic Role
The two interpretations of the causal theory suggested above operated on the assump-
tion that reference is metaphysically determined by causal chains. It is possible to reject
this assumption and still hold a place for causal chains. The following two accounts hold
that reference is at least partly metaphysically determined by the conceptual content
of language users.
According to the ﬁrst of this second pair, causal chains are taken out of a theory of
reference entirely. One way to put this is that the causal chains here bring it about
that I refer as I do rather than make it the case that I refer as I do. They are causally
responsible for the fact that the term refers, but do not themselves constitute that fact
(as the fall may be causally responsible for the broken leg, though the occurence of the
fall and its causal role are not what having a broken leg consists in.) When I use `Moses'
in a sentence I refer to Moses because of a series of causal chains going back, ultimately,
15My doubts lie in the viability of appealing to causation as something metaphysically capable of
determining reference in this mind independent way. See e.g. Anderson (1993).
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to Moses, but my reference to Moses cannot be reduced to those causal chains. On this
view the causal chains do not explain what my referring amounts to, they merely give
a causal explanation for why I now do actually refer in that way.
Such a view is suggested by Joseph Almog (1984). Almog argues that causal historical
links between uses of a word serve merely to pass on the semantic value of that word.
If the word is a referring term, then what is passed on is that the word refers as it does.
The causal chains on this view have nothing to do with what it is for the word to refer as
it does, i.e. they are not part of a theory of reference at all, and so have a metasemantic
rather than a semantic role (Almog, 1984, p.486). I think this interpretation of the
causal theory is, at least in some cases, relatively uncontroversial. In every case we
might ask how a term came to refer as it does (note: not how it does refer as it does),
and in some of those cases it seems plausible to give a causal account.
Crucially, though, this understanding of a causal theory need not deny that terms
refer as they do in virtue of associated conceptual content. It merely gives a story about
where that reference determining content came from. As such, this interpretation of the
causal theory can be passed over quite quickly. Its merits are not relevant to a defence
of Thomasson's conclusion.
(4) Causal Descriptivism
Some passages in the text notwithstanding, it is possible that Thomasson had a fourth
causal theory in mind that again does not attempt to separate the mechanisms of ref-
erence from the abilities or conceptual content of language users. Such a theory, like
the one immediately above, makes reference determination a matter of the conceptual
content of language users. However, it holds that this knowledge and ability sometimes
just involves appeals to causal chains. As such one need not have any further discrimi-
nating conceptual content for the term to refer determinately. For instance, on this view
`Moses' refers to Moses because competent users intend the term to refer to whatever
lies at the end of a particular causal chain of use. Similarly `water' refers to water be-
cause we associate with `water' the intention to refer to the stuﬀ causally present at the
grounding of that term. Here (contra Thomasson's description of the causal theory) the
meanings of our terms, and the reference of those terms, is determined by the concepts
of competent speakers. Nevertheless, this causal theory would stand opposed to the use
of conceptual analysis to guide an ontology because the reference determining concepts
of speakers merely involve appeal to a certain causal-history and thus reference requires
no a priori ontologically relevant conceptual content.
This causal theory avoids many of the pitfalls of pure externalism. Reference is not
epistemically inscrutable, it seems, because we as language users specify the relevant
causal chains, and our use of the terms is guided by our knowledge of the relevant causal
chains. The metaphysical determinacy itself depends on epistemic determinacy. Fred-
erick Kroon has defended a theory of this sort under the name of casual descriptivism
which is the view that what names refer to is determined by descriptions couched in
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causal terms (Kroon, 1987, p.1). It is worth noting a terminological issue here. Kroon
describes his theory as a kind of descriptivism, and it is often assumed that a trademark
of description theories is that associated descriptions form part of the semantic content
or meaning of terms. However, Kroon explicitly rejects this interpretation of his view:
The causal descriptivism argued for does not purport to give the meaning of names,
only the way in which their reference is determined (Kroon, 1987, p.10). Likewise, the
kind of causal theory discussed here is not a theory about semantic content, though it
is a theory about reference-determining conceptual content.
It is not clear whether Thomasson had this kind of causal theory in mind, but it seems
that perhaps she should have had this in mind given ﬁrstly that this theory denies that
we need have any categorical conception to refer determinately, and secondly that this
theory provides an ideal target for the qua problem.
This theory is an ideal target for the qua problem because, unlike pure externalism,
this theory is committed to the view that language users have discriminating conceptual
content, but merely holds that this discriminating conceptual content is not suﬃcient
to restrict an ontology. The qua problem can be brought in here, however, and used
to point out that a general appeal to whatever entity lies at the end of the causal
chain is not suﬃciently discriminating, since there will always be many diﬀerent sorts
of entity present. If it is claimed that `Moses' refers to whatever was present at the
baptism of that name, the qua problem responds by pointing out that there were many
kinds of thing present.16 If that thin causal account is all that has been oﬀered to ﬁx
reference, it will not be enough to determine that it is Moses qua whole person that
is referred to, rather than a time-slice of Moses or a spatial part of Moses.17 This
understanding of how the qua problem can be yielded is strongly reminiscent of the
problem of ostensive deﬁnition. The theory of ostensive deﬁnition carries with it the
assumption that we deﬁne a name by having certain beliefs and intentions (contra pure
externalism) but suggests that we can do so by pointing and saying `that will be called
such and such.'18 The problem, though, is that if this is all that is going on then we
ought to be puzzled about how anything determinate is being named at all, for on any
given occasion there will be numerous candidates for what is being indicated by the
pointing. In the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein writes:
Now one can ostensively deﬁne a proper name, the name of a colour, the
name of a material, a numeral, the name of a point of a compass and so
16This echoes the objection originally oﬀered by Thomasson against pure externalist theories. However,
as I argued above, if the pure externalist is challenged on grounds of metaphysical indeterminacy,
they can respond by insisting that the qua problem only highlights epistemic indeterminacy. They
may hold that reference is metaphysically determined by external context despite our epistemic
inadequacy. Thus the real argument against the pure externalist was that epistemic indeterminacy
itself is implausible for any theory of reference. The account discussed here accepts that, but merely
holds that our knowledge of the referent is an insuﬃcient to guide an ontology.
17Note that the causal descriptivist theories of Lewis (1984) and Jackson (1998b) are not likely to be
phased by the qua problem as they already allow that causal elements form only part of reference
determining descriptions.
18Harrison (1979, p.18).
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on. The deﬁnition of the number two, That is called `two'  - pointing to
two nuts  is perfectly exact. - But how can two be deﬁned like that? The
person one gives the deﬁnition to doesn't know what one wants to call two;
he will suppose that two is the name given to this group of nuts! ... That
is to say: an ostensive deﬁnition can be variously interpreted in every case.
(Wittgenstein, 1953, 28)
Wittgenstein's puzzle here is about how one teaches a name with an ostensive deﬁnition
but we can just as easily see it as a problem for how one can assign a name in the ﬁrst
place using just ostensive deﬁnition. The point is that we cannot think that all that
is going on is an act of pointing and the saying of a name  some other discriminat-
ing knowledge is required.19 Perhaps it is helpful, in seeing the connection between
Wittgenstein's puzzle and the problem of how a word comes to refer in the ﬁrst place,
to imagine the act of baptising something with a name as an act of teaching oneself a
name. The problem now, however, is not how it is you know what has been named, but
how it is that anything determinate has been named at all.
At this point, then, we can bring back in Thomasson's suggestion that the reference
is further discriminated and so made determinate (to the degree that it is determi-
nate  Thomasson allows, sensibly, that degrees of both indeterminacy and vagueness
may remain (Thomasson, 2007b, p.41)) by competent language users having a categor-
ical concept which consists of a tacit understanding of application and co-application
conditions.20
Thus with causal descriptivism we have located a position that denies that language
users need have any ontologically relevant knowledge (tacit ability/ conceptual content),
but which is susceptible to indeterminacy as raised by the qua problem. What I want
to further point out is that the qua problem in this context applies not just to the
determination of what sort of thing a term picks out, but sometimes to which thing
within an ontological category is picked out as the referent. This is especially obvious
for kind terms. What we see is that even if we assume that eligible candidates are
narrowed down to just kinds (or even just natural kinds) which speciﬁc kind is actually
referred to needs to be determined in some way that goes beyond an appeal to `the kind
causally present'. This is because every sample is a sample of a great many diﬀerent
kinds.21 Thomasson's solution is still relevant here, however, for we can say that which
kind is picked out is settled (to the degree that it is settled) by the language users'
tacit understanding of how the kind term should be applied and how it should be re-
19Note that there is an important diﬀerence between what Wittgenstein seems to have in mind with
the notion of teaching a name, and the possibility of a member of a language community using a
name to refer successfully merely by uttering the name in the right context. This point, about the
social character of semantics, will be discussed more fully in 2.2.
20Though I do not claim to interpret Wittgenstein, it is interesting to note that his hints at solving the
problem of ostensive deﬁnition similarly involve knowledge and use: We may say: only someone
who already knows how to do something with it can signiﬁcantly ask a name (Wittgenstein, 1953,
31). It does not take a great leap to read `knows how to do something with it' as an early version
of `has a tacit understanding of application and co-application conditions.'
21See Devitt and Sterelny (1987, p.73), and Devitt (1991, p.463).
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applied to one and the same kind. Thus we refer to water-as-chemical-kind with `water'
(rather than to `potable liquid', for example) in part because of an understanding about
how the term should be applied in various situations.22 The reason for stressing the
relevance of the qua problem to the reference of kind terms is that I will argue in this
thesis that repeatable artefacts are kinds. Conceptual analysis of reference-determining
content then becomes highly relevant to which kind a given term refers to (Chapter 5).
The ﬁnal point to make here is that when the qua problem is clariﬁed as a prob-
lem speciﬁcally for causal descriptivism, one particular attempt to respond to the qua
problem without admitting language users have relevant conceptual content can be dis-
missed. In a discussion of Thomasson's methodological approach, Robert Stecker has
suggested that the qua problem can be solved without appeal to the conceptual content
of language users because what will be referred to in some cases will just be what is
most salient (Stecker, 2009, p.318). However, simply suggesting that one entity will be
more obvious to us as observers than other entities does not have any relevance to the
question of conceptual content. Even if there is a most salient candidate, the question
of how we come to refer to that candidate still remains. As an analogy, suppose a child
is oﬀered a choice of sweets. The child chooses one sweet. If we believe that she has
determinately chosen one sweet out of the batch, we might ask what it is that makes
it the case that she has chosen that sweet rather than another. Suppose also that she
chose the sweet that was most salient to her. Here the salience of the chosen sweet
cannot be oﬀered as part of the answer to what it is to have chosen that sweet. The
answer being sought will perhaps appeal to something like the actual and dispositional
actions of the child and her mental states and beliefs. The fact that that sweet was
most salient to her is an answer to the wrong question. Perhaps it is an answer to the
question of why she always chooses that sweet, or why she chose that sweet on that
occasion. It is possible then that Stecker has confused the question of what makes it the
case a term refers as it does (i.e what reference consists in), with the distinct question of
what brought it about that the term refers as it does (i.e. what is causally responsible
for reference).
Conclusion
My ambitions in this section have not been to analyse and pronounce on every possible
role of causal chains in theories of reference. I have even resisted arguing in favour of
either of the two basic frameworks discussed (reference metaphysically determined by
external causal chains, vs. reference metaphysically determined by conceptual content).
What I have argued is that the eﬀectiveness of Thomasson's argumentative move de-
pends signiﬁcantly on what kind of causal theory is on the table. There are indications
22Devitt and Sterely's tentative suggestion is similar: the grounder of a natural kind term associates,
consciously or unconsciously, with that term, ﬁrst some description that in eﬀect classiﬁes the term
as a natural kind term; second, some descriptions that determine which nature of the sample is
relevant to the reference of the term (Devitt and Sterelny, 1987, p.74). Harrison oﬀers a more
Wittgensteinian suggestion: the logical category of a term deﬁned by a given act of dubbing
depends on what we go on to do with a term (Harrison, 1979, p.161).
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that Thomasson has something like pure externalism in mind. However, it is not the qua
problem that needs to be employed here, but rather a more general argument against
the plausibility of metaphysical determinacy despite epistemic inscrutability. Accounts
(2) and (3), on the other hand, are compatible with the role for conceptual analysis
being defended, and thus do not need to be rebuﬀed to formulate this methodological
argument. Finally, account (4)  causal descriptivism  presents both an obstacle to
Thomasson's conceptual analysis, and a target for the qua problem. More generally, the
crucial element for a defence of Thomasson's conceptual analysis is epistemic scrutibil-
ity, rather than metaphysical determination. Had Thomasson been aware of this, or
made it explicit, it would have been clear that the qua problem, as a problem of meta-
physical determinacy, is only relevant as applied to a theory that rests metaphysical
determination on epistemic determination, as with casual descriptivism.
What then should we make of Thomasson's appeal to a `hybrid theory'? If the causal
account on the table is causal descriptivism, then the new proposal can be clariﬁed as
requiring that reference to terms is ﬁxed by conceptual content that partly consists of
appeals to causal chains, and partly involves a tacit understanding of the application
and co-application conditions. It is a hybrid theory in that the descriptions involve both
a causal and a non-causal component. What if, instead, she had something more like
pure externalism in mind? I argued against pure externalism on the grounds that it
leaves reference epistemically indeterminate. As such, any acceptable modiﬁcation must
allow some reliable epistemic access to the referents of our terms. It need not, however,
be a theory according to which reference is completely determined  epistemically or
metaphysically  by mental content. Thus reference can be understood to be `hybrid' to
the extent that what we refer to is partly determined by conceptual content and partly
determined by how the world actually is.
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I argued in the previous chapter that Amie Thomasson's methodological constraint
promises to provide an answer to the question of which aspects of our folk beliefs and
intuitions should guide an ontological proposal. To recap, the position I am defending
has it that the reference of a term is determined (at least epistemically) by the tacitly
held application and co-application conditions associated with the term. Thus an on-
tological proposal must conform to a careful analysis of that conceptual content if it is
to avoid changing the subject.
Before going any further, a point of terminology is called for. I have said that the key
issue is epistemic determination rather than metaphysical determination, and so the
defence of conceptual analysis need not be committed to any particular theory concern-
ing the metaphysical determination of reference. However, for the sake of simplicity,
in what follows I will speak of just `determination of reference' rather than `epistemic
determination of reference.' Readers who share doubts about the plausibility of separat-
ing metaphysical from epistemic determination of reference (such as those in support of
some form of modern description theory) may harmlessly read `determination' as con-
veying both the epistemic and metaphysical sense. Those more sympathetic to the idea
that there is a metaphysical fact of the matter about reference that is independent of
conceptual content should take claims about determination only in the epistemic sense.
In this chapter, then, I will defend the claim that reference is determined by con-
ceptual content. I do that by addressing four actual or potential sources of diﬃculty.
Some of these issues have been addressed in part by Thomasson, but Thomasson's
responses are brief and fail to tackle the broader issues involved. What follows will,
I hope, be a more holistic and robust defence of the kind of position Thomasson is
appealing to. I start by considering the use of thought experiments that appeal to in-
tuitions about the reference of our terms in possible scenarios (2.1). These `externalist
thought experiments'  so called for their use in motivating various forms of externalism
about semantic or mental content  are sometimes taken as evidence against the claim
that conceptual content determines reference. I will argue that though the thought
experiments deliver important semantic results, that conclusion is unwarranted. Most
importantly, however, the thought experiments themselves rely on conceptual content
epistemically determining reference, so any attempt to deny that conceptual content
determines reference using these thought experiments is bound to fail. In 2.2 I con-
sider the issues of social externalism and direct reference. As part of the broader aim
of defending and clarifying the proposed thesis, I discuss how these widely recognised
phenomena do not contradict that thesis.
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In 2.3 and 2.4 I turn to more direct criticisms of conceptual analysis. In 2.3 I con-
sider a set of objections oﬀered by Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis to the idea that
we can have a priori access to the conceptual content that determines reference. Lau-
rence and Margolis' objections are targeted at Frank Jackson's theory of A-intensions.
However, the similarities between Jackson's A-intensions and Thomasson's application
and co-application conditions are considerable and if Jackson's account fails here, then
so does Thomasson's. I argue against Laurence and Margolis that their objections are
based on misunderstandings of what is being proposed. Finally in 2.4 I address a chal-
lenge to this view based on concept change and reference stability. It is argued that
history attests to the fact that reference remains stable despite radical shifts in associ-
ated concepts. As such past language users have sometimes been so mistaken that no
aspect of their conceptual content could have determined the reference of their terms. I
will argue against this, however, on the grounds that it relies on shaky intuitions about
reference stability that should be rejected in favour of a more plausible understanding
of reference.
2.1. Intuitions About Possible Cases
In the previous chapter I discussed Richard Miller's purely causal theory of reference. I
suggested that while Miller seems to hold that reference is metaphysically determined by
external causal chains, he is still committed to language users possessing some epistem-
ically determining conceptual content which he puts in terms of counterfactual recog-
nitional abilities. As such, the kind of causal theory he proposes, I argued, need not be
seen as competing with the thesis being defended here. Nevertheless, Miller also mounts
an argument against a `hybrid' theory of reference which certainly could be construed as
a challenge to the claim that conceptual content even epistemically determines reference
(his own commitment to recognitional capacities not withstanding).1 As such, it will
be worth considering Miller's argument understood as an argument against epistemic
determination, not least because Thomasson has herself responded to Miller's argument
as a direct criticism of her own view.
Miller argues by appealing to familiar thought experiments about the reference of our
terms in possible scenarios, where those possible scenarios are considered as being actual.
Miller's understanding is that on a hybrid theory, the reference of `kangaroo' is partly
determined by its association with a categorical concept such as `species'. However,
Hilary Putnam's Martian robots example shows that `kangaroo' would still refer even
if we discovered that all kangaroos are not animals but are highly deceptive Martian
robots. Thus Miller concludes that the reference of `kangaroo' is not determined by the
associated categorical concept `species' (Miller, 1992, p.427).
Thomasson has responded to this objection, but her response is insuﬃcient. It in-
volves constructing an alternative thought experiment in which what ornithologists take
1As before, the argument is in his (1992).
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to be a new species  dubbed `Key Sparrow'  turns out to be a sophisticated anima-
tronic hoax. Here, Thomasson argues, our intuitions suggest that we would say that it
has been discovered (once the hoax is uncovered) that there are no Key Sparrows, not
that Key Sparrows are small robots (Thomasson, 2007b, pp.49-50). Thomasson's point
is then that reference does not automatically survive any failure of associated conceptual
content. Instead, when empirical discovery shows the failings of associated categorical
concepts, we have a decision to make regarding how to go on using the term. If, as
in the Martian robot case, we do decide to keep the term and adopt a new categorical
concept, that need not be taken as a sign that these were never part of the meaning
of the term (Thomasson, 2007b, p.50).
However, Thomasson concedes too much here. For despite Thomasson's response,
hasn't Miller shown that in some cases at least we can refer despite erroneous cate-
gorical concepts? Thomasson's Key Sparrow example merely shows that this need not
always happen. But if, as Thomasson claims, the associated categorical concept deter-
mines reference, and if that categorical concept is `species', wouldn't the Martian robot
example have to have resulted in failed reference? Thomasson says that an adjustment
in associated categorical concepts  from `species' to `robot', for example  need not
be taken as a sign that these were never part of the meaning of the term. But if it
was part of the meaning of the term `Kangaroo' (in the reference determining sense
being discussed) that it referred to a species, then the empirical discovery of Martian
robots would show that there were no (and had never been any) kangaroos (contra our
intuitions).
Fortunately there is a more successful and more general response to Miller, a response
that takes into account any argument based on these kinds of thought experiments. To
begin with, I think that Miller is in fact right to say that the reference of `Kangaroo'
is not determined by the associated categorical concept `species'. This is because the
conceptual content that determines reference need not involve developed concepts such
as `species' or `animal'. Instead, the defensible claim is just that language users are
tacitly aware of the application and co-application conditions of their terms, and that
those application and co-application conditions determine reference. To think that
knowledge of such conditions amounts to the concept `species' or something similar is
to adopt an account that is, as Miller suggests, too much like the fated description
theories of reference (see below). A thought experiment in which kangaroos turn out
to be robots may show that Kangaroo is not a species, but it does not (and, as we
will see shortly, cannot) show that the reference of that term is not ﬁxed by associated
tacit application and co-application conditions. It is not clear why Thomasson, who
elsewhere stresses that the associated conceptual content is to be understood in terms
of application and co-application conditions, allows Miller's point that the relevant
concept associated with `Kangaroo' is `species'.
The point being made is not speciﬁc to kangaroos and the Martian robot example, and
to develop the point, it will be helpful to consider these `externalist' thought experiments
more generally. To begin, we can note that these thought experiments have been used
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to counter a traditional description theory of reference, according to which reference
is determined for proper names by an associated deﬁnite description. Suppose it is
claimed that a name refers to an entity in virtue of that entity satisfying some unique
description. Does `Gödel' refer to whatever satisﬁes the description `discoverer of the
incompleteness theorem'? Following Kripke (1980, p.83), we agree that this is not how
the reference of `Gödel' is determined, because if it happened to turn out that Schmidt
actually discovered the incompleteness theorem, `Gödel' would still refer to Gödel and
not to Schmidt.2 Indeed, many take Donnellan and Kripke, among others, to have shown
that no description associated with a name will serve to determine the reference of that
name. For with any given description (barring certain question begging suggestions
(Donnellan, 1970, p.344)) it is plausible that we can construct a scenario in which the
referent does not satisfy that description.3
Hilary Putnam's discussions about the stereotypes associated with natural kind terms
appear to give a similar result for natural kinds (Putnam, 1970). That is, though we
may associate a stereotypical description with a kind term, the reference is not ﬁxed by
that description in virtue of the referent satisfying that description. It is claimed that
we might imagine, for any associated description, that it is in fact not true of the objects
referred to.4 Hilary Kornblith has argued that the same conclusion can be extended
beyond natural kinds to artefact kinds (Kornblith, 1980).
However, though these experiments deliver important semantic results, the results
consist only in negative claims to the eﬀect that some given description does not deter-
mine the referent of the term. This has lead some to argue that all that these thought
experiments show is that we have failed to hit on the right description.5 The view
oﬀered here is not committed to the success of that descriptive project. What is impor-
tant is that the negative conclusion about what it is for some terms to refer  that they
don't refer in virtue of the satisfaction of an associated deﬁnite description  does not
warrant the claim that reference is not determined by any conceptual content at all.
It might be suggested, however, that the failure of the description theory of names
is just a symptom of the more encompassing fact that the mental states of speakers
do not determine the referent of a term, and this is something we can know by testing
other intuitions about possible scenarios. Michael Devitt seems to adopt this line of
thinking when he attributes the failure of the description theories to a broader issue
characterised by Putnam's slogan that `meanings just ain't in the head' (Devitt, 1996,
p.160).
This leads us to a slightly diﬀerent kind of thought experiment involving the reference
of our terms in possible scenarios. Putnam's Twin Earth scenarios, speciﬁcally those in
which Twin Earth is a planet located somewhere in the actual universe, are the most
well known examples here.6 One of the intuitive results of the Twin Earth scenario is
2See also Donnellan (1970).
3See, e.g., Carlson (2004).
4C.f. Laurence and Margolis (2003, p.261).
5E.g. Jackson (1998b).
6In Putnam (1973) & Putnam (1975).
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that when the internal state of speakers is held constant and the external environment
is changed (as on Twin Earth), the reference of the corresponding term `water' is dif-
ferent (i.e. in the mouths of Twin Earthians, `water' refers to XYZ). The important
semantic result here is that the extension of a term is not wholly determined by how
things are in the heads of language users  duplicates from the skin in can nevertheless
refer diﬀerently if their external environments are diﬀerent.7 A slight variation on this
thought experiment that yields the same result involves us imagining (as actually being
the case) that the stuﬀ in our lakes and rivers is not H20 but XYZ, though we don't
know that yet (perhaps we have been blinded to it by some persistent scientiﬁc error).
Now in this scenario, our term `water' refers not to H20, as we think, but to XYZ even
though the scenario involves no change in the internal states of language users.
After a discussion of Twin Earth scenarios, Devitt and Sterelny conclude that there
is no internal state of the speaker that determines the reference and hence the meaning,
of his words (Devitt and Sterelny, 1987, p.52). If this was right, then the failure
of the description theory would be a symptom of this more signiﬁcant semantic truth.
However, I suggest this inference is a mistake. It doesn't follow from these scenarios that
the reference of `water' is determined independently of any language user's conception
or ability. All this shows is that for some terms, what the actual world is like has an
inﬂuence on what a term refers to. In other words, Putnam has shown the failings
of what we might call strong internalism  the idea that exactly what we refer to is
determined just by mental states from the skin in, so that same mental state (narrowly
construed) necessarily means same referent. It is a big and unwarranted leap to go from
a rejection of this to the conclusion that mental states are irrelevant to what we refer
to.8
It may be useful at this point to introduce a distinction between strong and weak
determination. Twin Earth scenarios and environmental externalism in general show
that mental states do not strongly determine reference. However, they do not show
that they do not weakly determine reference. A simple analogy can help us understand
this distinction. If a pack of cards are shued and spread face down on the table, a
observer may pick a card by pointing. The actions of the observer determine which card
type is picked, but the actions only weakly determine which card type is picked, in that
what the chosen card is also depends on how the cards are arranged face down on the
table. The actions and the actual arrangement of cards together determine which card
is chosen. On the other hand, if the observer picks a card by naming the card explicitly,
by uttering `Jack of Spades' for example, that utterance alone strongly determines which
card (type) is picked.9 Devitt and Sterelny may be right to say that mental states do
7Here `how things are in the head' is understood in the narrow sense according to which Earthians
and Twin Earthians do not have diﬀerent things in the head just because of their diﬀerent external
environments. For a discussion see the introduction to Pettit and McDowell (1986).
8As Jackson has pointed out, even traditional descriptivism is world involving to an important degree
 it holds that reference is determined by descriptions, but what we refer to also depends on what
in the actual world satisﬁes those descriptions. See Jackson (1998b, p.205).
9The distinction used here is developed from Chalmers (2002).
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not strongly determine the reference of many terms, but it has not been shown that
they do not weakly determine reference. Moreover, as we saw that conceptual analysis
is only committed to epistemic rather than metaphysical determination of reference, so
we can say also that conceptual analysis is committed only to weak rather than strong
determination of reference.
Thus we have two signiﬁcant results derived from these thought experiments. Neither
result, however, justiﬁes the conclusion that conceptual content does not (weakly & epis-
temically) determine reference. However, there is still a yet more important observation
to make about these thought experiments. Above, I claimed that Putnam's Martian
robots example does not imply that reference is not determined by a tacit understanding
of application and co-application conditions. I also said that it cannot show this. This,
crucially, is because the thought experiment itself relies on a tacit understanding of the
application and co-application conditions associated with the term `Kangaroo'. The
thought experiment asks us to consider what the term refers to in a given scenario, and
our answer reﬂects the conceptual content that epistemically determines the reference
of the term in that scenario.10
This point is quite general. Any thought experiment that appeals to our intuitions
about the referent of a term in a possible scenario must itself be committed to a tacit
understanding of the application and co-application conditions of the term. The very
fact that we can give any answer at all in these scenarios proves the existence of con-
ceptual content that (epistemically) determines the reference of our terms. I think that
with this argument set out we can see that Miller's attempt to deny that conceptual
content determines reference, and any other similar attempt employing diﬀerent exam-
ples, cannot be successful. This is the argument Thomasson should have made but
didn't.11
2.2. Direct Reference and Social Externalism
Hopefully I have shown that the traditional externalist thought experiments that rely
on intuitions about possible cases cannot be used to counter the claim that conceptual
content determines reference. In this section I want to turn my attention to two related
areas familiar to the philosophy of language: direct reference and social externalism.
In addressing these issues I will rule out any worries that might arise based on these
topics, and in doing so further develop the claim being defended.
Direct Reference
The issue of direct reference can be addressed fairly quickly, for while there is some
dispute about how direct reference (henceforth DR) should be formulated precisely12
10A similar point is made in Haukioja (2009).
11Recall, however, that Miller's own causal theory is itself committed to just such conceptual content
in terms of a `reliable discriminating ability'  see 1.3.
12For a discussion see, e.g. Recanati (1993, pp.7-27).
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no reasonable characterisation stands opposed to the thesis being defended here. Nev-
ertheless, there is space for confusion that it will be best to avoid. Why might one think
that DR stands as a stumbling block to the claim that conceptual content determines
reference? It might be supposed that DR stands as a stumbling block to this claim
because DR is typically contrasted with a Fregean sense theory of meaning, and it may
seem that what is being proposed here is tantamount to a theory of senses.
The account being defended here is not committed to any particular understanding of
senses, though it is certainly the case that some closely related philosophical positions
have drawn links with Fregean senses of sorts.13 Whether or not one regards a theory of
conceptual content that epistemically and weakly determines reference as amounting to
a theory of senses depends entirely on what one takes a theory of sense to be committed
to. To clear things up, it will be helpful to separate the kind of senses that DR is
opposed to from the account of conceptual content being defended here. We will see
that they are not the same, and so the theory being defended here is not in conﬂict with
DR. François Recanati has described the broad and intuitive notion of direct reference
as follows:
A (directly) referential term is term that serves simply to refer. It is devoid
of descriptive content, in the sense at least that what it contributes to the
proposition expressed by the sentence where it occurs is not a concept but
an object. (Recanati, 1993, p.3)
If this is how DR is understood, we can note that it will be opposed to any account of
senses that holds that a referring term contributes a sense to the proposition expressed.
David Kaplan's landmark paper originally set up direct reference as being an alternative
to just such an understanding of Fregean senses (Kaplan, 1989, p.486). Kaplan claims
explicitly that in Fregean semantics it is the sense that is contributed to the proposition
expressed.
However, the theory being defended here is committed to no such thing. The concep-
tual content that epistemically determines reference need not be understood as being
contributed to the proposition expressed. All the theory defended here is committed
to is that if a term contributes an object to the proposition expressed, we have con-
ceptual content that allows us to (weakly and epistemically) determine which object is
contributed.
We could leave matters there, but Genoveva Martí has recently claimed that there is
an additional stronger notion of DR. Martí describes a propositional characterisation of
direct reference which is as above: a directly referential term is one that contributes
an object, its referent, to the propositions expressed by the sentence containing it
(Martí, 2003, p.163). In contrast, however, what she calls the Millian characterisation
describes directly referential terms as those that refer directly without the mediation
of a Fregean sense or a semantic proﬁle whose function it is to select and single out the
13David Chalmers' two-dimensionalism, for example, promises a role for quasi-Fregean senses in
Chalmers (2002).
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referent (Martí, 2003, p.163). Now one may read Martí's Millian characterisation here
as being opposed to conceptual analysis, for haven't I claimed that conceptual content
can `select and single out the referent' even if only epistemically and weakly?
However, I think that even this Millian characterisation (as far as it is distinct from
the propositional characterisation) is compatible with the thesis being defended here.
This is because even this account is committed to language users having the ability to
epistemically determine reference. To see this note that in his Demonstratives Kaplan
contrasts a Fregean semantic theory with a direct reference theory and in a diagram of
the latter he suggests that a singular term refers to an individual by the conventions
and rules of language use (Kaplan, 1989, p.486). A similar claim is made by Martí
concerning her Millian characterisation: the Millian proponent of direct reference ar-
gues that a name is associated by convention with an object (Martí, 2003, p.166). But
now suppose that we ask: what is it for a name to be associated by conventions or rules
with an object? How does that occur? How is it that a name is associated with one
object and not another, for example? I do not know how this question can be answered
without appeal to the conceptual content of language users, especially as `conventions'
surely depend on a kind of knowledge or ability on the part of language users. In other
words, if language users have conventions and rules that associate words with objects,
then they do have conceptual content, (expressed in rules and conventions, perhaps)
that (at least) epistemically determines reference. Drawing out a full account of how
conventions ﬁt in with an epistemic determination of reference would be a delicate and
lengthy task that I will not undertake here, but there is no reason to think it could not
be done. The important point for us is just that these accounts of DR do not stand
opposed to the conceptual analysis being defended.
Social Externalism
The second issue to be addressed concerns another well known feature of meaning and
reference that has so far not been mentioned but about which we ought to be aware in
order to avoid a particular class of potential problems. This feature concerns the social
aspect of meaning and reference. There are two related points to draw out here. The
ﬁrst is that when an individual uses a word in a common language, the meaning of the
word is often the meaning that that word has in that language, irrespective of any facts
about the user other than that she is judged to be using that word in that language.
Tyler Burge made this point well with a number of now well known examples (Burge,
1979). To use just one, Burge asks us to consider someone who speaks English well and
has had arthritis for years. He has many beliefs about arthritis and has discussed it
often. However, he then develops a pain in his thigh and goes to the doctor to complain
that his arthritis has spread to his thigh. He now betrays a misunderstanding of arthritis
because arthritis is an ailment that only aﬀects the joints. Nevertheless, `arthritis' in his
mouth refers to a rheumatoid ailment of the joints despite his misunderstanding. Burge
then considers a Twin Earth scenario with a Doppelganger of our patient. The only
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diﬀerence on Twin Earth is that there `arthritis' doesn't mean arthritis (as we mean it)
but instead is used to refer to an ailment of the joints or limbs. The Doppelganger and
the original patient are otherwise exactly alike. Now the Doppelganger says something
correct when he says that his arthritis has spread to his thigh, despite the fact that the
patients are alike from the skin in (Burge, 1979, pp.77-79).14
One upshot of this is that what a speaker says with a word depends on what the
word actually means in the common language that they are speaking. The two patients
express diﬀerent propositions merely by being in diﬀerent socio-linguistic environments.
This is important to us because in the light of it we must understand the conceptual
content that determines reference as the conceptual content associated with a term by
the community of language users, and not just by some lone user who may refer with
the term. The crucial question for us is how a word refers in a language, and not how
an individual comes to be using that word.15
The second and clearly related point has been emphasised by Putnam, who notes
than within a language community there is a division of linguistic labour Putnam
(1973, p.704). We commonly defer to experts and the wider linguistic community when
speaking so that we mean `whatever they mean'  indicating the experts in the relevant
ﬁeld, or even the people in the pub whose conversation we have just entered halfway
through. There is a question here about whether such `borrowed' uses of words require
some epistemically determining conceptual content be possessed by each user of the word
if they are genuinely to refer with it. Both Kripke and Evans have suggested that in such
cases the otherwise ignorant user must at least intend for such a deference to take place if
it is to take place, and one might construe this as some minimal reference determining
conceptual content.16 As far as the conceptual analyst is concerned, however, that
point of detail is relatively unimportant. The conceptual analyst is not interested in
analysing the concepts of users who merely borrow the term from others in the linguistic
community in this parasitic way.
The point to be emphasised then is that the conceptual analysis being defended and
practised here is the conceptual analysis of terms in a social context. It is conceptual
analysis of what we mean by `novel' or by `photograph', or by the name of a particular
novel  `Emma', for example. If I, as an individual, were to apply the name `Emma'
in a manner wildly at odds with normal accepted usage then I could hold my ground
and insist that I am interested in the ontological status of what I mean by `Emma',
which wouldn't yield very interesting results for anyone else. Alternatively I could
accept the error of my ways and concede that my desire was to refer to the same thing
as everyone else all along despite my ignorance, and that, as it happened, I was too
linguistically incompetent to be a reliable source. The failure here would be with me
and not with the method of conceptual analysis. As an analogy, if a scientist discovers
truths about protons but, thinking they are electrons, publishes a paper of false claims
14See also Pettit and McDowell (1986, p.7) for discussion.
15For this distinction see Evans (1982, p.77).
16See Kripke (1980, p.163), and Evans (1973, p.191).
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about electrons, the problem is with the scientist, not the scientiﬁc method. Likewise, it
cannot be a held as a charge against conceptual analysis that any particular individual
may have unorthodox ideas about the meanings of words, nor can it be held against
conceptual analysis that an individual may defer to the rest of the linguistic community
with their concept of `sonata' for example. Only if they are going to do any ontology,
they had better go and ﬁnd out what everyone else does mean by `sonata'.
2.3. Objections to A Prioricity and a Connection with
Two-Dimensionalism
So far I have dealt with intuitions about possible cases and the issues of direct refer-
ence and social externalism. What I will turn to now are a set of arguments that have
been levelled not at this speciﬁc characterisation of this thesis, but at a closely related
thesis defended by Frank Jackson. Jackson has been a staunch defender of conceptual
analysis, and his argument is strongly dependent on a theory of two-dimensional se-
mantics (Jackson, 1998a). The aspect of two-dimensionalism that is relevant to us is
what Jackson calls the A-intension of a term (Jackson, 1998a, p.48). The A-intension
of a term is a function that assigns an extension to a term in a possible world w under
the supposition that that world w is actual. So, for example, if we suppose the actual
world is thus and so, the A-intension of a term assigns an extension to that term in
that supposed scenario. Note how similar this idea is to the thought experiments con-
sidered in 2.1. We are asked to imagine that we discover, for example, that all the
kangaroos on the planet are actually Martian robots. We then respond by saying that
the robots are indeed kangaroos, but that we have been mistaken about their nature all
along. In other words, we are given a scenario and are asked to consider it as actually
being the case, and make a judgement about the reference of our terms given that sce-
nario. According to Jackson, this judgement is based on the A-intension of the term,
which is a function that assigns an extension in just such a scenario. I have said, using
Thomasson's terminology, that this judgement is based on tacit understanding of the
application and co-application conditions associated with a term. It is clear then that
the two notions are closely related.17
If this association of A-intensions with Thomasson's application and co-application
conditions is right, then a recent challenge presented by Laurence and Margolis to the
possibility of having a priori access to A-intentions will also count as a challenge to
the claim that language users have (accessible) conceptual content that determines the
reference of their terms (Laurence and Margolis, 2003). For the most part, addressing
Laurence and Margolis' worries will provide an opportunity to re-apply some of the
17Thomasson goes only so far as to mention in a footnote that two-dimensionalism represents an
alternative formulation of her general position. See Thomasson (2007b, p.210). I think in fact that
two-dimensionalism represents one of the most promising methods of formalising the conclusion
defended here, but doing so, and properly defending two-dimensionalism from, e.g. Soames (2004),
would require a thesis in itself. Moreover, a defence of Thomasson's thesis, in her terms, will be
suﬃcient for the methodological needs of our ontological project.
51
2. Conceptual Analysis Defended
points already made. However, their discussion also highlights some additional confu-
sions that ought to be cleared up.
First, a note about the claim of a prioricity. The view being defended here is not
committed to the claim that an understanding of application and co-application condi-
tions for a term is somehow innate. It is perfectly possible, and indeed quite likely, that
we have the conceptual content we do as a direct result of our experience of the world.
It can even be allowed that generally speaking our experience has shaped and continues
to shape that conceptual content. The sense in which our understanding of these con-
ditions is a priori (and the sense in which access to A-intensions is a priori for Jackson)
lies in the fact that for a term to genuinely refer, language users must associate the
term with conceptual content that (epistemically and weakly) determines the referent
of that term. Such conceptual content is not something that can be revised or learned
after the term has become an established referring term in the language, because until
there is such conceptual content, the term does not refer at all. Moreover, understand-
ing this conceptual content, which involves understanding the application of the term
in possible scenarios considered as actual, does not depend on how the actual world
is. The answers we give to the Martian robot case, or the Gödel/Schmidt case, do not
themselves depend on whether or not Kangaroos are actually robots, or on whether or
not Gödel actually did discover the incompleteness theorem. Thus what Laurence and
Margolis are proposing, in rejecting a priori access to A-intentions, is that any content
that determines reference is empirical and subject to revision in light of discovery. In
other words, they are denying that such content determines reference at all.
They begin by claiming that we do not have a priori access to the A-intensions of our
terms because we do not have a priori access to a description that picks out the referent
of that term in any world considered as actual:
[P]eople can't have a priori access to a description that picks out the referent
of water in each world, w, since people don't even have a priori access to
a description that picks out the referent of water in the actual world.
(Laurence and Margolis, 2003, p.261)
This is because, they argue, any element in a natural kind concept's stereotype is open
to revision in the light of empirical ﬁndings. The claim then is that A-intensions are
as subject to refutation just as much as any other information associated with a term,
and so cannot be a priori. However, this criticism is based on a misunderstanding of
A-intensions. Firstly, Laurence and Margolis assume that A-intensions are descriptions
understood as `stereotypes'. In other words, they assume that epistemic determination
of reference involves knowing an infallible description in virtue of which we determine the
reference in a possible scenario. However, the epistemic determination of reference does
not involve possessing infallible stereotype descriptions. As discussed in 2.1, Putnam's
examples do show that reference is not ﬁxed to natural kind terms by satisfaction of
superﬁcial properties, but this does not warrant the further conclusion that reference is
not epistemically determined at all.
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Moreover, to pick up on another point made in 2.1, all of the examples that Laurence
and Margolis appeal to themselves depend on an ability to specify the referent of our
terms in possible scenarios considered as actual. Laurence and Margolis note, following
Putnam, that we may be under an illusion about the colour of lemons, or that a new
gas in the atmosphere may change them from yellow to blue. They then assume that
these empirical ﬁndings would result in us changing our A-intension of lemons from
including the criteria of being yellow to including the criteria of being blue. But in fact
what these examples show us is that we are already in a position in which `being yellow'
is not essential to being a lemon in a possible scenario considered as actual  if it was
essential, then our response to the story about the new gas turning lemons from yellow
to blue would be to say that lemons had ceased to exist.18
Laurence and Margolis then go on to object to a priori knowledge of A-intensions on
slightly diﬀerent grounds. They consider a person who grows up with no exposure to
lakes or oceans  maybe a nomad in the Sahara (Laurence and Margolis, 2003, p.262).
However, since, as they assume, knowing a priori the A-intension of water would mean
knowing a priori that water was `the stuﬀ in our lakes and rivers', either the nomad
would have a priori knowledge of such a fact, or lack the concept water all together.
It seems that neither of these options are very attractive.
However, this is a false dichotomy based on a number of mistakes. Firstly, as before,
the conceptual content that epistemically determines the reference of `water' is not a
description that includes the belief that water is `the stuﬀ in our lakes and rivers'.
Secondly, it is very unclear what is meant by the concept water. The implication is
that the conceptual analyst is committed to saying that to have the concept water is to
know the common A-intension associated with that term. It is further implied that this
is clearly not what it is to have the conceptwater (since the nomad presumably has the
concept water). However, the conceptual analyst is not committed to any particular
understanding of the phrase the concept water. If, for example, to have the concept
water is just to be able to refer to water then the nomad may have the concept either
by deferring to the wider language community (if we make the unlikely assumption
that they are speaking English) or by possessing their own conceptual content that
epistemically determines the reference of their term.
A third challenge is mounted against a priori access that involves arguing that it
relies on a description theory of reference determination, and that a description theory
is not obviously the right theory (Laurence and Margolis, 2003, p.263). Furthermore,
since, as they claim, the nature of reference determination is itself a broadly empirical
question (Laurence and Margolis, 2003, p.264) we cannot know a priori the extension
of our terms in a possible scenario considered as actual, because we cannot know a
priori what determines the extension in any scenario. There are a few things to note
here. The ﬁrst is that as we saw from 1.3, what matters for conceptual analysis is epis-
temic determination of reference. Though Jackson is very sympathetic to a description
18The example is from Putnam (1970, p.142).
53
2. Conceptual Analysis Defended
theory,19 conceptual analysis is not committed to a description theory. All conceptual
analysis is committed to is that for us to use a term to refer, we must be able to say
what counts as a correct use of the term in some scenario considered as actual.
Secondly, it is true that conceptual analysis is based on some broad theoretical ar-
guments about reference and semantics, many of which have already been outlined. It
is also true that there are competing theories of reference determination. However, the
existence of alternative theories of reference cannot be used as an argument against
the consequences of one such theory. Indeed, the understanding of reference needed
for conceptual analysis may be mistaken  as with any philosophical theory  but the
conceptual analyst believes there are good reasons for holding the kind of theory that
requires A-intensions to which we have a priori access. I doubt whether Laurence and
Margolis are right to say that the nature of reference determination is an empirical
question, but the point is that the fallibility of our theories should not stop us drawing
conclusions from what we take to be the best theory available.
The ﬁnal reason Laurence and Margolis oﬀer for doubting that A-intensions can be
knowable a priori is put as follows:
Suppose that some variation of the causal theory of reference is right, and
that what determines the extension of a kind term is a given world is a
matter of causal links, not satisfaction of descriptions. In that case it seems
clear that we will not have a priori access to the A-intensions which are
determined by these causal links, since we presumably do not have a priori
access to the relevant causal relata. (Laurence and Margolis, 2003, p.264)
At this point, however, we can appeal to the argument made against pure externalism
in 1.3. We have good reasons for doubting that the kind of external causal link theory
suggested is a coherent theory of reference. This point was argued for in the previous
chapter, but there is a deeper issue here that is worth emphasising. The kind of theory
being suggested by Laurence and Margolis would imply that in a scenario considered as
actual we would not know, without empirical investigation, what the extension of our
term was because we would not know which were the relevant causal relata without em-
pirical investigation. But recall that if the reference of a term really were epistemically
inscrutable, we would not be able to empirically investigate the relevant causal relata as
we would not know which causal chains would lead us towards the referent and which
would lead us away.
To summarise, then, the objections that Laurence and Margolis make to our ability to
have a priori access to conceptual content that determines the reference of our terms (or
to A-intensions, as they put it following Jackson) are based on general misunderstand-
ings about the position involved. In particular, once the relevant conceptual content is
separated from the possession of an infallible reference ﬁxing description, many of the
objections can be dealt with.
19See, e.g.,Jackson (1998b).
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2.4. Conceptual Change and Reference Stability
In this section I want to consider one last and particularly substantial objection to con-
ceptual analysis. The broad idea here is fairly straightforward and can be summarised
as follows. Recall that according to conceptual analysis, the reference of our terms is
weakly and epistemically determined by conceptual content. Consequently an analysis
of our intuitions about the use of a term in possible scenarios can reveal details about
the referent; details that any further assertions about the referent (in particular, on-
tological theories) must be compatible with. We saw that this position is extremely
resilient to counterexamples, because any attempt to show that some current concep-
tual knowledge is not involved in determining the referent of a term must itself rely on
intuitive knowledge about the referent in a possible scenario.
However, it is often argued that both experience and intuition show that in some
cases there can and has been radical conceptual change despite continuity of reference.
The aim here is not to try to show that what is referred to now is not determined
by conceptual content but to show that past reference must not have been determined
by conceptual content given that past users sometimes possessed radically mistaken
concepts that have since been overturned. Thus even details revealed by the most
insightful and accurate conceptual analysis may be rejected given future developments.
Conceptual analysis could not then provide the kinds of restrictions on ontological
proposals that we are hoping for.
By far the most common source of examples used to imply radical conceptual change
despite stability of reference involve developments in scientiﬁc theory. It is argued that
past speakers had radical misconceptions about the things they referred to. Subsequent
discoveries have revealed the true nature of these things, and have resulted in signiﬁcant
conceptual shifts.
In what follows I will argue that this direct challenge to conceptual analysis is weaker
than its proponents assume and relies on shaky intuitions about reference stability. In
particular I will argue that we should be suspicious of assumptions about the reference
of past speakers based purely on current conceptual content. While such moves retain
the stability of reference, they do so artiﬁcially and at the expense of a plausible theory
of reference.
The strength of the examples employed varies considerably, with intuitions towards
reference stability being much stronger in some cases than others. As such, the ease with
which reference stability can be called into question varies. I will start with a more easily
overturned example, oﬀered by Robert Stecker. Stecker has suggested that conceptual
content is not a reliable guide to the nature of the entities referred to since we might be
fundamentally mistaken about the kind a term refers to  as when it was widely believed
that . . . planets were gods (Stecker, 2009, p.382). The suggestion is that at a previous
point in history, language users referred to the planets with various names, though
they believed that what they were referring to were gods. Of course, as we have seen
conceptual analysis does not depend on explicit beliefs about the nature of the entities
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we talk and think about. Rather, it depends on our considered intuitions about the
use of terms in possible scenarios considered as actual (application and co-application
conditions). What we are to believe then, if the example is to have any force, is that
an analysis of past language users' understanding of these conditions would have been
compatible with god-like entities but not with planet-like entities, though unbeknownst
to them they were actually referring to planets.
We can ﬁll out the details of this example in two ways, neither of which will give
Stecker the result he needs. Firstly  and I think this is the most plausible way to
ﬁll out the scenario  we can imagine that past speakers had a host of diﬀerent beliefs
about their `gods', and an aspect of those beliefs involved associating the `gods' with
certain heavenly bodies. However, it is now very implausible that they were actually
referring to those heavenly bodies when they spoke of their gods. They were simply
failing to refer. If reference failure is ever possible, and it surely is, then this seems to
be one of the better candidates. Stecker has merely assumed that they were referring to
planets when they spoke of gods, while also assuming that their reference determining
conceptual content was wholly `god like'. The conceptual analyst's response is that if
their reference determining conceptual content was wholly god like, they merely failed
to refer.
Alternatively, it may be the case that there were people who were aware of the
`heavenly bodies' and referred to them and individuated them as those things that
move through the sky, are visible each night, etc., and of those things thought that
they were gods. Here it is plausible that they had false beliefs and made false claims
about planets. This scenario won't give Stecker the result he needs however, because ex
hypothesi the conceptual content of the past speakers is not suﬃciently diﬀerent from
our own. However, I think this scenario is very unlikely. Note that if this was the case
then they would not have come to the conclusion that the god of war (for example)
didn't exist.
The primary response to Stecker then is that he is just wrong to suppose that past
speakers referred to the planets when they spoke of gods. They merely failed to refer.
Moreover, any move Stecker makes to ﬁll out the story to persuade us otherwise will
involve him painting the scenario such that it no longer achieves his aims.
A more developed attempt to make the same point has been provided by Laura
Schroeter (2004). Schroeter's examples focus on Aristotle's classical elements: air, earth,
ﬁre and water. The argument begins by noting that Aristotle's metaphysical world view
and explanatory models were considerably diﬀerent from ours, involving potential for
change and rest, among other things. As such, the kinds of things Aristotle took himself
to be talking about, based on his beliefs and concepts, were radically diﬀerent from what
we now know he was talking about. So, taking water as an example:
a modern analyst might be tempted to say Aristotle's water concept
referred to that basic conﬁguration of prime matter which most closely
matched Aristotle's own criteria for identifying water in his actual world.
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If that is what Aristotle had in mind, however, his water concept did not
manage to refer to anything at all. (Schroeter, 2004, p.437)
But it is then assumed, in line with our `standard externalist intuitions', that these
terms as used by Aristotle do in fact refer to the same things that we refer to when we
use them. So Aristotle's `water' concept referred to H20 just as ours does, Schroeter
claims (Schroeter, 2004, p.437). Ergo, the modern analyst is mistaken in thinking that
concepts can reveal facts about the referent, since Aristotle managed to refer to the
same stuﬀ as us despite his radically diﬀerent conceptual content.
My response here will essentially be the same as that oﬀered to Stecker, but over-
coming the strength of the `externalist intuitions' will require slightly more work. I
will begin by discussing brieﬂy Schroeter's speciﬁc claims concerning earth, air and ﬁre,
where I think it is possible to push our intuitions away from reference stability. The ex-
ample of water, where intuitions are arguably the strongest, will require a more detailed
discussion.
Schroeter is asking us to accept that the Greek words used by Aristotle that have
subsequently been translated as `earth', `air' and `ﬁre' referred in Aristotle's mouth to
the same things that we refer to with our terms `earth', `air' and `ﬁre'. The ﬁrst thing to
note is that there is a real danger here of making false assumptions about the accuracy
of translation. Languages have idiosyncratic and untranslatable terms, and meanings
(and subsequently references) can and do shift especially over such long periods. We
should not blindly assume accuracy of translation. A second point to note is that none
of these terms even have clear well deﬁned extensions in modern English. Does `air'
refer to any gas, or any planetary atmosphere, or any gas with the same molecular
ratios as Earth atmosphere at ground level? Likewise, is the extension of `earth' any
inanimate naturally found solid, or just the soil-like compounds in which things can be
grown? `Fire' is also a slippery term: we speak of building ﬁres, or relighting the same
ﬁre, or having a coal ﬁre installed. Are we to believe that the words Aristotle used
has exactly the same vague extension as our words now have, and if so, in virtue of
what is this assumption made? Schroeter claims that Aristotle was referring to ﬁre as a
process which today is more precisely picked out by the term `combustion', but it seems
unlikely that Aristotle had anything like the concept of combustion at work. Why are
we to think that he was referring to combustion rather than, say, ﬂames, or heat, or
some other related kind of phenomenon? Schroeter addresses this worry as follows:
When we judge that Aristotle's ﬁre concept referred to the process of
combustion, we justify our interpretation by appealing to the most impor-
tant elements of Aristotle's own conceptual practice. But Aristotle himself
couldn't tell what the most important elements of this practice really were
purely on the basis of a priori conceptual analysis. Aristotle's strongest tacit
assumptions about which sort of thing he was thinking about were just plain
wrong. (Schroeter, 2004, p.442)
Yet notice that this proves too much, for this rules out even the possibility that Aristotle
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was thinking of and referring to ﬂames rather than combustion, on the grounds that
combustion is the most scientiﬁcally interesting aspect according to modern theory
(and even that is a questionable claim  scientiﬁcally interesting according to which
standards?). Yet surely the possibility that Aristotle was thinking of and referring to
ﬂames is very real. After all, one certainly can think of and refer to ﬂames rather than
combustion. Schroeter might assume that that Aristotle's ﬁre concept referred to the
process of combustion, but this is a bad assumption to make.
What emerges here, I think, is a tendency to make uncritical assumptions about what
past speakers were referring to based on modern theories and concepts. We should not
put the reference of Aristotle's words into his mouth simply based on our own under-
standing of terminology and theory, regardless of what our initial intuition suggests.
Schroeter might respond at this point, however, by arguing that even if intuitions
about reference stability can be questioned for `earth', `air' and `ﬁre', our intuitions
about the reference of `water' are surely strong enough to support the claim of reference
stability despite radical conceptual change. It is likely that discussions of the reference of
`water' beneﬁt from its familiarity in externalist thought experiments. We have become
accustomed to accepting that speakers in 1750 referred to H20 despite not knowing
the chemical constitution of water, and it seems that we can extrapolate backwards to
Aristotle without too much diﬃculty.
There is a problem here for Schroeter, however, and it is a problem that she recognises.
The problem is that with the example of water, it is not clear that Aristotle's conceptual
content would have been suﬃciently diﬀerent from our own to undermine the claims of
conceptual analysis (Schroeter, 2004, p.442).
Nevertheless, I think that even the intuition that the reference of `water' has remained
stable can be brought into question. To make this point we can begin by noting that it is
often taken for granted that developments in science lead to straightforward discoveries
about the true nature of the entities being referred to. Speakers in the past referred
to H20 with the term `water' it is claimed, despite not knowing its chemical nature, or
even that it is a chemical kind. However, there are good reasons to think that even
though we now specify the referent of `water' as H20, reaching this conclusion was a
matter of decision about what `water' should refer to rather than pure discovery. As
such we cannot assume that prior to these scientiﬁc developments the relevant terms
referred just as they do now. The presence of decision points in scientiﬁc progress in
general should put the brakes on the uncritical supposition that reference is always
stable through conceptual change.
The way to show this is to appeal to examples that demonstrate the inevitability
of decision points following certain scientiﬁc discoveries. Both actual and hypothetical
examples can be found in the philosophical literature. The point in every case is to show
that the precise reference that our terms have now was not mandated by any previous
(relevant) state of aﬀairs, and thus it is implausible that previous speakers referred to
what we do now.
For example, Keith Donnellan has oﬀered a Twin Earth thought experiment of his
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own to show that the precise reference of a kind term such as `gold' was not ﬁxed as
it is now prior to key scientiﬁc developments. In Donnellan's example, Twin Earth and
Earth diﬀer only in the following respect: scientists on Twin Earth decide that isotope
number is more interesting than atomic number. On Twin Earth as on Earth early
language users had the vernacular term `gold' and used it in the same way. However, as
the chemistry of elements developed, scientists on Twin Earth identiﬁed the vernacular
term `gold' not with the element having atomic number 79, but with a certain isotope
having a certain isotope number (Donnellan, 1983, p.100). Thus after the rise of
modern chemistry `gold' on Twin Earth has a diﬀerent extension to `gold' on Earth
even though the only relevant diﬀerences on Earth and Twin Earth arose following the
discovery of atomic number and isotope number. Given the possibility of this scenario,
the point then is that we cannot just assume that early language users on Earth had
the same extension for their term as we have now, without assuming that the extension
of their terms was ﬁxed by future scientiﬁc decisions. As Donnellan put it, it is bizarre
to suppose extension depends on future historical accidents (Donnellan, 1983, p.104).
Donnellan concludes: I do not see how we can accept Putnam's view that it is clear
that natural kind terms in ordinary language have the same extension before and after
scientiﬁc discoveries (Donnellan, 1983, p.104).
In case it is thought that a lot rests here on questionable hypothetical scenarios,
Joseph LaPorte has more recently used actual world examples to make the same point
(LaPorte, 2004, pp.103-108). LaPorte notes that following the discovery of D20, a heavy
isotope of H20, in 1931, it was scientiﬁc `decision' rather than discovery which resulted
in D20 falling under the extension of `water' (it is often called `heavy water'). This is
because nothing prior to the discovery of D20 mandated one extension of `water' rather
than the other. D20 and `normal' H20 are the same microstructural kind in one sense
(they are both H20) but diﬀerent microstructural kinds in another sense (they have
diﬀerent mass numbers). Furthermore, as LaPorte points out, it makes no diﬀerence
to accurate scientiﬁc theory which kind `water' picks out. We happen to have chosen
to have `water' refer to all H20 (heavy and light), but we need not have done. As such
we can bring into question the entrenched assumption that `water' in the mouths of
previous speakers picked out the very kind that we refer to now. LaPorte argues that in
1900, for example, it was simply indeterminate as to whether D20 lay in the extension of
`water'. To say that it did include D20 simply in virtue of decisions made 30 years later
is to be guilty of the kind of retrospective semantics that Donnellan called `bizarre'.
LaPorte further discusses other actual examples that show that in some cases vernac-
ular terms do not come to stand for micro-structural kinds at all. Jade, for example,
has come to refer for the Chinese to two diﬀerent chemical substances, despite the fact
that one of them was only introduced at the end of the 18th Century. The relatively
new stone (`new jade' or `jadeite') was superﬁcially similar to (though distinguishable
from) the traditional stone (`old jade' or `nephrite'). With the introduction of the new
material, the Chinese certainly could have retained the term `jade' just for the nephrite
they were already familiar with. However, they chose not too, and now `jade' in the
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Chinese language applies equally to the old and new forms (LaPorte, 2004, pp.94-96).
The term `ruby' provides a slightly diﬀerent kind of example. As LaPorte notes, the
term was used for a long time for a red mineral identiﬁed only by superﬁcial properties.
When the chemical composition of the mineral was discovered, it turned out that the
mineral could also be found in a blue form, the colour being changed by minor impurities.
It might seem then that `ruby' should have come to refer to the mineral in its blue form
as well (given our tendency, in other cases, to refer to microstructure), but it did not.
The term has been reserved only for the red variety of the mineral (LaPorte, 2004,
p.101).
The point in both cases is that there is a great deal more referential decision making
following empirical discoveries than our `externalist intuitions' would have us believe.
It is tempting to assume, as Schroeter does, that Aristotle was referring to H20 with
his term, given that that is what we now refer to. But there are no guarantees of
this. Things could have gone diﬀerently following the same scientiﬁc discoveries, and,
to repeat Donnellan's point, it is implausible to think that the extension of Aristotle's
terms depended on future accidents and psychological quirks.
So what was Aristotle referring to with his terms for `earth', `air', `ﬁre' and `water'?
This is a diﬃcult question to answer with any precision, though if we trust the trans-
lations we can certainly get some idea. The important point is that it is a question for
historians and translators, and not just a question for modern science. If Aristotle did
associate very diﬀerent application and co-application conditions with his terms than
we currently associate with our terms, we should doubt that his terms had the same
extension as our terms.
It should be noted that this tendency towards retrospective attribution of meaning
and extension becomes even less plausible when we move away from scientiﬁc terms.
For example, for most of us, `poor' is currently a vague term (it has borderline cases)
and a context sensitive term (what counts as being poor will change with context). It
is sometimes useful, however, to make the meaning of `poor' precise, usually in terms
of how much a person lives on in a day. Research bodies and governments do this all
the time. Now suppose that one of these precisiﬁcations becomes so widely used that
`poor' is no longer a vague term of English. In virtue of one of the deﬁnitions catching
on, `poor' now only applies to those living on less than a certain ﬁxed amount. It is
quite clear that we don't want to say that `this is what we meant all along'. We don't
retrospectively interpret our previous uses as having this new precise meaning. Instead,
we just say that the meaning of `poor' has changed. We might even suppose that some
more research is carried out and data gathered, and a new deﬁnition proposed that is
in some sense more accurate, or more useful. But it is still clear that we have changed
the meaning of `poor'  we have not discovered something about what the term meant
in the past.
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2.5. Conceptual Analysis in Practice
Defending the claim that language users have conceptual content that determines refer-
ence has taken us some way from the original methodological question. Along the way,
many broad and thorny philosophical issues have been touched upon, about which a
great deal more could be said. However, at some point we must move on from method-
ology to our motivating ontological question. Hopefully enough has been said to at least
ward oﬀ any premature objections to the methodological claim being defended here.
What remains in this chapter is ﬁrstly to discuss, brieﬂy, some of the consequences
that this commitment to reliable conceptual content has for our understanding of ref-
erence in general, and secondly to set out more fully how ontological theorising can be
guided by this methodology.
In terms of the general consequences for reference, the ﬁrst point to pick up on is that
it follows from this account that signiﬁcant disagreements between two parties about
the application and co-application conditions for a given term implies that the term
is actually being used to refer to diﬀerent entities by each party. However, this need
not worry us for two reasons. Firstly, this phenomenon is quite familiar. Sometimes
debates can continue for some time before it is realised that contributors are actually
talking about diﬀerent entities  they are `talking past each other.' This phenomenon
agrees well with conceptual analysis. We know we are talking past one another when
our understanding of how the term should be applied in scenarios diﬀers signiﬁcantly.20
At other times, a genuine debate can arise where the debate is not about some agreed
subject matter where this is understood as an entity, but about the most accurate or
suitable conceptual framework needed to explain some phenomenon. In these cases,
theorists may reject old entities and introduce new ones. A debate about what caused
the pattern in a cliﬀ face (is it caused by nesting birds or by a storm?) is not a debate
about what some established entity is like, but about which entity the best theory
should posit. In these cases of course the kind of conceptual analysis defended here is
ineﬀective. We cannot provide an ontological account of what caused the pattern in
the cliﬀ face if we as of yet have not identiﬁed in any clear way which entity we are
interested in.
The second concern that the method of conceptual analysis might invite is this: if our
application and co-application conditions are indeterminate in some key area then would
it not follow that reference of our terms is indeterminate? The answer is that this is
exactly what follows, but that this also needn't worry us. For a start, it doesn't follow
from this that, of any particular entity that is picked out, it itself is indeterminate.
Rather, it follows that sometimes, perhaps often, it is indeterminate what exactly is
being picked out by a term in a common language. In other words, the indeterminacy
is semantic rather than metaphysical. This kind of indeterminacy is commonplace and
20This kind of disagreement is not to be confused with the disagreement that takes place when debators
disagree about the correct use of a term whose reference is established by experts or in general by
the consensus of the wider linguistic community.
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usually quite harmless. We noted already that, as LaPorte argued, prior to the discovery
of D20, it was indeterminate whether D20 was in the extension of `water'. It may also
have been somewhat indeterminate what Aristotle was referring to with his term for
`earth'. Along with indeterminacy, there will be degrees of ambiguity. For example,
Paul Bloom has argued that while `water' is often used to refer to H20, the term also
has a strong vernacular use that suggests that we are picking out not H20 but an artifact
kind that includes swamp water and radiator water (both called `water') but excludes
tea, tears and Sprite (Bloom, 2007, pp.151-156).
The example of biological species, a topic that we will return to 6.1, is very useful
here. In most non-technical contexts language users discuss animal species with little
trouble. We say things like `The Tiger is a dangerous carnivore' or `The Aye-aye
is an unusual animal, if ever there was one' and there are no real problems with this.
However, we might ask what exactly the speakers are referring to. Likely they will
reply `the species by that name, whatever a species is' or something to the same eﬀect.
In other words, the reference is given by deferring to the experts. But there are in
fact around 20 diﬀerent species concepts, each of which picks out animals in a given
species according to diﬀerent criteria (Griﬃths, 1999, p.221). So they may say instead
that the ordinary users mean by `species' whatever a species actually is, according to
best future science. However, this makes the assumption that there is such a thing as
the one correct species concept that all the current uses of the term actually pick out.
Species pluralists argue on the contrary that diﬀerent concepts are useful in diﬀerent
contexts and so `species' has a number of diﬀerent but equally `correct' meanings.21 If
the pluralists are right about this then ordinary users can use the term `species' perfectly
well without referring determinately. The possible species concepts are `close enough' to
each other in most contexts for the indeterminacy to be communicatively unimportant.
If it is asked `Is the Tiger a carnivorous animal?' it would be inappropriate to ask in
reply `what exactly do you mean by Tiger?' because the answer is `yes' in every case.
It is only in more technical contexts that clariﬁcation is needed.
I think we should likewise expect a degree of indeterminacy and some cases of ambi-
guity to arise in our talk of entities such as novels, works of music, and poems. Many
of these will be minor and unproblematic, others are already well known. For exam-
ple, `book' is ambiguous between a copy of a book and `book' as a work of literature.
Here the diﬀerences in how we apply the terms in each case make the distinction easy
to recognise. That does not, of course, mean the distinction is ontologically straight-
forward. It will be the goal of the remaining chapters of this thesis to spell out the
relationship between copies and works of literature in more detail.
We can see now that this will be done by assessing our intuitions about the application
and co-application conditions for those terms. We can use these intuitions to reach
ontological conclusions by picking out patterns and similarities in our use of various
referring terms. We are looking for generalisations of the kind of information that we
21See, e.g., Dupré (1993), and Ereshefsky (1998).
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use to give answers to questions about the application of terms in possible scenarios.
The grouping of things into ontological categories depends on similarities in the way
that terms for individual things are applied. So for example, if we are interested in
the ontological nature of novels, we are not interested in when it is or is not correct
to apply the term `novel' in a scenario. That would amount to conceptual analysis
of the concept `novel' instead of an investigation into the ontological nature of novels
themselves. Rather we want to know what the application and co-application conditions
for terms referring to speciﬁc novels have in common both with each other and with
other entities. Given that these conditions provide the extension of the term in possible
scenarios, we are interested, when identifying an ontological category, in what those
conditions have in common.
The grouping that provides the target of the enquiry undertaken in this thesis is itself
based on just such an implicit analysis. So, for example, the logic behind the conditions
of application and co-application for novels appears very similar to that for works of
music, company logos, and photographs (or so it seems). The claim that certain things
are all repeatable is based on the implicit recognition that terms for these things apply
in scenarios in the same kind of way, and according to the same principles  principles
that we will attempt to extract and set out in terms of an ontological theory.
It is clear that conceptual analysis, as being put forward here, is not a matter of
language users being aware a priori of a set of propositions that are true, and obviously
true, about the entities in question. (On the contrary, many of the conclusions drawn
in this thesis will turn out not to be obvious at all.) Rather conceptual analysis is
the process of exploring one's intuitions about the application of a term in possible
scenarios, and working to develop conceptual descriptions and generalisations of those
intuitions. The process is thus reﬂective: explanatory hypotheses are oﬀered to account
for these intuitions, which are then tested against further intuitions.
Moreover, it should be pointed out that there is still plenty of room for manoeuvre
within this methodological approach. Intuitions about application and co-application
conditions need analysing and interpreting, and ontological theories must be developed
that both accommodate those intuitions and ﬁll in the gaps, so to speak. As such, there
is still plenty of work to be done even with this guiding methodology in place. It is to
that task that I turn now.
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We are now in a position to address the central question of this thesis head on. What
sort of thing is a repeatable artefact? We have names for novels, works of music and
graphic designs and regularly employ those names in sentences in order to make claims
about, ask questions about, and generally discuss the bearers of those names. We say
things like The 2012 Olympic Logo received a bad reception when it was ﬁrst unveiled.
We also, of course, appear to quantify over these repeatable things (All the proposed
logos were ﬂawed in some way), though as I said in the introduction, I will not be
mounting any substantial defence of realism here. Given that we accept that they exist,
we ask: what sort of thing is the 2012 Olympic Logo? In this part of the thesis I will
articulate and defend an answer to this question. In doing so I will seek to assess and
take seriously our practices of identifying and individuating these sorts of entities, and
of our understanding of application and co-application conditions. That is, we must
now try to apply the method outlined previously to a speciﬁc end.
To cut to the chase, I will argue in this chapter that repeatable entities are kinds.
Kinds are entities whose identity and persistence conditions are grasped in terms of the
instantiation of collections of properties. They are not like ordinary material objects
in that they do not trace continuous paths through space-time in the form of more
or less cohesive collections of matter. Instead, they are located and can be identiﬁed
wherever the relevant collection of properties are instantiated and so can be `multiply
located'. They are real physical entities in an ontological plane that cuts across the
non-repeatable objects and events with which we are more familiar.
There are two key elements to the theory of kinds indicated in that brief description.
The ﬁrst is that kinds have essences. The essence of a kind is the condition or conditions
that must be satisﬁed for the kind to be instanced. It provides a rationale for identifying
and individuating the kind and provides a unifying principle that binds the instances of
the kind together as instances of that kind. Motivating and expanding on this position
will be the task of this chapter. The second element to this theory of kinds is that,
contrary to the prevailing view, kinds that have physicial instances, and so repeatable
artefacts, are not abstract entities.1 Instead, kinds that have physical instances are
themselves physical. They represent a diﬀerent ontological categorisation of the same
material world occupied by chairs, mountains and electrons. I will leave a discussion of
this view, which I call Kind Physicalism, until the next chapter.
1I restrict the claim I am making to kinds with physical instances, because I do not want to rule out
the possibility of kinds of abstract entity. There may be kinds of number (such as the kind Prime
Number) which has abstract instances and is itself abstract.
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The theory I present accounts for the ontological nature of repeatable artefacts, but
extends far beyond those. To pave the way for a fuller explanation we can note that
according to this theory a paradigmatic example of a kind is gold. On this view gold is
a real physical mass2 that is found across the world instantiated by all the ingots and
pieces of jewellery that are made of gold. The essence of gold is (we can assume) the
atomic number: wherever there are atoms with atomic number 79 collected together
there is gold. However, these atoms will also form a piece of gold. To see and touch
a piece of gold is to see and touch gold itself as gold is instantiated by the ordinary
material object that is the piece of gold.
I will defend the view proposed here primarily on the following grounds. Firstly
it makes good sense of our intuitions concerning the application and co-application
conditions for these entities. That is, it adheres with a careful analysis of our concepts
of repeatable things, and so provides an account of what we ordinarily mean by `novel'
and by `work of music', for example. Likewise, it takes seriously and explains how we can
encounter artworks and other artefacts  how we can read a novel and see a play as well
as read a copy of a novel and see a performance of a play. Secondly it locates repeatable
artefacts, and more speciﬁcally repeatable artworks, in a broad ontological category
with far reaching explanatory virtues. Repeatable artefacts are not obscure entities
that call for their own ontology. Rather they represent a familiar (if philosophically
slippery) ontological category that encompasses many other things.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. I begin in 3.1 by presenting the onto-
logical task in terms of explaining the phenomenon of repeatability. I argue that to
understand repeatability we need to carefully assess those practices that give rise to the
phenomenon. We need to see clearly what is going on when we identify something as
repeatable. Doing so will reveal a conﬂict between the identiﬁcation of sameness and
the identiﬁcation of diﬀerence. I will argue that we have no reason not to interpret
these as ascriptions of literal identity and non-identity. In 3.2 I consider two solutions
to the puzzle of repeatability. The ﬁrst claims that the entity which is strictly identical
in cases of repetition is a set or a class, while the second claims that a repeatable entity
is a large scattered object (or scattered event). I argue that while both of these sug-
gestions can handle our practices of identifying repeatable entities to some degree, they
ultimatly provide unsatisfactory frameworks for understanding the relationship between
a repeatable entity and its instances. Instead I defend the view that when we make an
identity claim in the case of repeatability we are identifying an entity uniquely suited
to be repeatable - namely a kind (3.3). I introduce the kind/instance relationship as
an explanation of repeatability and tie kinds to the notion of an essence. The chapter
ends with a discussion of this theory of kinds in relation to the notion of natural kinds.
I argue that worries about kinds being highly proliﬁc can be eased by recognising that
kinds come in degrees of naturalness.
2I adopt the term `mass' following Quine (1960, p.90), though `material' or perhaps `substance' would
be alternative terms to use, if they weren't so likely to carry unwanted implications.
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3.1. The Puzzle of Repeatability
The method of conceptual analysis defended in Part I requires that if we want to know
what sort of thing a novel is we need to know what sort of thing `novel' in English refers
to. The reference of `novel' is partly determined by our understanding of the application
and co-application conditions for that term. It is because of that understanding that we
have placed novels into the broad ontological category of repeatable things. But what
exactly is this phenomenon of repeatability, and what does it imply about the nature
of the repeatable thing? In order to bring the question into focus it will be useful to
have some concrete scenarios to assess:
Example 1
Bill and Jane each give Mary a gift for her birthday. Unfortunately, they both give Mary
Pride and Prejudice in hardback, aware as they are that Mary is fan of Austen. As
such the following statements are both true:
1) Bill and Jane both gave Mary the same present for her birthday.
2) Bill and Jane gave Mary diﬀerent presents for her birthday.
(1) is true because they both gave Mary Pride and Prejudice. They both gave one
and the same novel. (2) is true because Bill and Jane did not club together to get one
copy. They both gave diﬀerent copies.
Here we are identifying and making claims about the novel Pride and Prejudice.
We are also identifying the copies of the novel. What this scenario highlights, it seems,
is that the diﬀerence between copies of the novel and the novel itself can be understood
in terms of diﬀering ascriptions of identity and non-identity.
Example 2
The second example is taken from David Armstrong in a discussion of universals. Arm-
strong oﬀers the following diagram:
THE THE
He then asks:
How many words are there in this display? It is obvious that the question
has two good answers: There are two words there. There is only one word
there. Pierce would have said there are two tokens of one type. (Armstrong,
1989, pp.1-2)
Again, what is going on here is the juxtaposition of an ascription of identity with an
ascription of non-identity. There is something identical, which we count as one, while
there are also two distinct things.3
3To repeat a point made in the Introduction, I will henceforth adopt the type-token terminology when
discussing words merely as a useful way of distinguishing between `word' as a repeatable and `word'
as a non-repeatable.
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Example 3
Thirdly, suppose that Bill and Jane go to see the same ﬁlm over the weekend. However,
they do not meet because they went to diﬀerent showings of that same ﬁlm. Thus what
they went to see was the same, and what they went to see was diﬀerent. The ﬁrst
claim is about the identity of the ﬁlm, while the second is about the non-identity of the
showings.
Example 4
A ﬁnal example takes us beyond what we normally think of as repeatable entities, but
will be useful to highlight what I perceive to be the extent of the phenomenon. Suppose
instead of a novel, Bill and Jane both buy Mary the same whisky, knowing how much
she likes Glenfiddich. Mary is disappointed because she would have preferred to get
two diﬀerent whiskies, rather than getting the same whisky twice. In this case the
identiﬁcation and individuation of the whisky can be contrasted with the identiﬁcation
and individuation of the bottles of whisky.
To take these practices seriously is to accept that when we talk of whiskies in this way
we are identifying what we might call a `mass' (substance, material) and the relationship
between the mass and the samples of that mass (bottles, shots, etc.) appears to follow
the same logic as the relationship between word types and word tokens, between novels
and copies of novels, and between the ﬁlms and the showings. Let us say that in each
case we have the repeatable entity on the one hand and the instances of the entity
on the other. The use of this term pre-empts the ontological account defended in this
thesis, but can be understood for now just as a useful label.
It is because of this similarity that I am going to argue that each of the four entities
discussed belongs to the same ontological category, and in understanding that ontolog-
ical category we can understand the ontological nature of repeatable entities. However,
the examples also bring to light diﬀerences within that category that we need to be
aware of. The diﬀerences lie in the diﬀerent sorts of instances that a repeatable entity
can have. Nicholas Wolterstorﬀ has made a distinction between repeatable works of art
that are occurrence-works and those that are object-works (Wolterstorﬀ, 1980, pp.36-
37). However, `works' here implies a work of art, and since I am interested in repeatable
artefacts more broadly I will adapt the terminology and talk of occurrence-repeatables
and object-repeatables. An occurrence-repeatable is a repeatable artefact that has as its
instances events or occurrences. Thus ﬁlms are occurrence repeatables, as are plays and
works of music. An object-repeatable, on the other hand, is a repeatable artefact that
has what we would commonly think of as non-occurring objects as its instances. Graphic
designs, logos, photographs, and castings are all object-repeatables, as are masses like
whisky. Finally, we can note that some repeatable artefacts have instances that are
either occurrences or objects. Words, for example, have instances that are inscriptions
and instances that are utterances (events). Poems certainly seem to fall into the same
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category, in that we can identify a poem through an inscription or an utterance.4
It is important to note that there is a thorny issue of what it is to be an object of
this sort that is being ignored here. For example, a logo has as its instances particular
images, but one might think that a particular image is on an object rather than being
an object itself, especially if we think of an image being displayed on a computer screen.
A similar puzzle holds for text based artefacts. Is a token of a word an object in itself?
It seems to be an arrangement of ink on a page or an arrangement of pixels on a screen,
but what exactly is this? A state of aﬀairs? Because my focus here is on the ontological
nature of the repeatable entities, I am not going to try and answer these questions.
It will be enough to say that image-based and text-based artefacts have instances of
some sort or another. Moreover, though it is simplifying matters somewhat, I will
continue to call all these instances `objects' where the primary demarcating feature
is that they are not events. Hence we can treat the object-repeatable/occurrence-
repeatable distinction as exhaustive. Fortunately the proposal defended in this thesis
does not rely on an articulation of the precise ontological nature of the non-repeatable
instances of repeatable entities. For the same reason I will not discuss the nature of
events in this thesis.
I want to suggest that these examples present us with the `raw data' of the puzzle of
repeatability. There are two word tokens and one word type in the display, but there
are not, straightforwardly at least, three separate entities in the display (but see 4.1).
But then what do we have?
In an attempt to strip our language of as many preconceptions as possible, we can
say that there is `sameness despite diﬀerence' when there is repeatability. And this is an
attempt to capture the notion of repeatability as `same again'. However, not just any
case of `same again' counts as repeatability. Each day I sit at the same desk even though
the day of sitting has changed, and I can identify the same cat at diﬀerent locations
throughout the day, but the desk and the cat are not `repeatable' in the relevant way.
What is unique about genuine cases of repeatability is that we do not just have the same
entity in diﬀerent circumstances, or identiﬁed under diﬀerent descriptions, but we seem
to have the sameness of an entity being identiﬁed `in connection with' the diﬀerence of
an entity. So when we have a situation in which one entity is repeated twice we have
the same entity twice but we also have diﬀerent entities. Moreover, we cannot, as it
were, physically separate the state of aﬀairs of there being two word tokens with the
state of aﬀairs of there being one word type. One could not take a rubber to the display
and remove the two word tokens without also `removing' the word type, nor could one
make it so that there was no word type there without also removing the word tokens.5
We can also bring clarity by contrasting genuine repeatability with the relationship
4Wolterstorﬀ has suggested that all literary (all text-based?) works have diverse instances in this
respect, but one might wonder whether, for example, we really do identify the novel itself when we
have a reading of the novel (1980, p.38). Fortunately that matter need not be decided here.
5With talk of `removing' a type here, there is a danger of begging the question against an abstract
account, according to which it is not possible to literally remove a word type. However, all that is
being implied is that without word tokens there is no sense in which one can identify the word type.
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between an original thing and a copy of that thing. If prints are produced from a
painting it may be that some image is repeated across the prints, but the painting itself
is not repeated. If we have two prints of a painting side by side, we do not have two
diﬀerent prints and one painting, because we do not have the painting at all. The actual
painting may be hanging in some distant gallery. We have seen the print, but it is not
true that we have literally seen the painting.6 Contrast this with two copies of a novel.
If I have two copies of the novel, I also have the novel. If I pick up a copy and read it,
it would not be right to say that I have not read the novel but only a copy of the novel
(as it would be right to say that I have not seen the painting, but only a print or copy
of the painting). `Copies' in this case cannot mean what it means for a painting and
its prints. The novel, unlike the painting, is repeatable, and the diﬀerence lies in the
genuine identiﬁcation of the repeatable thing despite the diﬀerent instances.7
The reason for labouring at this phenomenon is not because it is unfamiliar but if
anything because it is over -familiar. As Armstrong says, the distinction is ubiquitous
(Armstrong, 1989, p.2). There is a danger that we accept the distinction without
taking enough care to see what is actually going on when we make the identiﬁcations
that give rise to the phenomenon. By saying that we are identifying one word twice
when we say that there is one type in the display I am claiming that we have here
genuine identiﬁcation of the type going on  we are identifying something as being
literally identical alongside the distinctness of the tokens. It is essential to my account
that such literal identity claims are being made when we identify repeatable artefacts.
When we say that Bill and Jane gave the same whisky or the same novel, or when a
person says that they saw the same ﬁlm three times before, I am claiming that a strict
and literal identity claim is being made in each case. This is important because, as I
have argued, it is these practices which determine what it is that is being picked out.
There is a possible line of objection to my reasoning here that needs to be addressed
before we can move on and consider the consequences of this identiﬁcation. It might be
argued that I am reading more into the situation than I am entitled to. One might want
to distinguish between strict and literal identity and a more relaxed sense of sameness,
and then say that what is going on here is the identiﬁcation of two distinct word tokens
(or novel copies, to use the earlier example) that are the same as each other only in
some loose sense. That is, we do not look at the display and literally pick out the same
identical thing twice, according to this objection. Armstrong, who once thought this
kind of interpretation implausible, came to accept it after considering examples of the
6Though of course there is a sense in which one can say they have `seen' a painting when they have
only seen a reproduction.
7As Peter Lamarque (2002, pp.144-145) has argued, though, we should perhaps be cautious of the
assumption that categories of art and artefacts neatly fall on either side of the repeatable/non-
repeatable divide (Lamarque talks of `particulars' and `types'). Some pictures that we may think
of as `paintings' may be such that to see a copy just is to actually see the painting (paintings made
using computer software may be like this). In other words, something that we may consider as
a painting may also be identiﬁed as repeatable. Similarly, some pieces of music may perhaps be
identiﬁed a non-repeatable so that, as Lamarque puts it, [t]o have heard the work you would have
had to have been present at the performance (2002 p.145). The point is that whether an entity is
repeatable is a matter of how we identify the entity, not of which artefact category it belongs to.
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identiﬁcation of parts and wholes (Armstrong, 1989, pp.1-7). I think that Armstrong is
mistaken here, but the mistake he makes is quite revealing.
The ﬁrst example Armstrong considers arises from an attempt to understand the
identity of a person over time in relation to Leibniz's Law. Leibniz's Law tells us that
when two things are strictly identical they will have the same properties.8 Now consider
the case of a person yesterday and the same person today. The person will have diﬀerent
properties on diﬀerent days, perhaps being happy one day and sad the next. On the
face of it, this might seem like a violation of Leibniz's Law. Does this mean they are not
in fact the same person? Very few philosophers draw that conclusion, and rightly so.
Armstrong's own suggestion, however, is that following Leibniz's Law we should accept
that the person yesterday is not strictly identical with the very same person today
but instead we should say that what we have when we speak of a person yesterday and
the very same person today is identity only in a loose and popular sense of the word
`identity'  (Armstrong, 1989, p.4).
Armstrong favours a `temporal parts' account of existence through time (perduran-
tism) such that the same person exists yesterday and today in virtue of the existence
of diﬀerent temporal parts of the one person. Thus, according to Armstrong, when we
say that the person yesterday is the same as the person today we are actually ascribing
sameness to diﬀerent temporal parts of a single four-dimensional entity and thus it is
sameness only in a `loose and popular' sense. The loose and popular sense of sameness
occurs, according to Armstrong, when we apply `the same' to diﬀerent parts of the
same thing (Armstrong, 1989, p.4).
The second example considered doesn't rely on a commitment to temporal parts, and
instead involves two spectators looking at an elephant from diﬀerent sides:
We can properly say that you two are seeing the same elephant. At the same
time, though, we would agree that each of you can only see diﬀerent parts
of that one elephant. So in this case talk of seeing the (very) same thing
only amounts to talk of seeing diﬀerent parts of the very same thing. I am
inclined to think that when `the same' or `the very same' is used in the loose
and popular sense, it always involves applying `the same' to diﬀerent parts
of the same thing, where that last phrase `the same thing' has the sense of
strict identity. (Armstrong, 1989, p.4)
The inference drawn from these examples is that we might be doing something similar
when confronted with repeatability: the two tokens are the same in the loose sense and
there is no literal identity claim being made. Thus when we speak of Bill and and Jane
giving the same whisky, or of someone seeing the same ﬁlm three times, we would not
actually be identifying some entity as being identical.
However, I would argue that Armstrong is describing these situations inaccurately.
If we accept the account of persons as having temporal parts we can certainly provide
8Or that whatever is true of one is true of the other, to adopt a formulation from E. J. Lowe (2002,
p.41).
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an explanation of change: the person is sad one day and happy the next because one
temporal part is happy and one temporal part is sad. Yet it doesn't follow from this
that when we speak of the person yesterday and the very same person today we are only
identifying the parts of the person. Rather than assume that we are applying a loose
sense of sameness to the parts, why not take our language at face value and accept that
we are applying sameness to the whole person, which we encounter twice in virtue of
encountering temporal parts?
Or consider the example of the elephant. Armstrong says that we must be applying
`the same' to diﬀerent parts of the same thing. But this is emphatically not what
we are doing when we say that we are seeing the same elephant. When we say that
the elephant I am seeing is the same as the elephant you are seeing we are applying
`the same' to the whole elephant. The ascription of sameness here is strict and literal
identity  everything that is true of the elephant I am seeing is true of the elephant you
are seeing.9
The key point here is that when we say that what you are seeing is the same as
what I am seeing, given that we do not mean that we are having the same phenomenal
experiences (in which case strict identity claims would be almost entirely impossible),
there must always be some implicit understanding of what the `thing' in question is.
We cannot simply appeal to `that which we are confronted with' because  recalling the
discussion from 1.3  that would not be enough to pick out anything determinately.
The `that' of the ostentation must somehow be made determinate between, for example,
the part of the elephant (and then it would be reasonable to ask `which part?') and the
whole elephant. Since we are asserting that what you see and what I see are the same,
we have every reason to think we are talking about the whole elephant and making a
strict identity claim, and no reason to think that we are merely talking about the parts.
If we return to the case of repeatability, the moral is that we should take seriously
what appears to be the case: we can recognise the non-identity of the two word tokens
and thus count them as two, while also recognising and identifying the word type which
we `count as one': the word type that occurs on the left of the display is literally
identical to the word type that occurs on the right of the display. Rather than write oﬀ
or explain away these practices we should be looking for an ontology that accounts for
them if we want to provide an ontological account of those things we call novels, poems
and works of music.
9It might be objected that I am failing to account for the puzzle raised by property ascription and
Leibniz's Law. Armstrong introduced the identiﬁcation of parts because of the worry that that
which is said to be sad cannot be identical with that which is said to be happy, as this would violate
the Law. However, I would claim  though I cannot argue for it here  that the solution to this
puzzle, whatever it may be, should pay heed to the identiﬁcations being made rather than vice
versa.
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3.2. Unpromising Solutions
Having set out the phenomenon of repeatability, I now want to consider two potential
solutions to the problem which I will argue are unsatisfactory. This will pave the way
for the introduction of kinds. Though I argue against these solutions, it is worth not-
ing that they deserve attention here as they both reasonably successfully accommodate
our practices of identiﬁcation and re-identiﬁcation of repeatable things, and our gen-
eral understanding of application and co-application conditions. Thus they are both
compatible with the methodology set out in Chapters 1 and 2.
The Set Hypothesis
To begin with, I will consider, and in due course reject, an explanation of repeatability
by appeal to classes or sets. How would an appeal to sets explain the identiﬁcation of
supposedly repeatable entities? Well, it might be thought that when we identify one
word type and two word tokens, for example, we are identifying one set of which the two
word tokens are members. It might be claimed that we identify the set `in virtue of' its
members much as we identify the whole elephant in virtue of its parts. The members
are strictly distinct, though the set of which they are members is identical.
This view can be dispatched fairly quickly. One pressing diﬃculty for this view is
that, at least on the most common understanding of sets, whatever members a set has
it has essentially.10 Thus all the copies of Ulysses that exist now must form a diﬀerent
set from the one containing all the copies of Ulysses twenty years ago (given that
between now and then some copies have been produced and some have gone out of
existence.) Which set should we then identify with Ulysses? Identifying the right set
seems somewhat problematic. One might be forced to say that each new copy brings
about a new novel (since the collection of copies then form a new set), but then it would
be impossible to produce a new copy of a previous novel, and the novel I enjoy now
could not be the same novel that my grandfather enjoyed. Sets also face a related modal
problem. Given that a set is deﬁned by its members, it could not have had fewer or
more members than it actually does have.11 Yet intuitively, how many instances there
are of a given repeatable artefact is a highly contingent matter.12
A further worry about this view is that an appeal to sets oﬀers no explanation of
why all the copies of a novel or all the performances of the play are grouped together
as being instances of the same work. Is it simply that they are members of the same
set? But in virtue of what? Sets are deﬁned by their members, so one can't appeal to
the set itself to provide a rationale for which members the set has. The feeling is that
10SeeWolterstorﬀ (1980, p.44), and Van Cleve (1985).
11Dodd (2000, pp.424-425), Rohrbaugh (2003, p.201), and Sharvy (1968).
12One could propose a counterpart-theoretic account to avoid this problem. Roughly speaking, on this
view, the modal properties of the novel depend on the non-modal properties of the novel's coun-
terparts in other worlds, and which counterpart relation is relevant depends on the conversational
context. The novel (as a set) could then have had diﬀerent members if there is a counterpart to
the novel with diﬀerent members. See e.g. Lewis (1971), Lewis (1986); also Caplan and Matheson
(2006) for similar application.
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the set/member relationship is, to speak loosely, too `thin' to oﬀer any robust account
of the relationship between a novel and a copy of the novel. If a theory of sets is going
to be viable, then, a great deal of work would need to be done. I think the prospects
for such an account are dim.
The Scattered Object Hypothesis
Perhaps, though, instead of the repeatable entity being a set and the instances its
members, the repeatable entity is an entity that has the `instances' as parts. We might
suppose that a repeatable artefact is the collection of its instances in the way that a chess
set is a collection of its pieces. On this view a novel is a `scattered object' and each of its
copies is a part of that object. This view interprets our claims of identity and diﬀerence
as claims about the identity of the whole object despite the diﬀerence of the parts.
One initial observation is that this move attempts to account for repeatability using
a more familiar ontological distinction, rather than treating it as a basic ontological
phenomenon. Repeatability in this case is just the ability of an entity to have multiple
parts.13
This view avoids many of the diﬃculties faced by an appeal to sets. Unlike a set, a
scattered object can gain and lose parts just as more commonplace objects do (replacing
a broken car part does not generate a numerically diﬀerent car). Similarly, the scattered
object could have had more or fewer parts than it actually does have and still be
numerically the same object. Furthermore, because scattered objects are not deﬁned
by their parts, this theory does distinctly better than an appeal to sets in explaining
why two word tokens are tokens of the same word type. For in this case one can make
an appeal to the `nature of the whole'. While there is a certain amount of hand waving
involved in this, it is the same kind of hand waving made when we try to understand
what uniﬁes parts into wholes in general. Thus the scattered object theorist can claim
that spelling this out in more detail is a general problem for any metaphysical account
that admits ordinary objects.
Something like the scattered object view has recently been defended for musical works
by Ben Caplan and Carl Matheson (Caplan and Matheson, 2006).14 Caplan and Math-
eson complicate matters somewhat by presenting their view as `Perdurantism about
Musical Works' and oﬀering repeated close analogies to perdurantism about persons.
However, the scattered object hypothesis need not be tied to perdurantism in this way.
This is because perdurantism is normally understood as a metaphysical account that
interprets common-or-garden concrete objects as actually being `event-like' in that they
have duration and temporal parts.15 However, since a work of music is an occurrence-
repeatable, the instances of the work of music  the performances or playings  are
13Though note that it would be strange to say that a chess set was repeatable, simply because we can
identify diﬀerent pieces of the same chess set.
14For a similar position applied to works of literature see Ghiselin (1980). Ghiselin's account is inspired
by a scattered object account of species, which will be discussed in depth in 6.1.
15Lowe (2002, p.49).
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already events with duration and temporal parts. The claim that Caplan and Matheson
are making, which is just that the performances are parts of a larger whole, is more
simply understood as the claim that they are parts of one larger event.16 Thus rather
than draw an analogy with perdurantism about persons, a simpler analogy would surely
be with some other large `scattered' event.17 We might say, for example, that the per-
formances of a work are related to the work itself in the same way that the individual
games in the World Cup are related to the World Cup as a whole  they are shorter
events that are parts of a bigger and longer event. An advantage of putting the matter
in this way is that one does not need to think perdurantism about persons is at all
plausible in order to assess the proposal.
Comparing musical works with large events like the World Cup reveals some interest-
ing results that show that our talk about large events and their parts is not so diﬀerent
from our talk of occurrence-repeatables. For example, a spectator may say that they
are `watching the World Cup' even though they are watching only one of the games that
make up the whole event. Perhaps, then, when we say we are listening to Beethoven's
Fifth we can similarly do so by listening to only part of the whole work of music. We
also talk of a large event and its parts as occurring at the same time. The World Cup
is going on and the match is going on. Moreover, the world cup is going on because
of (or in virtue of ) the playing of the match. Notice how this parallels the claim that
the song is being played and the performance is under way, and that the song is being
played because the performance is under way.
Having compared an occurrence-repeatable to a large scattered event, we can simi-
larly compare an object-repeatable to an ordinary scattered object (in which case the
associations with perdurantism are even less helpful). Again there is some overlap be-
tween the way that we talk about scattered objects and their parts and the way that
we talk about repeatable artefacts and their instances. A pair of gloves is a scattered
object with which we are familiar. If a pair of gloves is placed on a table and we ask
`how many objects are on the table?' we have an ambiguity which might be seen to
echo the ambiguity in the earlier question `how many words are there in the display?'
There is one pair of gloves but two individual gloves; there is one word type, but two
word tokens.
A similar line of thought is pursued by Quine in relation to `masses' such as water and
sugar (Quine, 1960, pp.90-100). Here Quine notes that certain terms (`water', `sugar',
`gold') take the grammatical role sometimes of singular and sometimes of general terms.
In predicative sentences they may appear before the `is' as a singular term (`water is
ﬂuid'), or after the `is' as a general term (`that puddle is water'). I want to leave aside
16Though the theory applied to occurrence-repeatables would more accurately be called a `scattered
event hypothesis' for simplicity I will apply `scattered object hypothesis' to cover the application
both to occurrence-repeatables and to object-repeatables.
17They might reply by saying that their account is technically a perdurance account nonetheless. My
point is that emphasising this seems to be beside the point given that instances of works of music are
already events. Moreover, if they were to extend their theory to object-repeatables such as novels,
the truth of perdurantism becomes entirely irrelevant (see below). One could hold a scattered object
account of novels without accepting that that scattered object was a perduring entity.
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the role as general term for now and look at Quine's interpretation of a mass term in
subject position. Quine writes:
A mass term used thus in subject position diﬀers none from such singular
terms as `mama' and `Agnes', unless the scattered stuﬀ that it names be
denied the status of a singular sprawling object. (Quine, 1960, p.98)
Thus when we say `Water is ﬂuid' we are referring to a scattered object which is the
aqueous part of the world that has sundry parts which are lakes, pools, drops, and
molecules (Quine, 1960, p.98). If we accept, as I have proposed, that masses fall into
the same ontological category as repeatable artefacts then we can interpret this as a
proposal that the instances of water are parts of water.
The scattered object hypothesis has much in its favour. As well as what I have claimed
about the similarities between our talk of repeatable artefacts and their instances, and
out talk of scattered wholes and their parts, this view also has the advantage of re-
ducing repeatability and the ontological nature of repeatable entities to something we
are already familiar with. One might take that to be a signiﬁcant advantage of the
view, citing simplicity and parsimony. If we can get away only with the ontological
relationship between parts and wholes then something that appeared complex will have
been reduced to something more simple. The scattered object hypothesis ought not be
dismissed lightly.
However, it should still be dismissed. Once we start looking at the problems this view
faces, its appeal fades away. Firstly, our ordinary language betrays as many diﬀerences
as similarities. As Dodd argues, to accept this assimilation would be to accept that
works of music can (almost) never be heard in their entirety, and this is a hard pill to
swallow (Dodd, 2007, p.157).18 It is quite right that we are normally willing to accept
that one can hear or see something by hearing or seeing a part of it  just as we see the
elephant by seeing a part of the elephant, and as we see and hear the ﬁreworks even if
we only see the last half of the display. But in none of these cases do we claim to see or
hear the whole entity by seeing or hearing a part of it. When I catch the last half the
ﬁrework display I cannot claim that I saw the whole display, because I saw only part
of that event. Similarly, though one can watch the World Cup by watching a match
within it, one cannot watch the whole World Cup by watching just one match. Nor can
one study a single piece of a chess set and claim to have studied the whole chess set.
Yet there is a very strong intuition to the eﬀect that we do hear the whole of a work of
music when we hear a single whole performance, and we do see the whole photograph
when we see a single print of the photograph.
The same discrepancy can be highlighted by the fact that if a teacher asks a child to
write the word `cat', and the child inscribes `c-a-t' the teacher will not complain that
the child has written only part of the word, and if I ask you to perform Greensleeves
and you play the song through, I will not complain that you have played only part of
Greensleeves. Likewise, as Eddie Zemach argues, if I ask for water and you being a cup
18See also Zemach (1970, p.243).
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of water, I cannot complain that you have brought me only part of water. Yet if I ask
for my pair of gloves and you bring only one glove, or if I ask for the chess set and you
bring only the white king, just such a complaint will be appropriate (Zemach, 1970,
p.243).
One of Caplan and Matheson's responses to this line of attack is to say that they
are only as badly oﬀ here as the perdurantist about persons is  for they have to say
that contrary to supposition even when a doctor inspects a patient from head to toe
they have not seen the whole person but only a temporal part of the whole (Caplan and
Matheson, 2006, p.62). The idea is that we have an intuition about seeing the whole
person, but the intuition is wrong given perdurantism. Therefore our intuitions may
well be wrong about works of music and photographs. However, having separated the
scattered object hypothesis from perdurantism, this move has far less argumentative
force. We see merely that there are parallel problems for perdurantism about persons
and for the scattered object hypothesis, without reason to believe that either is correct.
19
The scattered object hypothesis also suﬀers because there is an unexplained asymme-
try between wholes and parts on the one hand and repeatable entities and instances on
the other. According to the hypothesis, an entity is an instance of a repeatable entity
if it is a part of a whole. However, even if we accept that every instance is a part of the
whole, it is not the case that every part of the whole is an instance. For example, if we
think of a work of music as a large scattered event, an individual performance, which we
recognise as an instance of the repeatable entity, would be a part of the event. However,
the opening ten bars of the performance will also be a part of the large scattered event,
but the opening ten bars cannot properly be identiﬁed as an instance of the repeatable
entity. If instances just are parts, as the scattered object hypothesis maintains, then
the hypothesis cannot account for this asymmetry. In other words, for the scattered
object theorist, being a part of the whole is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for
being an instance. The theorist must then provide some further suﬃciency criteria. It
is hard to see how this will not be ad-hoc and available only on a case by case basis.
Moreover, the need for these additional conditions demonstrates that the relationship
between a repeatable entity and its instances is not fully captured by the part-whole
relationship.20
19Dodd has a further objection against Caplan and Matheson's perdurantism about musical works
but this becomes moot once we separate perdurantism from a scattered object (or scattered event)
theory. The objection was that musical works as perduring entities would be ontologically multifar-
ious, having uniﬁed temporal parts when there was only one performance occurring but scattered
temporal parts when there were two or more concurrent performances. If musical works are thought
of as scattered events, however, this problem does not arise as there seems to be nothing preventing
the same event occurring sometimes in one location and sometimes in two or more distinct locations
(Dodd, 2007, p.158).
20Note that the scattered object hypothesis here is similar to a take on universals that Armstrong calls
mereological nominalism. On this view a is F obtains in virtue of a being a part of the aggregate
of all the Fs. Armstrong rejects the view on the grounds that while it may be a necessary condition
of a's being F that it is part of the aggregate of F's, it is not generally suﬃcient. Something can
be part of the aggregate of F's though not itself be F. See Armstrong (1978, pp.34-35).
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This asymmetry leads Quine into diﬃcult waters in his discussion of masses as scat-
tered objects. After claiming that `water' in subject position (e.g. as in the phrase
`water is ﬂuid') refers to a single scattered object he goes on to consider the possibil-
ity that `water' functions as a singular term even when it appears after the `is' of a
predicative sentence. In these cases the `is' would be interpreted as `is a part of', so
that when one points to a pool and says `That pool is water' this means that that pool
is a part of the scattered object that is water. An earlier comment suggests Quine is
committed to this: There remain, besides the world's water as total scattered object,
sundry parts which are lakes, pools, drops, and molecules (Quine, 1960, p.98). How-
ever, Quine rejects treating water as a singular term when it appears after the copula `is'
on the grounds that there are parts of water, sugar, and furniture too small to count as
water, sugar, furniture (Quine, 1960, p.98). In other words, his problem is that claims
that something is a part of water do not coincide with claims that something is water.
Though the instances are parts, not every part counts as an instance. His response is
to treat mass terms as general terms when they appear after the copula, and they thus
have a protean character, being singular in the subject and general in the predicate
(Quine, 1960, p.98). Quine's disjunctive account of the role of kind terms might provide
a ﬁx to the asymmetry problem, but he still must then explain the nature of the general
term `water' and why, if `water' as singular term refers to a large scattered object, the
general term only applies to certain (suﬃciently sized) parts of that object.
In short, though the scattered object hypothesis looked promising as an explanation
of the basic ascriptions of identity and diﬀerence surrounding repeatable entities and
their instances, once we take a closer look at the relationship between wholes and parts
that the scattered object hypothesis requires, we can see that the explanatory power
of the theory breaks down. Nevertheless, what is noticeable about the scattered object
hypothesis is that it very closely accommodates our understanding of application and
co-application conditions, departing only perhaps with the asymmetry problem noted
above. As such, this theory cannot be ruled out simply by conceptual analysis of the
kind defended in Chapters 1 and 2. The scattered object hypothesis should rather be
rejected on broader theoretical grounds. Note then that we could bite the bullet in the
face of all conﬂicting evidence. The problem is that we have been given no reason to
do such a thing. The evidence points to the fact that the scattered object hypothesis is
a far from ideal theory. If there are better contenders available, we should prefer them.
3.3. A Theory of Kinds
If repeatability doesn't involve the identiﬁcation of a class or set and its members, and
it doesn't involve the identiﬁcation of a scattered object and its parts, then what is
being identiﬁed? The answer I defend here is that the phenomenon of repeatability
is best explained by an appeal to the ontological category of kinds. What is strictly
and literally identical in each of the discussed cases is a kind. What are kinds? The
short answer is that kinds are entities that are repeatable in the way described above.
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In other words, I want to suggest that in identifying repeatability we are identifying a
category deﬁning phenomenon. Repeatability is not something to be explained away,
but rather points to a unique ontological category.21
This does not mean, however, that kinds have been invented purely to plug a hole.
Rather they provide what has been called a `self evidencing explanation' (Hempel, 1965,
p.370). That a person walked by wearing snow shoes explains the snow tracks in front of
the house, even though those snow tracks are the only evidence for such an explanation.
Likewise the ontological category of kinds explains the data of repeatability even though
it is that data  the identiﬁcations of sameness and diﬀerence discussed above  that
provide the very evidence for there being such an ontological category. As Peter Lipton
points out, even though these explanations have a distinctive circularity, the circularity
is benign: it spoils neither the explanation of the track nor the justiﬁcation for the belief
that someone did pass on snow shoes (Lipton, 2004, p.24). Thus we need not worry
that appealing to a theory of kinds in this way is cheating. We have justiﬁcation
for believing in kinds in the form of repeatability, and kinds themselves provide the
ontological explanation of repeatability.
In discussing the ontological nature of kinds, we cannot avoid discussing the relation-
ship between kinds and instances. However, we can approach the relationship either
from the direction of the instances, or from the direction of the kinds. Both will be
useful. I will begin with the former, by looking at what it is to be an instance of a kind.
We can understand this by appeal to the pre-philosophical notion of entities being of
the same kind, type or sort. When we say that two entities are of the same kind in
this sense, we mean usually that the entities have something in common  they share
certain properties. To say that two things are `of the same kind' can be understood as
a shorthand way of saying that they are both instances of the same kind. Thus two en-
tities are instances of the same kind in virtue of sharing certain properties. It is because
they share those properties that they are instances of that kind. These properties are
the essence of the kind, for these properties are essential (in a way that will be clariﬁed
shortly) for an entity to be an instance of the kind.
If we approach the relationship instead from the direction of kinds themselves, we
can say that a kind is something that is instanced whenever the essence of the kind is
instantiated. The kind itself is repeatable because it can have multiple instantiations.
When we identify two word tokens and one word type, or two copies of a novel and one
novel, we are identifying two instances of a kind and one kind of which there are two
instances.
I have argued that in cases of repeatability we genuinely identify something as being
strictly identical despite the diﬀerence of the instances. Here I am claiming that when
21The following account owes much to Wolterstorﬀ's understanding of kinds (Wolterstorﬀ, 1980). How-
ever, my approach diﬀers to his in an important respect. Wolterstorﬀ introduces kinds by way of a
list of formal deﬁnitions, and then seeks to demonstrate that those deﬁnitions describe a category
that accounts for repeatable works of art. My own approach looks instead to describe the nature
of kinds ﬁrst and foremost by drawing on our practices of identifying and individuating repeatable
entities.
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this happens we identify an entity that is individuated not by spatial or temporal
location, or by spatio-temporal continuity, but by an essence. To help make clear what
is going on when we identify a kind like this, it can be helpful to entertain a ﬁction
in which a person only identiﬁes the kind without also identifying or individuating the
instances. This will allow us to recognise the process involved in the identiﬁcation of
kinds without the distraction of identifying instances.
Just such a notion has been developed by P. F. Strawson.22 Strawson's aim is to
isolate the logical point at which ordinary particulars are introduced into thought. To
this end, he considers the possibility of what he calls `the naming game'. In the naming
game, we imagine that the speaker names only kinds and is blind to the individuation
of the particular instances of the kinds that he names. Thus the speaker utters the
general name for a kind of thing in the presence of a thing of that kind (Strawson,
1959, p.202). So in the presence of a ball the speaker says `ball' and in the presence
of a duck the speaker says `duck' etc. What the speaker is not doing in this game is
naming a particular duck or ball, nor are they saying `there is a duck' or `there is a ball'.
Each kind has what Strawson calls `corresponding features', and when the features are
recognised the name of the kind is uttered. Though Strawson resists regarding the kinds
being named as actual entities, talking instead of feature universals or feature placing
concepts, my claim here is that the person involved is making a genuine identiﬁcation
of kinds  an entity that is found whenever its corresponding features (i.e. its essence)
are found (Strawson, 1959, p.202). We might imagine a person who can identify only
kinds being presented with the question asked by Armstrong: how many words are
there in the display? Their answer would be that there was only one word, and if we
tried to convince them otherwise by pointing ﬁrst to the left inscription and then to the
right they would merely say that we had pointed to the same thing twice. They see and
identify the kind, but not the individual instances.
Of course, none of us lack the ability to identify instances in this way  whenever
we identify a kind we also recognise an instance. Hence we say that not only is there
one word type in the display, there are also two word tokens. Our ordinary practices
approach this ﬁction most closely when we identify masses, in which cases there is the
identiﬁcation of a kind with little thought of the instances. When a child looks out
of the window and remarks `There's snow!' or simply `Snow!' they are not naming
an ordinary individual but rather recognising and naming the kind snow, rather than
giving a name to this fall of snow, or this pile of snow.
The Importance of Essence
Central to the introduction of kinds given above is the notion of an essence: the set
of properties that the kind requires of its instances. The idea of every kind having
an essence is familiar, both in realist discussions of natural kinds and in discussions
22Strawson (1959, pp.202-209), see also Quine (1960). Strawson's discussion was brought to my atten-
tion by Zemach (1970).
80
3. Explaining Repeatability
that favour only nominal kinds. I will then address the question of `naturalness' in
the next section, but for now we can note that whether essence is a hidden trait to
be `discovered' in things of the same natural kind, or whether it be seen as a mere
Lockean `workmanship of the understanding' (nominal essences), I would argue that it
is diﬃcult to get a grip on the notion of a kind without thinking in terms of essences
(Locke, 1964, Book 3, III).23 The essence is for the kind as spatio-temporal continuity is
for ordinary persisting objects: the essence provides us with a rationale for identifying
and individuating the kind. What the essence is in any given case may not be obvious,
and we may think there is an essence that a collection of objects share so that they are
all of the same kind and be mistaken in this. But if the unifying role of the essence is
rejected completely I would claim that we have nothing more than a group of objects
that happen to be called by the same general name.24
I have said that we cannot understand the concept of a kind without an essence.
However, one might question this. Wittgenstein famously remarked that, if we really
look, we will see that there are no necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an object's
falling under many of our general terms:
Don't say: There must be something in common, or they would not be
called `games'   but look and see whether there is anything common to
all.  For if you look at them you will not see something that is common
to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.
(Wittgenstein, 1953, 66)25
Should this be seen as a counter example to the claim that kinds have essences? My
tentative suggestion is that is should not, for if Wittgenstein is right (and it is not certain
that he is) about the term `game', why not conclude from this that the given general
term appears not to correspond to any single kind? If Wittgenstein is right then we
will look at all the things that we call games and discover that contrary to supposition,
they are not all of a kind. Moreover, the fact that we expect there to be something
that all the things called `games' have in common points to the centrality of essence
in our aims to identify kinds. There is certainly scope for taking the discovery about
`games' as a failure of these aims, rather than as a truth about the nature of kinds. As
an analogy, consider the name `The FA Cup'. We might suppose that this names an
individual cup which is passed from team to team each year. If we then discover that, in
fact, over the years there have been a number of distinct cups used interchangeably, so
that there is no `one' FA Cup, we would not go on to conclude that ordinary persisting
objects do not follow continuous paths through space-time, and can be in two places
at once. Rather we conclude that `The FA Cup' does not uniquely pick out a single
object. Likewise I suggest that we should not conclude from our use of `game' that kinds
23It is interesting to note that recent work in psychology suggests that from a young age children operate
with the assumption that kinds have essences that are causally responsible for other non-essential
properties of instances. See Ahn et al. (2001).
24See Hacking (1991, p.115).
25See Armstrong (1978, p.76) for a similar worry.
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don't have essences, but rather that not every general term successfully corresponds to
a single kind. Certainly in the debates over the ontological nature of species (discussed
in 6.1), the presumed absence of any properties that all and only members of a given
species possess is taken as a knock down argument against the claim that species are
kinds. My response to the Wittgensteinien position is given in this spirit.26
An alternative objection to the view that kinds have essences might arise from the
thought that even in cases in which entities of a kind share more than family resem-
blance it would seem disingenuous to insist that one can always state whether or not
an entity is an instance of a kind thanks to some necessary and suﬃcient conditions.27
Given this, we can note that although every kind has an essence, it does not follow that
there need always be a fact of the matter about whether or not a kind is instantiated
at a given point. An aversion to either semantic or (more likely) metaphysical indeter-
minacy might make one sceptical of these scenarios, but there is nothing about kinds
themselves that rules this out. The actual extension of a kind  that is, where the kind
is actually instanced at a given time  may be indeterminate `around the edges', in
much the same way that we might identify a mountain but not know for every location,
`, whether ` is within the boundaries of the mountain. Whether such indeterminacy is
at root purely semantic, or whether it is also (or primarily) metaphysical is a matter of
some contention, and I will not try to settle it here.28
Either way, there is no need to think that an ontology of kinds committed to essences
poses a special problem here. If there is metaphysical indeterminacy then kinds will
share in that indeterminacy; if all indeterminacy is semantic, then neither will kinds be
exempt from that. The upshot of this is that a commitment to kinds having essences
commits one neither to holding that every general term picks out a unique kind, nor to
holding that it will always be determinate whether or not a kind is instanced. We can
be sure that natural language is messy, and it may be that the world is also, but there
are entities to be referred to nonetheless.
The Essential Nature of Kind Essences
I have argued that essences should play a central role in our notion of kinds. Can this
claim be strengthened further? It follows from the discussion above that we pick out
and identify kinds according to the instancing of certain properties. Two things are `of
the same kind' when they share properties, and which kind they are both of depends
on which properties they share (so that some third thing may be of the same kind as
the ﬁrst two if it also has those properties).
26It might be further objected my position is theoretically motivated, and that Wittgenstein has shown
that our ordinary notion of some common names does not admit of essences. I agree, however, that
this position is theoretically motivated. The motivation comes from the clarity that essences bring
to kinds. Notice that if `game' was to brought into some kind of scientiﬁc taxonomy, the ﬁrst thing
to do would be to `clean up' the concept of a game by applying stipulated necessary and suﬃcient
conditions.
27See Boyd (1991, p.142).
28But see Williams (2008) for a useful introduction to the topic.
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Given this, we can reasonably make the following individuative claim:
(PIK) For kinds K1 and K2, and the respective required properties P1 and P2, K1 =
K2 if and only if P1 = P2.
Some immediate consequences of this are that if K1 = K2, anything that is an instance
of K1 at time t is an instance of K2 at t, and if it is possible for there to be, at t, an
entity that is an instance of K1 and not an instance of K2, then K1 6= K2.
A further result of this individuative claim is that a kind cannot change with respect
to the properties it requires of its instances over time: If at time t1, a kind K1 requires
that its instances have properties P1, and at time t2 a kind K2 requires that its instances
have P2, and if P1 6= P2, it follows that K1 6= K2. Arriving at this result involves taking
the individuative claim at face value, and not relativising the identity of the required
properties to a time. For example, Van Cleve, in a discussion of the essential nature of
set membership, mentions a principle for individuation for `bodies' which is sometimes
given as follows: necessarily, for bodies x and y, x = y if and only if x and y occupy the
same place (Van Cleve, 1985, p.589).
If this principle is to be plausible, of course, we have to include a temporal dimension,
perhaps reading `place' four-dimensionally. This is just because bodies change place
through time without ceasing to be the bodies that they are. The individuative claim
given for kinds, however, should be read as implying that kinds do not change the
properties they require of their instances over time. The reason for insisting on this is
that if this was not the case an entity at t1 and an entity at t2 could be `of the same
kind' despite not sharing the relevant properties, a scenario which violates the intuitive
principle according to which kinds were introduced. Kinds are thus temporally inﬂexible
with respect to the properties required of instances (c.f. 5.4).
There is a further reading of PIK that is widely assumed, and that I will accept here,
but which is somewhat harder to decisively prove. This is that if a kind, K1, requires
that its instances have properties P1, then K1 could not have required anything other
than P1 from its instances. More formally, for kinds K, possible worlds, w, and required
properties P: if K1 requires P1 in w1, and K2 requires P2 in w2, K1 = K2 if and only if
P1 = P2.
Kinds are thus modally inﬂexible with respect to the properties required of instances
(c.f. 5.3).29 It is important to note that the truth of this claim does not follow
(straightforwardly) from the truth of PIK. This can be seen by noting that other prin-
ciples of individuation do not entail modal commitments. For instance, the principle
of individuation for bodies mentioned above may be true (if `place' is understood four-
dimensionally) without that entailing that bodies occupy the places they do occupy
essentially. Similarly, Davidson's account of the individuation of events (according to
which events x and y are the same event if and only if they have the same causes
29This is assumed in LaPorte (2004, p.61), and in Bird (2009). Wolterstorﬀ's account of kinds also
appears committed to just such a condition. The equivalent claim is also made for types: types
are modally inﬂexible with respect to the properties they require of their tokens. See Rohrbaugh
(2003), Dodd (2007, pp.53-54) and Caplan and Matheson (2008, p.500).
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and eﬀects) seems not to imply that events have their causes and eﬀects essentially
(Davidson, 1969). Van Cleve has even argued the stronger claim that no essentialist
consequences ever follow from any [principle of individuation] (Van Van Cleve, 1985,
p.589). A similarly strong claim has been made more recently by Guy Rohrbaugh who
argues that [a]nswers to individuation questions never settle questions of what is called
cross-world identity (Rohrbaugh, 2005, p.212).
However, although Rohrbaugh and Van Cleve might be right about the kinds of
individuative claims that they are considering, I think there is room here to strengthen
a principle of individuation so that essentialist consequences do follow. Let us call
the individuative claims with no essentialist consequences weak individuation claims,
and individuation claims with essentialist consequences strong individuation claims.30
If Davidson's principle for events does not have essentialist consquences, it is a weak
individuation principle. It allows us to recognise identity and distinctness in the actual
world, but does not tell us whether or not an event could have had diﬀerent causes
and eﬀects. Guy Rohrbaugh's consideration of authorship is similar. Rohrbaugh argues
that we might decide that paintings with diﬀerent authors cannot be the same painting
without thereby committing ourselves to the claim that a work could not have had a
diﬀerent author (Rohrbaugh, 2005, p.212). As far as this does constitute a principle of
individuation, it is only a weak principle.31
A strong individuation principle, however, provides a criterion for sameness and dis-
tinctness for both actual and possible entities that fall under the principle. If Davidson's
principle was given a strong reading, it would imply that an actual event would be the
same event as some possible event if and only if the events had the same causes and
eﬀects. Though this reading may not be acceptable for Davidson's principle, what is
widely assumed, and what I will accept here is that the strong reading is acceptable
for PIK. It provides us with a criterion not just concerning the identity of kinds in the
actual world, but also concerning identity of kinds across possible worlds.
Why should PIK get the strong reading? I think that the most promising defence of
this position involves arguing that an entity in w1 and an entity in w2 must share the
same properties if they are to be (instances) of the same kind (as an entity at t1 and
an entity at t2 must within the same possible world). That is, it can be argued that
our intuitive notion of `being of the same kind' applies across possible worlds as well as
30Caplan and Matheson (2008, pp.501-502) introduce a similar but slightly ﬁner distinction. Where
I have weak and strong individuation, they recognise weak, medium and strong individuation con-
ditions. According to their weakest level of individuation, an entity is individuated by a property
if that entity is contingently the only entity in the actual world with that property. A medium
principle of individuation implies instead that in any possible world in which an entity has that
property, only one entity has that property. Thus according to Caplan and Matheson, Davidson's
principle for events is a medium rather than a weak individuation principle (2008, p.504). Their
strong principle corresponds to my strong principle. I have no problem with this ﬁner three-tier
system, but it is not needed for our purposes since the emphasis here is on those principles that
have essentialist consequences, and those that do not. Caplan and Matheson agree that only the
strong principle delivers the modal essentialism under discussion.
31We can note that the condition only constitutes a necessary condition for individuation  sameness
of author is not suﬃcient for sameness of painting. Moreover, we can note in passing that it is not
clear that such a claim is not merely a consequence of Leibniz's Law.
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across diﬀerent times in the actual world.
So, for example, if two entities are instances of kind K1 in virtue of having properties
P1, then it is impossible that they could have been instances of K1 without possessing
properties P1, for had they failed to have properties P1, they would not have been of
the same kind as they actually are. (There is no possible world in which entities are
instances of K1 without possessing P1).
However, there is a worry here that this argument relies on the assumption that the
same kind relationship must be trans-world and thus begs the question in favour of
modal inﬂexibility. If kinds were modally ﬂexible, it might be argued, then the entities
could have been of the same kind despite lacking P1, because the very same kind could
have required that its instances had properties other than P1. To say otherwise is just
to assume the conclusion we set out to prove.
The problem, of course, is the familiar one of trans-world identity. The position
that is widely assumed and that we are trying to defend is that kinds are identiﬁed
across worlds, as well as within a world, according to the properties they require of
their instances. But providing independent grounds for trans-world identity conditions
is notoriously diﬃcult.32
Perhaps the argument given already can be strengthened by insisting that if we give
up on the modal inﬂexibility of the properties required of instances, then we give up on
the only grip we have on kind identity in any circumstances. This kind of reasoning is
sometimes oﬀered with respect to sets and their members. It is claimed that a given set
could not have had members other than the members it does have, and a supposition to
the contrary involves misunderstanding what it is to identify a set in the ﬁrst place.33
As far as sets go, a change in members is a change in the set, and likewise it might be
argued that a change in essences for kinds just is a change in kind; it is a consequence
of what we mean by kinds that a kind could not have required diﬀerent properties of its
instances. We could say that as a set is deﬁned by its members, so a kind is `deﬁned'
by the properties required of instances.
However, the air of question begging is still not cleared: it might yet be asked why
kinds should be understood in this way? If that is just what we mean by kinds, why do
we mean that and not something else? I will not try and settle this matter here con-
clusively. Rather, I will follow tradition and take modal inﬂexibility as an assumption,
for which at least some argument has been oﬀered. In other words, I will assume that
the essences of kinds are essential to kinds, and thus are essences in the usual sense of
that term. We can at least note that to depart from this line, though it may not be as
strongly grounded as we would like, would involve quite a considerable departure form
standard interpretations of kinds.
What sorts of properties can be part of the essence of a kind? I see no reason not to
allow that the essence of a kind can include any property whatsoever. Hence a kind may
demand that its instances have internal or external properties, as those are traditionally
32See, e.g., Chisolm (1967), Plantinga (1974), Loux (1979), Forbes (1980), Lowe (2002).
33See, e.g., Van Cleve (1985, p.585).
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understood, with external properties including relational properties. A kind may require
that its instances have a certain chemical composition, or that its instances be loved by
Socrates, or both.
Given this relationship between kinds and their essences, it is possible that at a given
time in the actual world every instance of one kind exactly `overlaps' with every instance
of another kind though the kinds are not thereby identical. For example, suppose that
as a matter of coincidence (though obviously not pure coincidence), every swan that
exists at a certain time is white. Then every instance of the kind Swan will also be an
instance of the kind White Swan at that time. However, there is no barrier to the
coincidence being broken at a later date following the birth of a brown swan.
Using this example we can also see that the kind Swan and the kind White Swan
are related so that whatever is an instance of the kindWhite Swan will necessarily be
an instance of the kind Swan but not vice versa. This is because the essence of White
Swan `includes' the essence of Swan. In Wolterstorﬀ's terminology the kind White
Swan is a species of the kind Swan (Wolterstorﬀ, 1980, p.55).
We can note ﬁnally that on this understanding kind terms are rigid designators in
the following sense: a kind term `K' picks out the same kind in every possible world 
that is, the kind with the essence such that instances must have properties P. However,
a kind can have diﬀerent instances in diﬀerent possible worlds, as far as it is possible
for diﬀerent objects to possess the demanded properties. So a kind does not have the
instances it actually has essentially. The theory of kinds espoused here is also neutral
as to whether or not entities that are instances of a kind are instances of that kind
essentially.34
3.4. Natural and Unnatural Kinds
With this description of kinds in place one might wonder ﬁrstly what this has to do
with the familiar appeal to natural kinds, and in particular the claim that natural
kinds are the only `real' kinds, and secondly whether kinds on this account turn out
to be worryingly proliﬁc: if kinds are individuated by their essences and there are no
theoretical restrictions on what those essences can be, does it not follow that we live
in a world populated by seemingly limitless numbers of overlapping kinds? Is there
such a gerrymandered kind which has as its essence the requirement that its instances
be currently on my desk? Surely we would not identify some `thing' as being identical
across the diﬀerent items on my desk in the same way that we identify a novel or a
song?
Let me consider two approaches to this worry. The ﬁrst approach involves biting the
bullet on proliferation, but sweetening the pill by noting that only some of those many
or even inﬁnite kinds will be interesting or relevant to us. We can draw a parallel here
between this issue and the fact that an ontological account of the nature of ordinary
34For discussion see Okasha (2002), and LaPorte (1997).
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persisting objects still faces what van Inwagen called the `special composition problem'
which asks the diﬃcult question of when a plurality of objects composes some other
object (van Inwagen, 1990). The question is motivated by the thought that many
collections of things do seem to compose legitimate entities, but if composition were
granted for every possible collection we would have to admit a plethora of gerrymandered
objects such as the fusion of my pen lid, the second story of the Empire State Building,
and Gordon Brown's left ear. One might respond here by allowing that strictly speaking
every possible fusion does exist, though many of them are uninteresting to us.
However, discussions of natural kinds sometimes have more than this in mind, and
make the claim that what is natural should be equated with what is real, or what exists
in ontological strictness (Elder, 2007, p.44). Would this cause problems for the realist
view of repeatable artefacts as kinds being defended here? I think not, for dominant
interpretations of naturalness still leave room for repeatable artefacts.
Returning to the special composition question, my inclination, though I will not argue
for it here, is to reject the need for a single universal answer that covers every case.35 I
prefer instead to take the lead of David Lewis who has defended the view that eligibility
for reference is a matter of degree, with some things being more naturally eligible as
referents than others:
The mereological sum of the coﬀee in my cup, the ink in this sentence, a
nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess of an object, yet
its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints in nature. It is an
eligible referent, but less eligible that some others. (I have just referred to
it.) (Lewis, 1984, p.227)36
Similarly, some kinds might be regarded as being quite natural and eligible entities (e.g.
gold, water) while others will be far more `grue-like' and lie at the other end of the scale
(e.g. Left Handed People Born on a Tuesday).
The view that the naturalness of kinds is a matter both of perspective and degree
is familiar and well defended in the philosophy of science. Ronald de Sousa argues
persuasively that naturalness is not an objective binary matter, but will always depend
on particular interests and epistemic priorities (de Sousa, 1984). Ian Hacking also rejects
the idea that that there is a objective and exhaustive list of natural kinds as being
something that does not make sense, not even as an idea to which we strive (Hacking,
1991, p.111). It doesn't follow from this that there are no criteria for recognising
naturalness, or that every kind is `as good as' any other. Joseph LaPorte has argued,
for example, that the naturalness of a kind consists in its explanatory value (LaPorte,
2004, p.20). While `explanatory value' may well be perspectival, it doesn't follow that
naturalness is a myth  it is at least as real as explanatory value. Also important in
LaPorte's discussion is the idea that what counts as natural will be relative to a context,
35For a defence of this view see Thomasson (2007a, pp.126-236).
36Note that `natural' here is not to be understood as being opposed to `man-made'. A desk may be
highly natural as a referent in a way that the fusion of a random collection of `naturally occurring'
objects would not be. See also Lewis (1983, p.372).
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much as what counts as `ﬂat' will depend on context. In some contexts, standards for
naturalness will be very high. In many scientiﬁc contexts, it may seem that the only
truly `natural' kinds are those that are included in a description of the universe in terms
of fundamental physics. In other contexts many more kinds will count as being natural.
As LaPorte points out, Green-Kind is generally assumed to be quite un-natural, since
it has a fairly eclectic collection of things as instances (green trees, green frogs, grass,
green cars etc). Yet compared with a Goodman style Grue-Kind it is quite natural
(LaPorte, 2004, pp.23-27).
If repeatable artefacts are kinds, as I have argued, they are not gerrymandered in the
way that the kind Left Handed People Born on a Tuesday seems to be. For
a start, they are familiar, regularly referred to and (often) easily identiﬁed. In fact,
we will see in Chapter 6 of this thesis that many repeatable artefacts are similar in
important respects to biological kinds and that the motivations for regarding biological
kinds as natural transfer comfortably over to novels, photographs and the like.
My aim here is not to defend any particular theory for judging naturalness in a given
context, but merely to make use of the popular notion that naturalness is not an `all or
nothing' matter.37 Signiﬁcantly for us, just because novels, ﬁlms and plays are called
`artefacts' it doesn't follow that they are unreal, even if one favours the view that we
should not admit every possible kind (or every possible fusion) into an account of what
exists. If naturalness is a matter of degrees there will be no neat natural/artefactual
divide that corresponds to a real/unreal divide.38
Conclusion
There are many things that might interest us about novels, works of music, plays, ﬁlms
and photographs. I have argued that from the perspective of metaphysics it is the
repeatability of these entities that both groups them together in an interesting way,
and introduces an important ontological question. We must ask ourselves how it is
possible that there can be two diﬀerent inscriptions but only one single word, or how
two people can see diﬀerent showings but also see the same ﬁlm.
The best explanation of these scenarios, one that takes our understanding of ap-
plication and co-application conditions seriously (and as innocent until proven guilty)
appeals to the ontological category of kinds. Rather than explain repeatability in terms
of some other phenomenon such as wholes and parts, a theory of kinds has the possi-
bility of repeatability built into the very ontological nature of kinds. There is one word
type despite there being two inscriptions because a word type is a kind, which can be
identiﬁed wherever the essence of that kind is instantiated. Two distinct inscriptions
can instantiate the same essence and thus we have the sameness of word type despite
the diﬀerence of the inscriptions. Two showings can instantiate the same essence and
thus there can be one ﬁlm though there are two showings.
37For a discussion of common criteria for judging naturalness, see Boyd (1991, p.129).
38For more on the reality of `man-made' entities see Thomasson (2003).
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This provides us with the beginnings of an ontological account, but there are still
important details to ﬁll in. To this point, the view defended here departs from other
type/token or kind/instance theories in the literature only in the detail. However, any
type or kind theory that posits entities that are instanced (or tokened) just when certain
conditions are met will need to provide some account of what those conditions are. In
Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis I take on that challenge and provide an account of the
essences of repeatable artefacts that overcomes many of the diﬃculties other type and
kind theories face.
Before that, however, there are more immediate matters to be settled that pertain not
to the speciﬁcs of repeatable artefacts as kinds, but to the ontological nature of kinds in
general. It is nearly universally assumed that kinds or types, if they exist, are abstract
entities. However, I think the dominance of this view must be called into question. In
the coming chapter I defend the view that kinds (at least those with physical instances)
are in fact physical, rather than abstract, entities.
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In the previous chapter I claimed that the ontological nature of repeatable artefacts
should be teased out of an analysis of our practices of identifying and individuating
them. I argued that doing this places repeatable artefacts into the broad ontological
category of kinds. Kinds are entities individuated (in the strong sense) by essences,
where the essence can be understood as the requirement that must be met for the
kind to be instanced. A novel is a kind, and an arrangement of paper and ink is an
instance of the kind if it satisﬁes the essence of the kind. What more can we say about
the relationship between a kind and its instances? Most theories of kinds (or types)
that fall within this general framework add at this point that kinds (or types) are
abstract entities.1 It is claimed that the relationship between a kind and an instance is
a relationship between something abstract and something concrete. In this chapter I will
challenge this dominant position and defend the view that kinds, like their instances,
are concrete.
What it means precisely for an entity to be abstract is a matter of some contention,2
but there is one key element that we can focus on for our purposes. Arguably the most
important feature of an abstract entity is that it is non-spatial. Mathematical entities
 paradigms of abstract entities par excellence  invite this assumption with a degree
of naturalness. The question `where is the number four?' seems to either have no good
answer, or the trivial answer of `nowhere'. Whatever numbers are, they seem not to
be entities that have a location or occupy space. To this condition of being non-spatial
it is sometimes added that abstract objects are also non-temporal, though the appeal
of including the criterion is not nearly so strong, and the view of abstracta that I am
interested in here need not be committed to it. More popular is the further condition
that abstract objects are causally inert. While I think that causal ineﬃcacy is a plausible
consequence of being non-spatial, it also need not be regarded as a necessary condition
for abstracta (we will encounter in due course an argument for the causal eﬃcacy of
abstract entities). Thus I want to adopt a minimal deﬁnition of an abstract object
as any entity that is non-spatial. In challenging the view that kinds are abstract I am
challenging any view which regards kinds as non-spatial. For the sake of this discussion,
I will call any view of this sort Platonism about kinds.3
1See, e.g.,Wolterstorﬀ (1980); Levinson (1980, 1990); Kivy (1987); Dodd (2000, 2007); Howell (2002b).
2For a discussion see Caplan & Matheson (2004 pp.117-122).
3This is in contrast to, e.g. Levinson (1980) and Fisher (1991), where Platonism is limited to those
theories that hold that the entities in question are eternal or timeless, in which case Levinson's
type thery is anti-platonist because it allows that musical works are created. According to my
terminology, however, Levinson's position is a version of Platonism.
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By approaching the topic in this way my critique of the view that repeatable artefacts
are abstract entities diﬀers from what is commonly found in the literature. A common
move is to assume that if a novel or a work of music is abstract then it faces a number
of associated problems  being causally inert and being eternal or timeless (and so not
created), for example  that should persuade us to look elsewhere for a theory.4 These
issues are not irrelevant to the present discussion  the view I defend has the distinct
advantage of avoiding them altogether  but the argument in this chapter looks to
undercut the assumption that kinds are abstract by challenging the assumption that
they are non-spatial before these further issues can take hold. That is, I want to bring
into question the status of Platonism as the default theory of kinds.
Rejecting Platonism and accepting that kinds with physical instances are themselves
physical will require a signiﬁcant shift in the way that theorists have traditionally
thought about kinds. However, I will argue that the move is not unprecedented, and
brings some distinct advantages. We will see that it allows us to recognise that kinds
have parts, where these are the parts we thought they had (in contrast to claims of the
scattered object hypothesis). We will be able to allow that the opening movement is
part of the symphony, and the last chapter is part of the book. This view also allows
that kinds are the objects of sensory experience. We can literally see a photograph and
hear a song. Further, with some caveats, it allows that kinds, and thus works of music
and novels, can be created.
A couple of points need to be made about the scope of this chapter. Firstly, my
aim is not to reject all abstract entities. I am sympathetic to the belief that there
are some abstract entities  mathematical objects seem to be excellent candidates 
but a full and general discussion of abstract objects is outside the scope of this thesis.
Secondly, I cannot hope to oﬀer a knock down argument against kind Platonism here.
Rather my more modest aim will have been achieved if the dominance of kind Platonism
as a realist theory of kinds is undermined. If I cannot convince the reader that kind
Platonism (henceforth, just `Platonism') is wrong, perhaps I can convince them that
there is a serious contender in the arena. My tactic to this end will be to introduce
and defend a theory of kinds as being spatially located physical entities. I call this view
Kind Physicalism (or for brevity just `Physicalism', though it should be remembered
that my thesis is only a thesis about kinds, and only about those kinds that have
physical instances). It should also be noted that though Physicalism is motivated in
part by the methodology of Chapters 1 and 2, no other part of this thesis depends on
an acceptance of Physicalism, and to this degree the positive argument of this chapter
is independent of the rest of the thesis.
In 4.1 I introduce the proposal that kinds are concrete or physical entities.5 I argue
that without prior metaphysical commitments, it is more natural to view kinds as
physical entities. I then develop the view in 4.2 by drawing on an account oﬀered by
4Caplan & Matheson (2006); Rohrbaugh (2003).
5Note that I take being `concrete' and being `physical' as amounting to the same thing, which I analyse
only intuitively and roughly as being part of the physical or material nexus of the universe.
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Eddy Zemach of the ontological category of pure continuants. If we are to view kinds
as physical entities, they must be understood as entities that are continuous (or un-
bound) in both space and time. This allows them to be multiply located in both space
and time. I argue in 4.3 that this has important consequences for the notion of kinds
having parts.
In sections 4.4 - 4.6 I turn my attention to the more traditional Platonist proposal.
I argue that ultimately motivations for adopting Platonism over Physicalism are un-
persuasive. In 4.4 I consider the Platonist's argument that Physicalism falls foul of
the axiom of localisation. I suggest that when probed, the axiom amounts to no more
than an unjustiﬁed assumption. In 4.5 I consider instead the claim that it is in fact
quite natural to think of repeatable artefacts as being non-spatial. In 4.6 I discuss the
plausibility of the Platonist's attempts to explain our encounters and causal interactions
with kinds. I will show that while the Platonist can make progress here, it comes at
a price and it is a much less attractive explanation of the evidence than Physicalism.
Finally, I end the chapter by drawing out the consequences that this view has for the
persistence of kinds (4.7). I will argue that most sensible account of the persistence of
kinds has it that kinds exist when and where they have instances.
4.1. Kind Physicalism Introduced
The view that I am calling Platonism about kinds  the view that holds as a min-
imum condition that kinds are abstract (non-spatial) entities  has been the default
realist view about kinds in the recent literature. This is perhaps unsurprising given
the historical association of kinds with universals and the common view that universals
are abstract. However, I would argue that given our practices of identifying and indi-
viduating repeatable artefacts  those practices that themselves provided the basis for
postulating a theory of kinds  it is not clear that Platonism is the most straightforward
or prima face obvious view to adopt. Take, for instance, the example of the following
display:
THE THE
How many words are there in the box? There are two word tokens and there is one
word type; that is the answer Armstrong gave. But notice the question asks how many
words there are in the box. Thus if the latter answer is a good answer, and we have
been assuming that it is, then the answer implies that there is one word type in the
box, as well as two word tokens.6 The temptation will be to move quickly to explain
away this apparent claim about the location of a word type, but if we can approach the
claim without the prior assumption that word types are abstract then this temptation
can perhaps be resisted long enough to assess the claim at face value. What appears to
6Does this mean there are three things in the box? Well, there are at least three. There are also three
letter types and six letter tokens. We could say `there are three words in the box', but this obscures
the distinction between word types and word tokens.
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be the case is that when we identify the word tokens and then identify the word type
we are identifying all three as being there in the box.
This apparent commitment to location is not an isolated incident. We seem to make
similar claims about many other repeatable artefacts. For example: `the family photo-
graph from last Christmas is pinned to the fridge in our house, but my parents have it
on their mantlepiece.' Taken at face value, the claim here seems to be that the same
photograph is both on my fridge and in my parents' house. It is located in two places.
As well as claims about location, we also make claims about hearing, seeing and touch-
ing repeatable artefacts. Songs can be heard, ﬁlms and plays can be watched, and novels
and theses can be read. While it may be possible to argue that abstracta can be encoun-
tered in this way, these claims certainly don't suggest a theory of abstracta. Moving
away from paradigm repeatable artefacts to other kinds, a similar trend emerges. We
claim the same whisky is in both bottles, that gold was found in California, and that
ice is cold to the touch.
The entities that we are to be talking about, and that I have labelled kinds, at least
seem to be physical things that are spatially located  things that we physically interact
with as easily as we interact with ordinary physical objects like rocks and chairs. While
there are responses that the Platonist can make here  in the next section we will
encounter a Platonist-friendly interpretation of what it is to see and hear repeatable
artefacts  I want to present an account that makes no excuses about such claims, but
rather takes them to be data to be interpreted by an ontology. If such an account is
possible, then it surely deserves the status of being the default view.
An ontology that allows that both the word tokens and the word type are in the
display, and that allows that the photograph is both on my fridge and in my parents
house, is an ontology that allows that kinds are, in the way to be described, co-present
with their instances.7 Thus this is a realist ontology of kinds that  insofar as kinds
can be seen as a sort of universal  resembles David Armstrong's `immanent realism'
about universals, though, as I have said, my aim here is not to argue that there are no
abstract entities at all.8 Nor, in developing this view, am I committed to any particular
theory of properties. This theory is put forward only as a theory of kinds, as described
in the previous chapter.
4.2. Kinds as Continuants
What does it mean to say that a kind is co-present with its instances? Understanding
this claim will be the key to understanding Physicalism about kinds. I will defend the
view that if kinds are physical they must be continuous both spatially and temporally.
To make progress on this front I want to discuss an ontological proposal put forward by
7The term is from Lewis (1983, p.345).
8See Armstrong (1978) and (1989). Are kinds universals on my view? This is not straightforward to
answer because it is not obvious what exactly a universal is. They may warrant the label `universal'
simply in virtue of their relationship to their instances. However, they are not straightforwardly
`true of' or `applied to' multiple things except insofar as many things are instances of them.
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Eddy Zemach  a proposal to which the Physicalism defended here is heavily indebted.
I will look brieﬂy at Zemach's overall position, and then focus on the aspect relevant to
kind Physicalism.
Zemach (1970) has made the unorthodox claim that there are four basic `ontologies'
of the physical world, diﬀerentiated upon whether or not the entities of the ontology
are `bound' or `continuous' in time and space.9 A rough account of what this means
(and one that will need to be amended shortly) is this. If an entity is continuous in
time then at any time at which the entity exists, the whole entity exists. Likewise if an
entity is continuous in space then at any spatial point at which the entity is located,
the whole of the entity is located. On the other hand, if an entity is bound in time
then any temporal slice of the entity contains part of the entity. Likewise, if an entity
is bound in space then there are regions of space occupied by the entity that contain
part of the entity:
Hence, four kinds of ontology: an ontology whose entities are bound in space
and in time, an ontology whose entities are bound in space and continuous
in time, an ontology whose entities are bound in time and continuous in
space, and an ontology whose entities are continuous in space and in time.
(Zeamach, 1970, p.233)
The ﬁrst ontology can be seen to correspond to the perdurantist's `space-time worms'.
Entities in this ontology are spread out in space and time so there that are both spatial
and temporal cross sections that contain parts of those entities. Zemach associates this
ontology with the category of events. The second ontology, with entities bound in space
but continuous in time, corresponds to the endurantist's entities. These entities can have
spatial slices that contain parts of the entity, but no temporal parts  any region of time
occupied by the entity contains the whole entity. As Zemach points out, this ontology
is the `natural' ontology that accounts for how we tend conceive of ordinary objects,
long before we are introduced to the possibility of space-time worms in undergraduate
metaphysics. The third ontology has entities bound in time but continuous in space.
This is the most diﬃcult of the four to conceptualise, but Zemach oﬀers the examples
of `the rain', `the Industrial Revolution' and `the Roosevelt era'. The entities, dubbed
processes by Zemach, have temporal parts (the `start' of the revolution) but no spatial
parts  at every place at which the process is, the whole process is found. Whilst you
may experience the beginning of the heat wave, and I the end of the heat wave (temporal
parts), we cannot both experience diﬀerent spatial parts of the heat wave. (The diﬃculty
of this ontological category is that it is very tempting to construe something like a heat
wave as an entity of the ﬁrst category  an event with both spatial and temporal parts.
To grasp Zemach's processes one must put this interpretation of `heat wave' to one side
and allow the formal deﬁnition of the category to take hold.)
Much more could be said about these three ontological categories and Zemach's treat-
ment of them, but it is the fourth category that is most relevant to us. The entities of
9For a further exposition, see also Zemach (1975).
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the fourth ontology are continuous in both space and time. Zemach calls these entities
pure continuants, or types, and gives, as paradigmatic examples, gold, The Common
Elm, the letter Q, andWar and Peace. I believe that with this ﬁnal category, Zemach
has put his ﬁnger on the ontology of kinds. However, it should be noted that my theory
of kinds diﬀers from Zemach's account of `pure continuants' or `types' in at least two
respects. Firstly, Zemach makes no mention of entities of this ontology having essences.
On my view, however, essences are vital to the individuation and recognition of kinds
and are central to understanding the ontological category of kinds. Secondly, Zemach
argues that each one of these four ontologies is on its own suﬃcient to represent the
whole of physical reality (Zemach, 1970 p.231). I make no such commitment about the
ontology of kinds in this thesis.
Given this rough description of what it is to be continuous or bound in time or space,
we can characterise Zemach's pure continuants as entities that are wholly present at
any point in space or time that they are found. (This is not quite right, as we will see,
but nevertheless provides a helpful ﬁrst take.) Entities like gold and water provide a
useful way in to this category, especially as they are paradigmatic examples of kinds in
philosophical discussion. The view being put forward here is that water is a kind and
is a genuine physical entity  a `mass', as I have been calling it  that is wholly located
wherever and whenever it is found. Just as the endurantist insists that the same person
is found in her entirety at 5 pm and at 6pm in the same place, so the kind physicalist
insists that the kind is found in its entirety both in one room and in another at the
same time. It also follows from this that when we have an instance of water we do
not have proper part of water (recall the rejection of the scattered object hypothesis in
3.2). Zemach writes:
If I want water and you bring me a cupful I cannot object saying, You
brought me only part of water, not water itself, but I am likely to make
this objection if I want Fido and you bring me his ear. (Zemach, 1970,
p.243)
Of course, whenever we have water, we also have a quantity of water  a cupful, or a
litre, for example  which we can divide into parts. I can throw part of this cup of
water on the ﬁre, or turn part of that lump of gold into a ring. But I cannot throw
part of water on the ﬁre or turn part of gold into a ring, and the explanation given here
is that this is because water and gold do not have spatial (or temporal) parts.10 The
cup of water, and the lump of gold are entities of one ontological category, and they
are, to introduce my terminology, co-present with gold and water  entities of another
category. The kind and its instance (gold and the gold ingot, or water and the cup of
water, for example) can be thought of as overlapping one another (or coinciding with
one another) in physical reality at that point. This is the sense in which the kind and
10Recall that the scattered object hypothesis claims just the opposite: when I throw a cup of water I
do throw part of water on the ﬁre (3.2). The point being made here is that pre-theoretically, the
claim that one can throw part of water onto the ﬁre appears to involve some kind of mistake.
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its instances are co-present.11
At this stage, however, we need to be more precise in the description of what it is to be
continuous in time and space, and in doing so we will qualify the claim that continuous
entities have no parts. The rough characterisation was that at every place at which the
entity is found, the entity is present in its entirety, and so there is literally no sense in
which the entity has parts. However, even for stuﬀs like gold and water, there will be a
minimum region of space in which the kind can properly said to be found in its entirety.
If region ` is the region containing only a single hydrogen atom in a water molecule,
then it would not be right to say that ` contained water in its entirety. Rather genuine
instances of water have a certain minimum size. We may be able to divide up a sample
of water, but it is not the case that each division produces smaller and smaller samples
of water (as Quine realised  see again the discussion in 3.2). Once a small enough size
is reached, we no longer have an instance of water within the divided area.12
Thus we need to make a distinction that Zemach does not make, between being
purely continuous along a dimension, and having what we might describe as `chunky' or
`quantiﬁed' continuity along a dimension. The entities of the endurantist's ontology are
purely continuous in time (though bound in space) and so there is no minimal temporal
region in which they can be found. Similarly, mass kinds like gold and water are purely
continuous in time but have `quantiﬁed' continuity in space. Could there be a kind
that was purely continuous in space, with no limit on the region of space in which it
is found? Ether, if it had existed, would perhaps have named such a kind. A quantity
of ether could be divided inﬁnitely and each part of the quantity would itself contain
ether. Thus ether would be purely continuous in both space and time.
Given the possibility of quantiﬁed continuity, a more accurate account of what it is
to be continuous in time and space is that there are multiple regions of space and time
that contain the entity in its entirety.13 This weaker description allows for both pure
continuity and quantiﬁed continuity.
The point that I want to emphasise, then, is that we can understand repeatability
11Simons uses the term superposition for what I am calling being co-present (1987, pp.210-254). Simons
draws a distinction between objects that are superposed and those that are conincident. Conincident
objects share their parts, where as superposed objects need not. Simons writes:
There are certain cases where objects are superposed which for categorical reasons cannot
coincide. A continuant and an occurrent involving all of it occupy the same spatial region
for a while, but clearly, since they belong to diﬀerent categories, cannot have a common
part, and equally clearly they do not compete for this region (Simons, 1987, p.211)
Using Simons' terminology, then, it would be right to say that kinds and their instances do not coin-
cide but are superposed (since kinds and their instances belong in diﬀerent ontological categories).
See Simons (1987, pp.210-254) for a discussion and defence of superposition. See also (Wiggins,
1968) and (Doepke, 1982).
12Note that the point is not that kinds are not located at all in regions smaller than theses minimal
regions, just that they are not wholly located in those regions. Similarly, a car can be said to occupy
a region ` marked out by the drivers seat, but region ` does not contain the whole car. The account
also translates to the temporal dimension. If a performance of a work of music lasts from 1pm to
1.30pm, then the time period 1.10pm to 1.15pm does not contain the whole work of music, but it
does contain the work of music in virtue of containing part of the work. See 4.3.
13This is weaker than the requirement that every region at which the entity is located contains the
entity in its entirety. All that is required is that there are many regions at which this is the case.
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using the notion of continuity along a dimension. However, that an entity can be found
multiple times in its entirety along a dimension is not suﬃcient for an entity to be
repeatable. Enduring entities are continuous through time, but we do not think of
them as being repeatable. Rather, our notion of repeatability seems to correspond
to continuity through both space and time. It makes it possible for us to genuinely
identify the same entity in multiple places at once, and at multiple times, as we do
with repeatable artefacts. To clarify then: the kind is co-present with its instances. It
is located when and where its instances are located, but is distinct from them. This
is possible because the kind, unlike the instances, is continuous in time and space and
thus can be multiply located.
4.3. Kinds and Their Parts
That certain kinds have minimum spatial or temporal regions has important implica-
tions for the notion of kinds having parts. It is common to talk as if repeatable artefacts
do have parts. We talk of the ﬁrst half of a song, or the last few pages of a novel, or a
section of the new company logo which we don't like. Can we take this talk of kinds hav-
ing parts seriously? The initial account that was given of what it is for an entity to be
continuous along a dimension stated that the entity has no parts along that dimension.
Hence a purely continuous entity would have no parts at all. However, if a kind has a
minimal region in which it can be instanced, and the kind is located where its instances
are located, then we can allow that the kind has parts. That is, kinds can be thought
of as having parts as long as it is understood that those `parts' exist just in the same
ontological category as the kinds themselves. We might say that kinds have kind-parts.
For example, the region of space occupied by an instance of a photograph will contain
the whole photograph, co-present with the instance (and indeed every instance of the
photograph will be co-present with the whole photograph). But the top right quadrant,
containing part of the instance, will not contain the whole photograph but a kind-part
of the photograph. As the whole photograph is co-present with the whole instance, the
kind-part of the photograph is co-present with the corresponding part of an instance.
The top right quadrant of each instance of the photograph is co-present with the same
(strictly identical) kind-part of the photograph kind in each case, and the kind-part is
repeatable just as the kind itself is.
As an instance of a photograph can be divided into spatial parts, each part being
an instance of the corresponding part of the photograph kind, so an instance of a work
of music can be divided into temporal (kind-)parts, and each temporal part will be
co-present with the corresponding temporal part of the work itself. The opening bars of
Beethoven's Fifth are a temporal (kind-)part of that work of music. They are identiﬁable
and repeatable as a part of the whole kind. Thus we can see that a further advantage
of kind Physicalism over Platonism is that it makes good sense of our talk of parts of
repeatable artefacts. The talk is legitimate because repeatable artefacts do have parts,
though we must understand them as kind-parts.
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We can contrast this with a Platonist account, according to which the view that kinds
(or types) have structures and parts is untenable. For if kinds are abstract objects, it is
hard if not impossible to make sense of the claim that they are spatially or temporally
arranged. If a photograph is non-spatial, it makes little sense to identify the top right
quadrant of the photograph itself; the Platonist must interpret such talk as talk about
the spatial arrangement of instances of the photograph, and they are likely to conclude
that the kinds themselves are structureless.14
However, there is a further problem with viewing abstract kinds as having parts and
structure that one might think is also a pressing problem for Physicalism. This problem
was raised for abstract types and their tokens by Peter Simons (Simons, 1982, p.196).
Consider the expression `Faa'.15 We might ask: how many letters does the expression
type `Faa' contain? It is plausible to reply that there are three letters in `Faa'. However,
if these are letter tokens that are being counted, we seem to be saying that the type
contains three letter tokens. This is problematic because a type, as an abstract object,
cannot literally contain tokens (which are physical, locatable particulars). However, if
we mean letter types, then there are not three but two letter types in the expression
`Faa'. But if `Faa' is an expression composed of two letter types, there would be no
distinction between `Faa' and the expression `Fa', which also contains the same two
letter types.
It seems possible to generate the same worry for a physicalist account of kinds. If the
physical word kind `hoot' is a structured entity, it cannot be composed of four letter
instances, because instances are not repeatable, whereas the word itself is. We said
above that parts of kinds are kinds themselves, and so we called them kind-parts. But
if it is composed of letter kinds, there are only three distinct letter kinds to be counted.
There would then be no diﬀerence between the structure of `hoot' and the structure of
`hot'.
I think that to answer this problem, the physicalist must recognise that kind-parts
of a word are not identical with letter kinds. Thus we can understand `hoot' as being
composed of four kind parts. The second part and the third part are numerically distinct
kind parts of that word, but neither of those parts are kind-identical with the letter `o'.
This is because the second part of the word `hoot' and the letter `o' have diﬀerent
requirements of their instances (and thus diﬀerent essences). Note, for instance, that
in writing `o' in this sentence I am producing an instance of that letter, but not an
instance of either the second or third kind-part of the word `hoot'. To instance the
second and third kind-part of the word `hoot' I have to write the word `hoot' itself.
Alternatively, the diﬀerence can be seen from the fact that if I point ﬁrst to one `o' in
`hoot' and then to the other, I am pointing to the same (identical) letter, but diﬀerent
parts of the word. Because the second and third part are non-identical, they cannot be
identical to some third thing. Thus none of the parts of the word are identical with the
letter `o' itself (though, of course, every instance of the second and third part will also
14See Dodd (2007, p.51).
15I have adapted the argument slightly from Simons' presentation.
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be an instance of the letter `o'). Hence the answer to the problem might be that words
are not in fact composed of letters (in that no part of the word is identical with any
letter), though they do have parts.
Before moving on to consider Platonism in more detail, more can be said to ﬂesh out
the details of Physicalism. For instance, the discussion of photographs and works of
music above reveals the diﬀerent ways that kinds can be continuous. We can see that
while a photograph has quantiﬁed continuity in space and pure continuity in time (there
is no minimal temporal region in which a photograph can be found in its entirety) a work
of music has quantiﬁed continuity in time but something approaching pure continuity
in space.16 A ﬁlm, on the other hand, has quantiﬁed continuity in both space and time:
one can see part of a ﬁlm either by only watching in the ﬁrst half hour or by covering
up part of the screen for the duration of a showing.
The ﬁnal point to emphasise here is that the kind of continuity that a repeatable
artefact has along a dimension is not ad hoc. Rather it depends entirely on the essence of
the kind in question. A photograph, as an object-repeatable, requires that its instances
have properties that relate directly to spatial arrangement (relative spatial locations)
and so instances have minimum sizes, but there is no temporal dimension to the required
properties. A work of music  an occurrence-repeatable  is just the opposite. An
instance must have certain temporal properties  it must be a sound event with certain
duration  but there is no strict spatial requirement. Thus minimum spatial or temporal
regions are set by the minimum regions in which the required properties, whatever they
may be, can be found.17
This concludes my introduction of kind Physicalism which presents kinds (with phys-
ical instances) as being spatially located repeatable entities. They exist in the physical
world though they do not belong to the ontological category of ordinary physical objects
like chairs and rocks.18 I argue that accepting this as an ontological category allows us
to make better sense of our talk about repeatable artefacts and other kinds than can
be gained by appealing to abstracta. In 4.4-4.6 I will argue that once Physicalism is
on the table, the arguments for Platonism about kinds are not nearly so appealing.
4.4. The Axiom of Localisation
A Platonist about kinds, as that term is being used here, is anyone who thinks that
kinds are not spatially located. Sensible Platonists object to claims that such entities
are `outside of space' because this adopts a unhelpful spatial metaphor (saying `where'
they are) and leads to metaphysical queasiness and jeers about `Platonic realms' and
16The minimum spatial region in which a work of music can be instanced will be the minimum spatial
region in which one can identify a sound event as being located, whatever that may be.
17I will argue in Chapter 6 that these structural properties are not in fact part of the essence, though
they are entailed by the essence.
18Note that I remain neutral in this thesis as to whether chairs and rocks are enduring or perduring
entities.
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`wraith-like hinter-worlds'.19 Instead, the Platonist claims simply that they are not the
sorts of things that can be located. They cannot be at a particular place, nor can they
have a volume, any more than `4.30pm yesterday' can have a mass, or the number four
can have a velocity.
However, I will argue here that the arguments for Platonism are surprisingly weak
and do not justify the banishing of repeatable artefacts to the realm of the abstract. I
suggest that the weakness of these arguments has generally gone unnoticed thanks to a
scarcity of alternatives. What the Platonists get right is that many things that we want
to say about instances of kinds, especially with regard to their relationship to space and
time, we cannot say about the kinds that they are instances of. This is because kinds
and instances are in fundamentally diﬀerent ontological categories. However, it has too
often been assumed that this diﬀerence must be a diﬀerence between the abstract and
the concrete.
I will consider three arguments that have been given for Platonism: the argument
from the axiom of localisation (this section); the argument from the peculiarity of where
is X? questions, where X is the name of a kind (4.5); and, ﬁnally, the argument that
Physicalism is unnecessary (4.6). The ﬁrst two arguments for Platonism are designed
to show that any view which tries to locate kinds is untenable. I will claim that neither
of these arguments provides us with enough reason to reject Physicalism. The third
argument tries to show that Physicalism isn't needed because a Platonist account can
explain everything that needs to be explained about kinds. I will argue that while a
Platonist explanation can be oﬀered, Physicalism oﬀers a better explanation.
Before launching into these arguments it should be noted that while Platonism has
the weight of tradition on its side, Physicalism does a better job from the outset of
allowing for our ordinary talk of repeatable artefacts and other kinds. It allows that we
can straightforwardly causally interact with kinds, it allows that kinds can have parts
(though we must understand them as kind-parts) and it allows for our claims to see,
hear and touch kinds. In that sense, at least, it begins with the upper hand and the
onus should be on Platonism to show that it oﬀers a better account.
This ﬁrst argument hinges on an insistence that a central feature of kind Physicalism
is intuitively false. Kind Physicalism holds that a kind can be multiply located; i.e. that
it can be wholly located in diﬀerent places at once. However, it has been claimed that
this cannot be possible because the contrary is a truism to which any ontology must
conform. This `truism' has been put forward as the axiom of localisation. Quoting from
Julian Dodd, we can present the axiom as follows:
AL no entity whatsoever can be wholly present at diﬀerent places at once. (Dodd,
2007, p.48) 20
19See, for example, Glock (2002, p.249): Platonists hold that abstract objects . . . inhabit a super-
natural world beyond space, time and causation...Nominalists protest that this hinterworld is a
myth... See also Howell (2002, p.124) who talks unhelpfully of an abstract pattern hovering ghost-
like over the musical landscape.
20J.P. Moreland (2001, pp.9-10) presents AL as the claim that no entity can exist at diﬀerent places
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Clearly, if there were independent reasons to believe that AL was a universal truth,
then kind Physicalism would have to be rejected. But why should we think that AL is a
universal truth? It might be thought that it is true because it is impossible to conceive
of it being false. However, this seems to indicate a lack of conceptual imagination more
than anything else. Most philosophers are willing to accept that a person can be wholly
located at diﬀerent times (or at the least that this is a conceptual possibility). Is it
really that much of a conceptual step to also allow that an entity can exist wholly at
diﬀerent locations?
Alternatively, though in the same ball park, it might be insisted that AL is true
because it is true by deﬁnition. In other words, it might be claimed that it is just what
we mean by `wholly located' that if an entity is wholly located in a region `1 then it
cannot be simultaneously located at any other place outside of `1. On this view it is
contradictory to say that an entity is wholly located at `1and wholly located at `2 where
`1 and `2 are non-identical, in the same way that it would be contradictory to say that
a stone had a mass of one kilo and a mass of two kilos, or that a race began at time t1
and at time t2 (where t1 6= t2).
However, it is far from clear that our concept being wholly located has such a strict
deﬁnition. If one were to deﬁne `wholly located' or `wholly present' in this way then AL
would be trivially true. But then we could re-state the central claim of Physicalism in
diﬀerent terms that avoided this conceptual contradiction. We might say, for example,
that when a kind is multiply located it is found `in its entirety' at each location, thus
avoiding the claim that it is `wholly' located in multiple places. This might seem like
slight of hand, but note that merely deﬁning a term so that a claim cannot be made
using it does not mean that there is no true claim to be made. The truth or falsity of
Physicalism cannot lie in a contestable deﬁnition of the phrase `wholly located'.
More importantly, however, I argue that a reﬂection on the nature of kinds provides
precisely the sort of evidence that should persuade us that our concept of being `wholly
located' is more encompassing than we thought. For example, I noted above that it
appears contradictory to claim that an event had two beginnings. On the face of it this
strikes us as plausible. It might seem that it is part of what we mean by `beginning'
that something can only `begin' once. However, doesn't it make good sense to say
that a ﬁlm begins at the cinema at 16.30, 18.30 and 22.30? Similarly, to someone who
missed the opening sequence of a video installation on loop, we might say that they
needn't worry because it will begin again in ﬁve minutes.21 We have every reason to
take this as evidence that, contrary to what we thought, some things  namely kinds
 can begin more than once. Our mistake was to limit the concept of what it is to
or at interrupted time intervals. Interpreting Moreland (with a little charity) as meaning that `no
entity can wholly exist at diﬀerent places at once', his is the slightly stronger formulation of the
axiom, but we will do well enough to stick with Dodd's more careful formulation.
21In a similar manner, Simons (1987, pp.195-196) distinguishes a global from a local sense of `beginning'
for activities, so that one may only begin climbing (for example) in the global sense once (`When
did you ﬁrst begin climbing?') but each episode of climbing will have a new beginning in the local
sense. See also the discussion of intermittent existence in 4.7.
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begin to non-repeatable entities. Likewise, I would argue that reﬂection on kinds gives
us good reason to think that we were mistaken to think that no entity can be wholly
located in two places at once, or at the very least that our prior understanding of what
it is to be wholly located was unnecessarily restrictive.
An alternative and more persuasive version of the `true by deﬁnition' argument can
be found in the work of Jonathan Lowe (Lowe, 2006, p.24). Lowe begins by claiming
that the suggestion that something can be wholly present in two diﬀerent places at the
same time seems to make no sense. He then argues this is because the relation of
being wholly in the same place as appears to be a symmetrical and transitive relation.
(The axiom of localisation was not put in terms of being `in the same place as' but
that formulation can easily be derived from the axiom. If a kind is wholly present in a
region `, and the instance is wholly present in a region `, the kind and the instance are
wholly located in the same place.) Thus if we want to say that the kind is wholly in
the same place as instance A, it follows  if the relation is symmetrical  that instance
A is wholly in the same place as the kind. But then if the kind is also wholly in the
same place as instance B (and thus B is wholly in the same place as the kind) it seems
we would have to say, by transitivity, that instance A is wholly in the same place as
instance B, which is obviously false.
But we can reply here very much in the same spirit as before: we can either deny that
our concept of being wholly located is symmetrical and transitive in this way, or argue
that a reﬂection on kinds should persuade us to rethink this understanding of being
`wholly located'. How can the relationship not be symmetrical and transitive? Well,
if instance A is wholly in the same place as the kind, and instance B is wholly in the
same place as the kind we can insist that is doesn't follow that A and B are in the same
place, precisely because the kind can be wholly in two places at once! So, contrary to
supposition, though the relationship may be symmetrical, it is not transitive. In this
respect it is like the relationship of being the same nationality as. If Ben has the same
nationality as Mary, Mary has the same nationality as Ben. But if Ben is also the same
nationality as Jane, it doesn't follow that Mary is also the same nationality as Jane.
This is because Ben could have dual nationality.22
Lowe anticipates this move, however. He notes that someone may simply reject the
claim that the relation is transitive, but charges this as being both unprincipled and
question begging (Lowe, 2006, p.24). Lowe's reason here is that if one gives up on
this condition then it becomes altogether obscure what one does mean by `wholly
located'. In other words, a supporter of the view that an entity can be wholly in two
places at once cannot reject the most central components of what we mean by being
`wholly located' and still be understood as saying something coherent.
This challenge could equally be made in response to the previous point: if, by `wholly
located in region `' it is not meant that the entity is not located in any other region, then
what is meant by such a claim? Kind Physicalism must be able to meet this challenge
22That being co-present is not a transitive relation is regarded as obvious by David Lewis (1983, p.345).
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or Lowe's charge of it being altogether obscure will be justiﬁed.
Fortunately, this challenge can be answered. What we mean when we say that a
kind is wholly located in a region ` is that in that location every part of the kind is
located. By parts, here, we mean of course kind-parts. To say then that the kind is
wholly located in region ` is to say that every part of the kind is located in region `,
and so if the kind is located outside region `, say in region m, then m will not contain
a numerically diﬀerent part of the kind, but the same kind and the same parts again.
In other words, we mean that one cannot look elsewhere and ﬁnd a diﬀerent part of the
entity, but we do not mean that one cannot look elsewhere and ﬁnd the same entity
and same parts again.
This is not an ad hoc move that deﬁnes `being wholly located' in a question begging
way. Rather it picks out something that is surely central to our meaning of being wholly
located in every case of using that term. If a house is wholly located in region h, then
one cannot ﬁnd an additional part of the house somewhere else outside of h. Of course,
because the house is an entity bound in space, it also follows that the entity cannot be
found outside of h at all. But consider this example: if an enduring person is wholly
located in a space-time region, one cannot ﬁnd an additional part of the person in
another space-time region, even if the person can be found to exist in other space-time
regions. For what one will ﬁnd in these other regions is not a diﬀerent part of the same
thing, but the same parts (and the same whole) again.
Now Lowe and others might still object that this doesn't really do full justice to our
ordinary sense of `wholly located' and our ordinary understanding of parts and wholes,
but this need not trouble the Physicalist. All the Physicalist needs is that there is an
understandable and reasonable sense in which the kind can be said to be wholly located
in a region. It can be claimed that `wholly located' as applied to kinds was never meant
to be used in this strong `ordinary sense', since that strong ordinary sense is the sense
that only applies to ordinary spatially bound (i.e. non-repeatable) entities.
It is no doubt because we are so familiar with spatially bound entities that the axiom
of localisation has the degree of intuitive pull that it does have. However, when we
move onto kinds we have no reason to think that the axiom should apply. In fact, I
have argued that consideration of kinds provides a solid antidote to the claim the axiom
is a universal truth. Entities can be wholly located in two places at once: the word
The is both in the left half of the display and the right half of the display; water is
underground and in lakes and rivers.
4.5. The Peculiarity of Where is X? Questions
I have argued that the axiom of localisation cannot be used to show that Physicalism
is false because we have no independent reason to think that the axiom applies to
kinds. It therefore provides no reason to think that Platonism should be preferred over
Physicalism. However, the Platonist might attempt to counter one of the motivations
for Physicalism by claiming that at least some of the time it is far more natural to think
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of kinds as not being located. For example Dodd notes that
[t]he question `Where is Beethoven's Fifth Symphony?' has a curious ring
about it: its occurrences take place in concert-halls and living rooms, but
we do not describe the work itself as inhabiting such spaces. (Dodd, 2007,
p.92)
Dodd then counts this as (at least some) intuitive evidence for his version of Platonism.
However, I suggest that the oddity of the proposed question is really just evidence of
the fact that works of music are kinds of sound or noise, and that it is unusual to ask
`where' a noise is. Kind Physicalism is the thesis that kinds are physical entities that
are co-present with their instances. If the instances are noises, or sound events, then
a kind has no obvious location just as a noise has no obvious location, but the kind
is still physically present in the way that the noise is present. The oddity arises from
the ontology of noises, and should not be taken as evidence for the non-physicality of
repeatable artefacts in general.
However, this isn't the whole story. It might be objected that it still sounds odd to
ask where a repeatable artefact is even for artefacts that have easily locatable instances
(such as photographs). `Where is the 2012 Olympic logo?' sounds just as peculiar as
`Where is Beethoven's Fifth Symphony?' though instances of the logo are not noises.
However, we can easily identify two further reasons why the question sounds peculiar,
without rejecting the view that kinds are located. The ﬁrst is that because a kind can
be multiply located the question is poorly worded and ambiguous as to the kind of
answer being sought. Is the question asking for every point at which the logo is to be
found, or is there a contextually relevant instance about which the enquiry is aimed?
As an analogy, consider the question `How much gold is there?'  in the whole world?
In this room? Now? It sounds odd because it is a poorly formed question, not because
gold cannot be quantiﬁed.
The second reason follows from the ﬁrst and is that because kinds can be multiply
located while instances cannot, the question, in appearing to ask for a single location,
seems to betray a category mistake. When presented with the question its ambiguity
suggests that the questioner has mistaken the name of a kind for the name of an ordinary
object. Thus while Platonism would say that the question sounds odd because kinds
are not located at all, the Physicalist's claim is equally plausible: the question is odd
because kinds are multiply located. Again, we have no reason in this argument to prefer
Platonism over Physicalism.
4.6. The Argument Against the Necessity of Physicalism
The previous two arguments tried to show that Platonism is to be preferred over Phys-
icalism because in the ﬁrst place Physicalism has insurmountable problems, and in the
second place there is intuitive evidence for Platonism rather than Physicalism. This
third argument for Platonism is less direct. The aim here is to show that we should not
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be wooed by Physicalism in the ﬁrst place because Platonism can account for everything
that Physicalism can account for. Recall that the advantage of Physicalism was that
straight oﬀ the bat it could allow for our apparent claims about locating kinds, and
it made it simple to see how kinds could be seen and heard, and how they could be
causally eﬃcacious. The Platonist will argue that all these claims can be made sense
of, or otherwise dealt with, by a Platonist account. I will argue that while ground can
be made by the Platonist to this end, it comes at a price. Physicalism still provides the
better explanation.
We should note that this ﬁnal line of attack will only be eﬀective for the Platonist
in conjunction with the success of an additional argument to show that Physicalism is
ﬂawed, for otherwise it seems that the simpler option of Physicalism should be preferred.
I have not found such an argument, but that doesn't mean that there isn't one. Thus it
is worth assessing the plausibility of the Platonist's hopes in this respect. The version
of the Platonist argument that I will focus on comes from Dodd (2007).
Firstly, we can note that Dodd's argument deals with the two issues of encountering
kinds and of kinds being causally eﬃcacious in one blow. We can encounter kinds
because kinds can be causally eﬃcacious, according to Dodd. Speciﬁcally, Dodd argues
that we can hear a work of music because the work participates in a sound event which
causally aﬀects us. I will argue that while this account may be workable for music it is
not without problems. More signiﬁcantly, however, it does not translate well to other
repeatable artefacts such as photographs.
Firstly, Dodd fully accepts the need to account for the fact that we can hear works
of music:
Someone who had clearly listened attentively to a performance of In This
House, On This Morning, but who nonetheless insisted that she had never
heard the work, would be looked upon with bewilderment by her fellow
concert-goers. An ontological proposal that had as a consequence that such
a person had spoken truly should only be adopted in extremis. (Dodd, 2007,
pp.12-13)
He then notes that the objection to his Platonism, given the force of the above, is based
on the claim that:
types of sound-event cannot themselves be perceived because, lacking lo-
cation in space, they cannot enter into causal relations, and hence cannot
ﬁgure in the causal process that ends with an auditory experience. (Dodd,
2007, p.13)23
It is here that Dodd ties being heard to being causally eﬃcacious. Something can be
heard if it can ﬁgure in the causal process that ends with an auditory experience.
23Note that Dodd uses the terminology of types here, but for the purposes of this argument they can
be taken as suﬃciently similar to kinds.
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The traditional line of thought is then that because abstract entities cannot ﬁgure in a
causal process in this way, they cannot be heard.
To be clearer as to the argument involved here, we can helpfully distinguish between
diﬀerent kinds of hearing. If a bird is singing, we can talk of hearing the noise, or of
hearing the bird singing, or of hearing the bird itself. The ﬁrst two are closely related. I
suggest we can understand the noise as being the audible aspect of the event of the bird
singing. When an event occurs, if part of that event involves vibrations of a suitable
frequency travelling through a suitable medium there will be noise available to be heard.
On the other hand, we hear the bird itself in a slightly diﬀerent sense. We hear the bird
because it participates in the event in the right kind of way. Let us say that we directly
hear the event, but indirectly hear the object that participates in the event. Thus we
directly hear a musical performance (an event), because we hear the audible aspect of
the event (which is the noise), and we indirectly hear the orchestra which participates
in that event in a suitable manner.
The conceptual connection with causal eﬃcacy seems relatively straightforward. Our
directly hearing the event, in particular the audible aspect of the event, is a result
of the event causing an auditory experience. The indirect hearing of the object (the
orchestra or the bird) is also connected to the causal powers of the object but in a
slightly diﬀerent way. To see why, we need to note that it is events that are commonly
taken to be the causal relata.24 Nevertheless, as Dodd notes, our concept of what can
be a cause seems to stretch to objects (orchestras, birds) in a derivative way (Dodd,
2007, p.13). An object can be said to cause something if it is suitably involved in the
causing event: the nail caused the tyre to burst by being suitably involved in the event
of the nail coming into contact with the tyre; the alarm clock caused me to wake up
by being suitable involved in the event of the alarm clock going oﬀ. This derivative
way in which an object can be causally eﬃcacious nicely mirrors the sense in which
we indirectly hear an object thanks to its involvement in an audible event. Thus it is
natural to say that we (indirectly) hear an object as a result of its (derivatively) causing
an auditory experience. Being a cause, either straightforwardly or derivatively, seems
to be a necessary condition of being heard, either directly or indirectly.
We can be more speciﬁc, then, and say that the traditional thought is that ab-
stract objects, being non-spatial, cannot cause either straightforwardly or derivatively,
and cannot be heard, either directly or indirectly.25 That an abstract object cannot
straightforwardly be a cause, and that it cannot directly be heard, is quire clear. Be-
cause it is non-spatial it is not a physical event, and it cannot have an audible aspect
involving vibrations. However, Dodd's argument is that it is far from clear that an
abstract object cannot be a cause derivatively, and cannot thus be heard indirectly.
To be a cause derivatively, and so to be heard indirectly, we have said that an entity
must participate in or be involved in the event in the right kind of way. The orchestra
seems to satisfy this condition in relation to the performance. Thus the orchestra
24See, e.g. Davidson (1967), Lewis (1973), and Collins et al. (2004).
25See, e.g., Cheyne (2001, p.3).
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(derivatively) causes the auditory experience and can be (indirectly) heard. Can we be
so sure that an abstract object cannot play an analogous role to the orchestra here?
Any objection to this thought would have to rely on a worked out and principled theory
of what it is to participate in an event in the right kind of way, Dodd argues, and no
such theory appears to be available. Thus the Platonist should be free to hold that
their abstract objects are as good candidates as anything else for participating in this
way (Dodd, 2007, pp.15-16).
Dodd's argument here certainly serves to undercut the assumption that it is obvious
that an abstract object cannot be heard and cannot be causally eﬃcacious. However,
one might wonder about the relationship between intuitions and inferences at play
here. We have the intuition that a work of music can be heard, and if theory says that
a musical work is an abstract object, we might infer that we have reason to believe that
an abstract object is an entity suitable to be heard, at least in an indirect way. But if
one is unsure about the theory that a musical work is an abstract object, then the prior
intuition to the eﬀect that something abstract cannot be heard will continue to be a
sticking point. If all else was equal, they will say, a theory of musical works that didn't
have us saying an abstract object could be heard would be preferable. Platonism that
holds that musical works can be heard will hold it a price, even if Dodd has persuaded
us that the price was much less than we thought.
Perhaps more importantly, however, Dodd's account of how we can hear a work of mu-
sic doesn't translate well to visual repeatable artefacts, such as plays and photographs.
While our concept of hearing allows that we can hear something indirectly in virtue of
it participating in an audible event, it is not obvious that there is an analogous sense
of indirectly seeing something. That is, in seeing we cannot draw a distinction parallel
to the one drawn between a sound and an object that makes a sound.
Now, what it is to see something might not be as straightforward as having our retina
impinged by light reﬂected or emitted from an object. The concept also allows us to see
using electronic equipment to transmit this kind of visual data over long distances, so
that we can `see' the person we are in a video call with. We may even see an object using
sonar or a heat sensitive camera. However, all of these ways of seeing involve us receiving
visual data relating to an object's physical presence in a physical environment. Seeing
is in this way quite a singular concept that doesn't allow for the seeing of something
non-spatial. There are of course non-literal uses of `see' as in `I see your point' or `I
don't see why I should' but here `see' is being used to mean `understand' or `grasp' and
the fact that it is a non-literal use of the verb `to see' is obvious. If this is right, it
is much harder to see how an account could be given of how we could literally see an
abstract object.
There may be a Platonist response here. They may argue that our concept of what
it is to see something should be expanded in light of our claims to see repeatable
artefacts, coupled with the theory that such artefacts are abstract. Or they may argue
that the singular sense of seeing that I have described is subject to as yet unknown
counterexamples. However, the point is that the Platonist has their work cut out for
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them here, and a theory that has it that the plays and photographs that we see are
not abstract provides a considerably more straightforward explanation. According to
Physicalism we can see photographs and plays because they are physical and literally
reﬂect light.26 Similarly, we can hear pieces of music just because, as physically located
event kinds, they can involve vibrations of a suitable frequency that cause auditory
experiences, just as ordinary events can. In summary, then, though the Platonist is not
entirely at a loss when it comes to explaining how we can hear repeatable artefacts, the
waters muddy considerably when we turn to seeing artefacts, and, moreover, Physicalism
provides a simpler explanation in both cases.27
4.7. The Persistence of Kinds
A theory of kinds has been set out as the best explanation of repeatability, and I have
defended the view that kinds are physical multiply located entities. However, we have
yet to address an important issue concerning when kinds exist. (The related question of
where kinds exist, which only comes into play given the rejection of kinds as abstracta,
needs also to be addressed). I have said that kinds exist and are real physically located
entities, but do they come into existence at a certain point, and if so when? Do they
cease to exist, and if so under what circumstances? These questions, concerning the
persistence of the entities, have proved surprisingly diﬃcult to answer.
The ontological theory developed so far, however, suggests a quite speciﬁc response
to this question. If kinds are multiply located physical entities, then I argue that they
must exist (and only exist) when and where they are located. With respect to repeatable
artefacts, this position is certainly contrary to our intuitions, as we will see. However,
the view seems unavoidable for anyone committed to the physicality of kinds. I will
argue that our intuitions are weaker than they seem here, and in terms of a cost-beneﬁt
analysis, the view defended here does remarkably well.
Take the issue of spatial location ﬁrst as this is the least problematic. If kinds are
physical then the question of where they exist is just the question of where they are,
which is a simple matter of their locations. Being located at ` is suﬃcient for existing
at `, and being located at ` is also necessary for existing at `.
What of the temporal aspect of their existence? I am claiming that if kinds are
physical they exist when they are located. I suggest that the truth of this is an example
of a more general principle that applies to all physical entities, which we can call the
Principle of Physical Existence (PPE):
PPE A physical entity exists at a time t if and only if it is located at t.
26Note the the photograph and the print of the photograph will both reﬂect the same light given that
they are co-present.
27I have focussed on hearing and sight, but the discussion could easily be extended to the other senses.
We say we can smell a perfume, though the perfume is a kind of stuﬀ, taste a herb though the the
herb is plant kind, and touch gold or water. Any theory that regards these as physical entities will
always be more straightforward in accounting for these claims than one that does not.
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Why should we believe the bi-conditional PPE? One half of the bi-conditional, that an
entity exists at time t if it is located at t (that location is suﬃcient for existence), is
straightforward. That an entity is located at t entails that the entity exists at t, for
something cannot be at a place without being simpliciter.
The second half of the bi-conditional is the claim that an entity is located at time
t if it exists at time t (that location is necessary for existence). This is not quite as
straightforward as the ﬁrst conditional, but I still think it deserves our assent. To see
why, note that the falsity of this claim would imply that a physical entity could exist
without being located.
Is this possible? One immediate response is that this is impossible because, on pain
of contradiction, an entity cannot be physical and lack a location. However, this is only
true if for an entity to be physical it must have a physical location at every time that
it exists. One might propose that some entity could be physical in virtue of being only
occasionally located. I do not know how to show conclusively that such an entity is
not possible, but I think we have good reason to doubt that there are such entities.
An entity of this sort would be sometimes abstract and sometimes physical, but a
common characterisation of what it is to be abstract is that something is categorically
unsuited to having a location. Perhaps it would be responded that though the entity is
sometimes not located, it does not follow that it is abstract at such times; it is physical
though sometimes lacking a location. The problem, though, is that we normally take
the existence of a physical thing to be bound in an important way to its physicality. If
it exists though it is not located, how or why does it exist? In what sense does it have
being? Again, I do not know how to show that such an entity is impossible but I think
we should avoid postulating such entities if we can.
Of course, PPE as applied to kinds has the following consequence. If a kind is a
physical entity, then according to PPE it exists at multiple times and places, just as
it is located at multiple times and places. However, there may be a time, t, at which
the kind is not located and so does not exist, even though the kind exists at a time
both before and after t. In other words, PPE implies that kinds can have intermittent
existence.28
It is likely that this will be seen as a problem, and we can identify two lines of ob-
jection. On the one hand there is likely to be a principled objection to intermittent
existence. The claim here is that intermittent existence violates more basic ontological
principles and is universally implausible. On the other hand there is likely to be an ob-
jection to accepting intermittent existence for certain speciﬁc entities which supposedly
fall within this ontological category. It is important to keep these objections separate
and not allow worries from one bleed into our consideration of the other. I will argue
ﬁrstly that there are no good reasons to object to intermittent existence in principle,
28Note that the theory of intermittent existence here is quite independent of Joseph Margolis' theory
that all works of art (repeatable or not) have intermittent existence. According to Margolis, a
work of art exists only when some `lower level' material object which `subvenes' the work receives
some properly orientated attention (Margolis, 1958). The work then exists intermittently as it is
perceived intermittently. See also Hein (1959).
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and secondly that worries about the intermittent existence of speciﬁc repeatable arte-
facts are inconclusive and insuﬃcient to undermine the broader ontological proposal set
out here.
Objections in Principle to Intermittent Existence
To object to intermittent existence in principle is to advocate a principle of No Intermit-
tent Existence (NIE). NIE may be defended on the grounds that if an entity goes out of
existence at a time, t, it cannot exist at any time after t. After all, the conjecture goes,
isn't this what `ceasing to exist' means? Similarly, it may be insisted that for an entity
to begin to exist at t, it must not have existed at any time before t. Locke, for example,
made the claim that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence (Locke, 1964,
Book 3, 27:1). The proper response, I think, is that this is an indefensibly weighty
meaning of what it is to come into and go out of existence. All we are committed to,
I suggest, is that an entity ceases to exist at t if it exists immediately before t and
does not exist immediately after t, and an entity begins to exist at t if it does not exist
immediately before t and it does exist immediately after t. To insist that something can
only come into existence if it has not existed at any time before is to beg the question
against intermittent existence. Of course, we may want to infer special status to the
event in which an entity comes into existence for the ﬁrst time (and perhaps in such a
way to appease Locke's intuitions about singular beginnings), or to the event in which
an entity ceases to exist permanently, but it does not follow that coming into existence
and going out of existence are concepts that only apply in this limited way.29
The principle NIE may instead be defended on grounds of individuation. Suppose
an entity, E, comes into existence and then goes out of existence, and subsequently
an entity E* comes into existence. If kinds can have intermittent existence, it would
be possible that E and E* are identical. However, it may seem that E* must be non-
identical with E because of basic principles of individuation that require that we count
them as two just in virtue of the discontinuity of existence. An illuminating discussion
by Michael Burke is helpful at this point (Burke, 1980). Burke argues that there are
some cases where ordinary material objects exist intermittently. Because Burke is not
writing about kinds, the ﬁne details of the discussion are not relevant to us, but his
argument is roughly as follows. He considers a table made of thirty pieces of wood.
The table is dismantled and those same thirty pieces of wood are then used to make
a chair. Later the chair is dismantled and the pieces are put back into their original
arrangement to make a table. Burke argues that in this scenario we have good reason to
accept that the table ceases to exist when the wood is arranged as a chair, but that the
original table exists again after the wood is put back into its former arrangement. The
table then has intermittent existence. Towards the end of the paper, Burke defends the
claim that the table at the end of the story is identical with the table at the beginning.
He recognises that objectors will be motivated by a criterion of particular identity.
29For a similar point, see Simons (1987, pp.195-196).
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This criterion is described by quoting Henry Laycock:
[A]n object m at t1 is identical with an object n at t2 only if m is spatio-
temporally continuous with n between t1 and t2 under some covering concept
F. (Laycock, 1972, p.28)30
Part of the motivation for accepting the criterion, Burke explains, is that otherwise
there is no apparent way of making sense of the assertion that the later object, besides
being qualitatively identical to the earlier, is identical to it numerically. For what would
make the later object numerically the same (Burke, 1980, p.404)? Burke does have a
response to this, but the key point to emphasise is that we can see clearly that these
motivating intuitions about individuation are speciﬁc to ordinary persisting material
objects, and kinds sidestep this worry neatly. In the case of kinds, what makes it the
same kind being identiﬁed at a later time is the instantiation of the essential properties.
No reference needs to be made to spatio-temporal continuity or unbroken existence, and
the puzzle that Burke notes is not relevant.31 The problem then is that an adherence to
such a principle as NIE based on individuation criteria is unjustiﬁed for kinds. Though
we may ﬁnd ourselves prejudiced towards NIE, I believe that on inspection it should
be treated in the same way that AL was treated: applicable to certain entities but not
universally applicable, and in particular not applicable to kinds. NIE is nothing more
than, as Peter Simons puts it, a disposition based on our normal experience (Simons,
1987, p.195). Though we may be disposed to accept NIE I argue that we have no reason
to accept it. On the contrary, in the ontological category of kinds and the theory of kind
physicalism we have reason to reject NIE. Some things do have intermittent existence.32
Objections to the Intermittent Existence of Artefacts
The second line of objection to my proposal challenges not intermittent existence per
se but the claim that some entity or other in fact has intermittent existence in the way
suggested. For example, the (supposedly) Aristotelian position that properties exist
only when they have instances is often objected to not on the grounds that intermit-
tent existence is impossible, but on the grounds that it is apparently demonstrable that
properties exist even when nothing possesses them. Property existence is not intermit-
tent, it is claimed, because their existence at a time does not depend on their being
possessed at that time.
A similar argument may be levelled at the theory on oﬀer here. Our intuitions
about when repeatable artefacts exist, such as they are, do not neatly coincide with
the existence of instances. In particular, we do not normally think of repeatables as
temporarily going out of existence when they have no instances. Suppose that right now
there is nowhere in the world where The Nutcracker is being played or performed.
30Quoted in Burke (1980, p.404).
31Burke defends his own theory against this challenge by appealing to the continuity of the parts of
the table throughout the period during which the table itself does not exist.
32Indeed, if Burke is right, it is not only kinds that have intermittent existence.
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Could we really accept that if that was the case The Nutcracker would not exist
right now?
It cannot be denied that this appears problematic. However, I hope to show that
giving up on it and accepting intermittent existence is not so serious a consequence as
it ﬁrst seems. To begin with, we need to consider carefully what exactly our intuitions
are here and how our intuitions about existence should be handled. Our intuition seems
to be that a song or a play exists at a time even if it has no instances at that time, but of
course this is only relevant to our ontological account if we have reason to believe such
an intuition. If ontological theory suggests one answer to the question of persistence
and intuition suggests another, does the former show the latter to be mistaken or vice
versa?
The obvious place to turn for help here is to the methodology of conceptual analysis
defended in the ﬁrst part of this thesis. If we can extract truths about the entities we
are referring to by conceptual analysis, it might seem that we should take seriously our
intuitions about the persistence of kinds. However, recall that in defending conceptual
analysis I was careful not to endorse the view that ontology is beholden to all our pre-
theoretical suspicions. We do not do ontology merely by listing all the things that seem
pre-theoretically to be true about the entities of interest. Instead I argued that our
basic dispositions concerning the application and co-application of terms are relevant
in determining which entity we are referring to with that term.
However, little can be determined about the persistence of entities from these prac-
tices. We can recognise that if a kind is identiﬁed at time t, then the kind must exist
at time t in order to be identiﬁed. This itself seems like an uncontroversial principle.
However, this only provides a suﬃcient condition for existence at a time  one that does
not conﬂict with the proposal that a kind exists when and only when it has instances,
note  and little can be extrapolated in terms of broader principles. Nothing can be
inferred about whether the kind comes into existence or goes out of existence, or under
what circumstances this happens. The problem is that our dispositions to use a term
are relatively opaque with respect to the persistence of the entity in question, the point
just made about suﬃcient conditions notwithstanding. As such I think we ought to
handle intuitions about when entities exist with caution.
An important reason for treating our intuitions about existence carefully is that there
seems to be a number of diﬀerent facts that we could be trying to express and that we
may fear are being denied. Once these facts are made explicit in other terms, the
temporary non-existence of the repeatable is much less worrying. We may ﬁnd the
claim that the artefact does not exist when it has no instances surprising, but what
exactly are we reacting to here? Consider, for example, a song that is composed and
played on Monday, but not rehearsed again until Wednesday. The claim being made
here is that strictly speaking the song does not exist on Tuesday. But what truth about
the world do we think this fails to capture?
It is still true that the artefact `exists' in the loose sense that there have been instances
and there will be instances, and things are such that instances can be produced from
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memory or from a score or other set of instructions. It is true that things on Tuesday
are not as they were on the Sunday prior to the composition of the song, at which
point the song was merely an unformed idea in the composer's head. We can even
say the relevant diﬀerence is that something new has been added to the world. All an
acceptance of intermittent existence means is that on Tuesday there is not at that time
any entity that is identical with the song.
Furthermore, the artefact is still `real' on Tuesday in that the name has a referent and
we are in position to identify the artefact when it is instanced. For the sense of `real'
being appealed to here, we can contrast Beethoven's Fifth with Beethoven's Fifteenth.
Even if, at a time t, Beethoven's Fifth is not being instanced anywhere there is still a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence at t between Beethoven's Fifth and Beethoven's Fifteenth. The
former refers to a real (actual) repeatable artefact, where as the latter does not. Neither
exists at t, according to the proposal set out here, but that does not put them on a par
in other respects. Here we can draw a parallel with the distinction between a no longer
living person and a ﬁctional person: compare Julius Caesar with Hercules. Neither
exist now, but `Julius' refers to a real historical character where as `Hercules' (we can
assume) does not.
It is interesting to note our intuitions about substance kinds (masses) are generally
more in keeping with a theory of intermittent existence. Suppose that all the aspirin
in the world is used up and for a while no more is made. Does aspirin exist at that
time? I think if our intuitions oﬀer any answer here then they agree that when there
are no instances of aspirin, aspirin does not exist. We might more normally say `there
is no aspirin', rather than `aspirin does not exist', but it seems plausible that the latter
sounds odd just because we don't mean to imply that there will never be any more
aspirin, nor do we mean to imply that aspirin is not a `real' substance.
What this discussion points to, then, is that intuitions about existence seem to be
entangled with a number of other (related) beliefs about how things stand in the world
at a particular time. Once these beliefs are untangled we face a choice. We can continue
to insist that our initial gut response reﬂects the actual truth about the existence of
such entities, perhaps claiming that this is just what `exists' means in this context.
Alternatively, we can allow a carefully articulated account of what these entities are
like (developed, recall, in response to an analysis of our practices of identifying such
entities) to indicate what should be said in response to this question. I ﬁnd the latter
approach more plausible here. If kinds are physical multiply located entities, then we
should welcome the sharp clarity that this brings to an otherwise murky area.
Creation and Existence
With this account of the persistence of kinds set out, we are in a position to address the
question of creatability : a particular focal point of debates in the ontology of art. Are
repeatable artefacts created according to my account? The short answer is that if by
`created' we mean `brought into existence', then yes, repeatable artefacts are created.
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Kinds exist when and where they have instances, on my view, so if there are no instances
of the kind at a time, producing an instance will bring that kind into existence.
This might be taken as welcome news for those who think that works of music and the
like are obviously created. However, some care needs to be taken here in understanding
where my support lies. In ontological discussions, theorists such as Margolis (1980,
p.22), Levinson (1980, 1987), and more recently Lamarque (2002, p.146) and Rohrbaugh
(2003, p.190), have taken the creatability of the entities in question as a datum to be
explained. Accordingly, that such things are created has been built into the subsequent
ontological accounts, as we saw in 1.1 with Levinson's commitment to (Cre).33
I have argued on the contrary that we should be suspicious of building commitments
to creatability into our theories, since that an entity, N, is created, does not seem to
be part of our application and co-application conditions for the term `N'. That a work
of music is created is something that we could be wrong about, while still referring to
that work of music.
Instead, that repeatable artefacts are created is, on my view, something that falls out
of the more general metaphysical considerations discussed above.
Moreover, those committed to the creatability of works of music, for example, will be
unsatisﬁed with my account of intermittent existence. On my view, even if a score has
been written, the work itself does not come into existence until it has been performed.
The unperformed symphony has yet to be brought into existence, and a minor symphony
that is only performed or played occasionally only exists occasionally. Worse, am I to
say that the occasionally performed work is created anew each time it is performed, and
even then, not by the composer but by the orchestra and conductor? For some it will
seem that my account gets out of the frying pan of eternal existence, and into the ﬁre
of something even more outlandish.
For example, Caplan and Matheson (2004) have argued that a view that holds that
the entities (types, kinds) exist only when they are instanced (and here they discuss,
brieﬂy, an Armstrong-style immanent account of properties) allows for creation but
violates what they call the Persistence Requirement, which they suggest is something
else that we should intuitively be committed to for entities such as musical works:
Musical works must be such that they can exist uninterruptedly for a good
stretch of time after the composer's compositional activity. (Caplan and
Matheson, 2004, p.128)
They go on to say that, considering both the creation and the persistence require-
ments, [s]atisfying one requirement should not come at the cost of satisfying another
(2004, p.128). However, no argument is given for this persistence requirement; it is just
33Rohrbaugh speaks more broadly of the temporality of photographs: they both come into and go out
of existence (Rohrbaugh, 2003, p.190). Note that the creationist view has also been defended on
ﬁrmly metaphysical grounds. Howell (2002b) adopts a Levinsonian account of works of music as
indicated types, and argues that the existence conditions for such types imply that they cannot
pre-exist the acts of composition. Other defences are more conceptual. Nussbaum (2003) argues
that musical works are created, rather than discovered, because, unlike mathematical proofs, there
is no timelessly valid deductive routes to speciﬁc musical works (2003, p.284).
114
4. Kind Physicalism
oﬀered as something as intuitive and unrevisable as the creation requirement. More
importantly, for methodological reasons discussed above, I did not set out to satisfy the
creation requirement or the persistence requirement, and so I will not be put out by
failing to satisfy either. These kinds of objections from the creationists, then, will not
bite.
There is, however, something else we can say about the notion of creation before
ending the discussion. This is that it is far from obvious that our notion of creation
should match exactly with the metaphysical notion of coming into existence. I very
much share John Fisher's feeling that creation seems to be just a place marker for our
diﬃculty in conceptualising the relation of artists to their work (Fisher, 1991, p.129). A
metaphysical account that implies that a symphony comes into existence each time it is
performed need not be committed to saying that it is created each time it is performed,
because, it seems, being created may well be a richer notion than simply coming into
existence. It is plausible that my account is compatible with artists and agents creating
repeatable artefacts with authorial acts, in virtue of the fact that they are creatively
responsible for all the subsequent instances being as they are (in a way that someone
performing a work of music is not).
With that, I want to draw the discussion of creation to a close. A great deal more
could be said along these lines, but it would principally involve further explication of
our concept of creation, and that task is not something I am concerned with here.
Metaphysically speaking, matters are clear. Repeatable artefacts exist when and where
they have instances.
Conclusion
The most important point to grasp about kind Physicalism is that kinds represent a
unique way of identifying entities that occupy the physical world. Rather than being
spatially and temporally bound entities, kinds are instanced wherever and whenever the
essence of the kind is instanced. Thus while the description of kinds set out in Chapter
3 does not entail kind Physicalism (it is compatible with Platonism) the relationship is
a natural one.
I have tried to overthrow the dominance of Platonism about kinds, but there is no
doubt that Physicalism will still leave some metaphysicians feeling uneasy. This may be
because the axiom of localisation, as understood in its limited application to ordinary
objects, is deeply entrenched. Furthermore, it is hard to shift the intuition that, as
David Wiggins put it, material things have to compete for room in the world, and
that they must tend to displace on another (Wiggins, 1968, p.94). But the grip of this
intuition should be loosened when it is emphasised that kinds and their instances belong
to diﬀerent ontological categories. Physicalism asks us to get used to the idea that out of
the same basic stuﬀ of the universe we can and do identify entities belonging to multiple
ontological categories, and it is our very practices of identifying and individuating the
entities around us that points to this. We are surrounded by and encounter inscriptions
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and utterances of words, copies of novels and performances of songs, but we are also
surrounded by and encounter words, novels and songs themselves.
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Part III.
Essences
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At the heart of the theory of kinds being oﬀered here is a commitment to the view
that instances of a kind are instances of the same kind because they have something,
or some things, in common. Instances of the same kind are not simply entities that
happen to be called by the same name. To recap, for any kind, K, the properties, P,
that every instance must have in order to be an instance of that kind can be called the
essential properties of the kind, or more simply the essence of the kind. It is essential to
being an instance of the kind K that an entity has properties P. Hence to hold that all
the instances of a kind have something (or things) in common, and that having those
common properties is what makes them instances of the same kind, is to hold that kinds
have essences.
Now, of course, the all important question is this: If kinds have essences, and repeat-
able artefacts are kinds, what are the essences of repeatable artefacts? This isn't just
a case of ﬁlling out the details. The challenges involved in providing suitable essences
which we will meet have motivated some theorists to reject the whole framework. As
such the plausibility of any kind theory (or suitably similar type theory) rides on the
possibility of giving an acceptable account of the essences of the entities to which the
theory is supposed to apply.1
I begin that task in this chapter by rejecting the `default' view of the essences of
repeatable artefacts, which assumes that artefacts have structural essences. In 5.1 I
introduce structuralism as the view that kinds have structural essences. The discussion
involves recognising the distinction between simple structuralism and what I have called
modiﬁed structuralism. According to simple structuralism the essences of repeatable
artefacts are purely structural. Modiﬁed structuralism is the view that the essences
are partly structural and partly non-structural. While some theorists adopt simple
structuralism, modiﬁed structuralism of some sort is far more widely accepted. I argue
that at least in some cases, modiﬁed structuralism should be accepted over simple
structuralism. Sections 5.2 - 5.4 then deal with three challenges that any form of
structuralism faces. I argue that the problem of improperly formed instances (5.2), the
1An important point of clariﬁcation is needed here regarding the scope of this discussion. If we consider
kinds in general, we have no prima face reason to restrict the sorts of essences diﬀerent kinds may
have, thus any account of essences should be oﬀered on a case by case basis. Restricting our enquiry
to repeatable artefacts, we still have no clear reason to assume that all repeatable artefacts have
essences of the same sort. As such, in what follows I will focus on paradigmatic examples such
as works of music, novels, photographs and ﬁlms. Hopefully, the extent to which these share a
common problem and a common solution will become clear. A notable omission from this list is
words. Though words provide a useful example of repeatability, they have had very little ontological
attention in the literature (though see Kaplan (1990) and Cappelen (1999)). I think words raise a
unique puzzle for essences, and I will not attempt to incorporate them into the account given here.
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problem of modal ﬂexibility (5.3) and the problem of temporal ﬂexibility (5.4) jointly
provide suﬃcient motivation to consider a rejection of structuralism entirely.
It should be made clear that none of these three issues taken individually constitute
a conclusive rebuttal of structuralism. As with many other aspects of the ontological
theory forwarded here, what we must engage with is a fairly subtle interplay between
intuitions and theoretical virtues, and the defence of a given theory must be understood
holistically. My aim then should be understood as that of building a case against
structuralism. I will argue that the three issues mentioned give good reason, when
considered together, to look elsewhere for an account of essences. The challenge then
remains to oﬀer a suitable replacement. If a kind theory is to remain plausible it must
be demonstrated that a kind theory can be maintained despite abandoning structural
essences. I take up that task in the ﬁnal chapter, and whether one ultimately accepts the
rejection of structuralism will depend signiﬁcantly on the plausibility of the alternative.
It is the comparative virtues of the alternative, as much as the inherent problems in
structuralism, that will provide motivation for departing with tradition as far as essences
go.
5.1. Structuralism Introduced
We both appreciate and recognise a piece of music, to a large extent, by attending to
how it sounds. It is the structure of the sound that is particular to that piece of music
that strikes us as being of primary importance, at least in many cases. The same can
be said about the visual appearance of a photograph. A great deal of our aesthetic
appreciation is directed towards visual structure. When we attend to a photograph
we attend to how it looks. Again, with a poem or a novel we seem to be principally
concerned with the word structure. The skill of the writer lies in her ability to choose
which words to put where. The word order is surely not an accidental feature of the
work but instead appears to be central in some way to what the work is.
In all these cases, structure is king. It is no surprise then that the obvious candidate,
and for some the only candidate, for the essences of these entities has been structure.
To be an instance of a novel it has been assumed that a copy must have the correct word
structure. To be a performance of a work of music it has been assumed that the sound
produced must have the correct sonic structure. To be an instance of a photograph
it has been assumed that a print must have the correct visual structure. The essence
of each repeatable artefact is to have just that particular sonic or visual or semantic
structure. Charles Stevenson clearly made this assumption in his 1957 essay `On What
is a Poem?':
Having taken "What is a poem?" to be a way of asking what "poem" is to
mean, I have given a partial answer to the question by saying that for an
important sense, and subject to certain qualiﬁcations, "poem" refers to a
sequence of words. (Stevenson, 1957, p.339)
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Nicholas Wolterstorﬀ also begins his account from a structuralist position when he
considers the act of composing a work of music. The composer composes, he suggests,
by selecting a set of criteria for correctness of occurrence (Wolterstorﬀ, 1980, p.65).
That is, the composer lays down the properties that instances of the kind must have to
be instances of that kind. And because it is a work of music that is being composed
the composer must select a set of properties which sound-sequence-occurrences can
exemplify  the property of being a piano sound of F pitch, the property of being
a piano sound of A pitch, etc. (Wolterstorﬀ, 1980, p.62). Wolterstorﬀ goes on to
elaborate on this but the basic idea is that required properties for a musical work kind
are sound-structure properties. And what could be more natural given that specifying
this structure appears to be exactly what a composer is doing when writing a score?
The trend has been so strong that Guy Rohrbaugh, speaking of type and kind theo-
rists, has recently remarked that
All agree that multiple works are individuated, at least in part, by the
intrinsic qualitative and structural features of their occurrences. What two
prints look like or what two performances sound like is clearly relevant to
the question of whether they are prints or performances of the same work.
(Rohrbaugh, 2003, p.5)
At this point we can usefully distinguish simple structuralism from modiﬁed structural-
ism. The theorist who favours simple structuralism holds that repeatable artefacts are
individuated only by intrinsic qualitative and structural features. That is, in the lan-
guage of the kind theory, they hold that the properties required of instances of artefact
kinds are limited to structural properties. The modiﬁed structuralist holds that the re-
quired properties are structural at least in part but allows that kinds may also make
certain other demands of their instances. It would be fair to say that simple struc-
turalism, at least concerning the repeatable works of art discussed in the literature,
is a minority position.2 Julian Dodd favours simple structuralism for works of music,
which he labels `sonicism' (what makes In This House On This Morning that work is
that it sounds like that. Period. (Dodd, 2000, p.425)), and is surely right to note that
in defending his unfashionable position he is swimming against a strong intellectual
current (Dodd, 2007, p.203).
In due course I will reject both simple and modiﬁed structuralism completely, but it
is important to understand why simple structuralism has become so unpopular. We can
start by looking again at Wolterstorﬀ's discussion of the act of composition. Wolterstorﬀ
claims, plausibly, that the composer of a musical work sets out the conditions for correct
performance of his or her work. We have already noted that many of these conditions
appear to be structural, but Wolterstorﬀ also suggests that the composer may lay down
conditions that go beyond this:
2Note that there is no theoretical reason why one should not adopt a disjunctive approach, holding
that some artefact kinds require purely structural properties of instances, while others require more
complex combinations of internal structural and external properties.
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The composer can also lay down as a condition for correctness that the
sounds have the property of being produced in such-and-such a fashion on
such-and-such instruments. (Wolterstorﬀ, 1980, p.69)
That is, for a sound event to be an instance of a particular piece of music it may be
the case that not only must it sound a certain way but that it must also be produced
in the right manner  on the right instruments, for example.
This view  instrumentalism about works of music  has been championed in partic-
ular by Jerrold Levinson. Note the form of Levinson's argument here:
Consider a sound event aurally indistinguishable from a typical performance
of Beethoven's Quintet Opus 16, but issuing from a versatile synthesizer...
If performance means were not an integral aspect of a musical work, then
there would be no question that this sound event constitutes a performance
of Beethoven's Quintet Opus 16. But there is indeed such a question... We
can count something as a performance of Beethoven's Quintet Opus 16 only
if it involves the participation of the instruments for which the piece was
written...(Levinson, 1980, p.16)
Here Levinson is making a claim about what counts as an instance of a particular work
of music  only those sound events produced in the right manner, he claims  and so is
making a claim about the properties required by sound events in order to be instances
of certain works. Levinson does oﬀer an argument for this (Levinson, 1980, pp.16-17).3
His claim is that the full body of aesthetic and artistic properties of a work of music
can only be transmitted via performances that are produced in the right kind of way.
What we appreciate about a piece of music, Levinson claims, is not just how it sounds,
but how it sounds in relation to the performance means.4
While this argument from appreciation seems to give a reasonable account of why
we may include performance means in our practice of identifying what counts as an
instance of a given work of music, what matters for us is the assertion that it is in fact
the case that something counts as a performance of Beethoven's Quintet Opus 16 if it
produced in the right manner (i.e. using the performance means speciﬁed in the score).
This assertion can (and has) been contested,5 but if it is accepted then the apparent
unavoidable conclusion is that modiﬁed structuralism should be preferred over simple
structuralism, at least as far as works of music go.
Beyond instrumentalism for works of music there are a number of other arguments
for modiﬁed structuralism that can be grouped under the name contextualism. If in-
strumentalism made demands on the immediate causal histories of music performances
3Note here that I am ignoring a distinction, peculiar to certain types of repetables, between a perfor-
mance and an instance. Slightly counter-intuitively, I think, Levinson treats instances as subclass
of performances (1980, p.26). I would prefer to see performances as a subclass of instances, being
those instances produced by a performance action. However, for our purposes, the issue can be
regarded as more terminological than substantial.
4To assess that character correctly one must take cognizance not only of the qualitative nature of
sounds heard but also of their source of origin (Levinson, 1980, p.17).
5See e.g. Dodd (2007, pp.225-239).
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(`performance means'), then contextualism can be understood as making demands on
the long term causal histories of instances.
A very simple form of the contextualist argument can be made for photographs. To
be an instance of a particular photograph, it is plausible to think, a print must not
just look a certain way, but must also emanate from the right photo-taking action.
For example, prints of your slightly blurred photograph of the Eiﬀel Tower against a
blue sky may be visually indistinguishable from prints of my photograph of an accurate
miniature model of the Eiﬀel Tower against a blue sky, but the two prints are not
thereby prints of the same photograph. To be an instance of the photograph I took,
a print must not just look a certain way, but also have a certain historical provenance
connecting it to my photo-taking action. There are other examples involving more
obviously evaluative aspects: a particular piece of photo-journalism may be admired for
capturing a particularly signiﬁcant moment of spontaneity. A visual duplicate produced
by careful staging would be both a diﬀerent photograph and far less admirable (or
admirable for diﬀerent reasons). Whether or not a print is a print of the former or
latter photograph will depend not just on how the print looks (structural properties)
but also on the historical properties of the print, or so it seems.
These intuitions about photographs no doubt arise from the fact that photographs
are usually `of' something or other. They are not just visual structures but represent
actual objects. Regardless of how structurally similar two prints are they will be dif-
ferent photographs if they are of diﬀerent things.6 What a particular print is of will
depend on the causal history of the print. However, the same phenomenon can be
observed even when the relevance of the causal history is more subtle. Robert Howell
oﬀers the example of the clockwise hooked cross used in pre-Columbian Amerindian
cultures which is visually indistinguishable from the Nazis' swastika but the two count
as distinct symbols in part because [t]ribespeople will not count the Nazis' mark as
another example of their own symbol (Howell, 2002b, p.120). Turning to the more
fanciful realm of thought experiments, if space explorers discovered an alien race ﬂying
a white rectangular ﬂag with a red cross on it, we would be unlikely to say that our
new friends were ﬂying St. George's ﬂag, despite the structural similarity. Plausibly,
to be an instance of St. George's ﬂag something must not only look a certain way,
but originate from England and other earlier examples of the ﬂag. With photographs,
swastikas and St. George's ﬂag we can be persuaded to move from simple structuralism
to modiﬁed structuralism, accepting that to be an instance of the artefact an entity
must have more than just the right structural properties.
Moving from simple structuralism to modiﬁed structuralism seems highly plausible
at least in some cases. That is, at least for some repeatable artefacts the properties
required of instances appear to be more than just structural properties. I do not claim
to have covered all the bases in the arguments for some form of modiﬁed structuralism
over pure structuralism, however. Enough energy has been spent on that elsewhere
6Note that this speciﬁc line of thought will not be relevant to pure instrumental musical works as it
is unlikely that they have representational properties (of the sort relevant here).
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and, more importantly, my target here is not pure structuralism but structuralism in
any of its forms. We will see that there are still signiﬁcant problems for both simple
and modiﬁed structuralism. In the next sections I will look in detail at these problems
and suggest that they provide enough motivation to take seriously the idea of giving up
on structuralism entirely.
5.2. The Problem of Improperly Formed Instances
One way to think about the move from simple to modiﬁed structuralism is as a problem
for structuralism that was easily patched: allow for the addition of causal, historical
and relational properties and our intuitions about what counts as an instance of this
or that photograph can be accounted for. But the demand for plasters is not yet
over. Three larger problems loom that cannot be so easily solved. The ﬁrst is the
seemingly widespread possibility of properly and, more importantly, improperly formed
instances of repeatable artefacts. The second and third problems concern the possibility
of repeatable artefacts being modally and temporally ﬂexible: structuralism must deal
with the intuition that as far as structure goes, we think that some repeatable artefacts
could have been diﬀerent, and in some cases may even change through time. I should
emphasise that these problems for structuralism are not entirely conclusive. Responses
can and have been given, and some will be discussed. However each problem does
constitute part of the case against structuralism.
I will look ﬁrst at the issue of properly and improperly formed instances. The problem
for a structuralist kind theory is straightforward. According to a kind theory, the kind
demands that its instances have certain properties in order to be instances of that
kind. Anything possessing these properties is an instance of that kind, and anything
lacking any of these properties is not an instance of that kind. However, our practices
of identifying repeatable artefacts appear inconsistent with this if it is assumed that
the essential properties are structural. For example, on this view a poem is such that
copies of that poem should have certain structural features. But we allow that a copy
of the poem can have some errors in it  deviations from the standard structure  and
yet still be a copy of that poem. It will merely be an improperly formed copy of the
poem. Similarly, a performance of a work of music with a few wrong notes is still a
performance of the work, and a telling of a story that gets one or two details mixed up
is still a telling of the story, albeit a bad one. How can a kind theory account for these
improperly formed instances? According to the kind theory, do they not just fail to be
instances of the artefacts in question in virtue of falling short on some of the required
properties?
Here are two unacceptable solutions to this problem. The ﬁrst `solution' takes a leaf
out of Nelson Goodman's book (Goodman, 1968) and simply denies the existence of
improperly formed instances. Goodman's own (nominalist) theory of notational systems
and the identity of works of music famously led him to the conclusion that a performance
of a musical work must comply exactly with the score if it is to be a performance of
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that work at all. Play a wrong note and what is played is not that piece of music but
something else. Noting how much this conﬂicts with ordinary usage, Goodman is
nevertheless willing to allow his theory to have the last word, otherwise by a series
of one note errors...we can go all the way from Beethoven's Fifth Symphony to Three
Blind Mice and so all performances whatsoever are of the same work (Goodman,
1968, pp.186-187). The details of Goodman's nominalism that result in this counter-
intuitive conclusion can be safely passed over at this point, but might a kind theorist
not want to adopt a similarly robust response to the possibility of incorrect instances?
Why not say simply that while we think that there can be incorrect instances of poems
or songs, we must accept our mistake in the clear light of philosophical enquiry? Surely
philosophy should not be held hostage to our potentially error ridden pre-philosophical
assumptions?
At this point, however, we can appeal again to the method of conceptual analysis
outlined in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis. In 1.3 I argued that to epistemically
determine the reference of our kind terms we must appeal to our intuitions and practices
about the application conditions for those terms. Thus an account of what we are
referring to must allow for the fact that we do identify repeatable artefacts despite their
being improperly formed. Moreover, we cannot use some of our intuitions about what
counts as an instance of an artefact kind to decide on a form of structuralism, and then
subsequently reject our further intuitions about the possibility of improperly formed
instances. Structuralism, or at least modiﬁed structuralism, seemed plausible because
of our assumptions about what does and does not count as an instance of a given kind.
It would be ad-hoc to allow those assumptions to take us so far and no further. A
Goodman-style bite-the-bullet denial of improperly formed instances is thus unjustiﬁed
and would be methodologically inconsistent. By departing from our concepts in this
crucial respect, it can no longer lay claim to being an account of what we ordinarily
mean by these terms.
A second unacceptable solution goes as follows. In the face of improperly formed
instances it might be thought that the structures required by the kinds are just less
speciﬁc than previously thought. This way a few wrong notes `here or there' does not
annul a performance from being a performance of that kind because the kind in question
does not require such speciﬁc properties of its instances. Rather than a musical work
requiring an exact sound structure of instances, it might be that it only requires a
`higher-level' structure that allows for variation at the level of individual notes. This
move isn't very satisfactory, however. For a start, it is hard to envision exactly what
kind of structure would do the required work of allowing for some variation but avoiding
overly radical diﬀerences. Furthermore if we adopted this higher-level structure into our
theory we would struggle to make sense of the claim that the performance had wrong
notes. The diﬀerence between correct and incorrect instances would be mysterious.
If the work of music is a kind and the kind is less prescriptive, the `wrong notes'
performance would in fact be a perfectly acceptable instance of the kind and there
would be no sense in which there were really wrong notes.
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A more popular and initially more plausible solution, put forward by Nicholas Wolter-
storﬀ, is to appeal to norm-kinds (Wolterstorﬀ, 1980, p.57). In short, norm-kinds are
kinds that can have properly and improperly formed instances. The idea is to accept
from the start that repeatable works of art (and by extension other repeatable artefacts)
can have properly and improperly formed instances and that this is because while there
are certain properties that it is essential for the instances to have to be instances of
that kind, there are also properties that are normative. Instances must possess all the
normative properties required by the kind if they are to be properly formed instances,
but they can be improperly formed instances without these. According to Wolterstorﬀ
every essential property will be a normative property, but not every normative property
is essential. Thus a performance with wrong notes will have all the essential properties
required by the kind but only some (perhaps most) of the normative properties. Exactly
how many of the normative properties are also essential properties would then be down
to the kind in question.
However, the main worry with this view is that it appears to be a somewhat ad hoc
amendment to the basic theory of kinds. Recall that two things are of the same kind
when they share properties, and the kind that is instanced in both cases is individuated
by the properties it requires of its instances. In that original characterisation there was
no place for a normative/essential distinction and it is not clear that such a distinction
can easily ﬁt with the basic theory. If a kind, K, requires that its instances have
properties P, anything with those properties will be an instance of the kind, and anything
lacking those properties will fail to be an instance. To then amend this, so that there are
normative as well as essential properties, appears to be a rather `purpose built' solution
to the diﬃculty of improperly formed instances.
Neither Wolterstorﬀ, nor Dodd, who adopts Wolterstorﬀ's account, say very much
about this (Dodd, 2007, p.32). Wolterstorﬀ simply allows that some kinds can have
improperly formed instances, and then builds that allowance into his deﬁnition by stip-
ulating that some properties are `normative within' a kind (Wolterstorﬀ, 1980, p.58).
Dodd adds that in the case of norm-kinds, the identity of the kind is then determined
by the conditions something must meet to be a correctly formed instance (Dodd, 2007,
p.32). Neither of these suggestions clear norm-kinds of their air of mystery. Dodd re-
buts the charge of `ad-hocery' by appealing to the familiarity of norm kinds. They are
common-or-garden entities which are part of the fabric of the universe (Dodd, 2007,
p.33). Not only are musical works and other art works norm-kinds, Dodd suggest, but
so are words and many natural kinds (such as The Polar Bear). Thus with an appeal
to norm-kinds the theorist is not guilty of plucking a notion out of thin air (Dodd,
2007, p.33). I'm not sure that Dodd's appeal to familiarity does the work that he needs
here. What he shows is that it is common for us to see things as having properly and
improperly formed instances (or more properly and less properly formed instances).
However, this doesn't count as evidence that such a practice is best analysed in terms
of norm-kinds as described by Dodd and Wolterstorﬀ. At best, what Dodd shows is
that we might reasonably expect a common analysis of properly and improperly formed
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instances in all these cases, and that ﬁnding a solution might have application beyond
repeatable artworks.
Of course, this doesn't constitute a knock down argument against norm-kinds as a
solution to the problem of improperly formed instances, but it should persuade us to be
receptive to alternatives. The positive proposal I outline in Chapter 6 is just such an
alternative. We will see there that it is possible to deal with properly and improperly
formed instances by giving normativity a natural place in the overall account.
5.3. The Problem of Modal Flexibility
The problems of modal and temporal ﬂexibility are raised for repeatable works of
art by Guy Rohrbaugh, and the following account partially draws on his discussion
(Rohrbaugh, 2003). We can begin by elaborating on the concept of modal ﬂexibility.
Roughly speaking, an entity is modally ﬂexible if it could have been diﬀerent in some re-
spect. If we read `some respect' broadly enough, it will seem that everything is modally
ﬂexible (unless a strict form of modal actualism were assumed  roughly the thesis that
nothing could have been diﬀerent in any way from how it actually is). As such, when
discussing modal ﬂexibility, it is useful to speak of entities being modally ﬂexible in
some speciﬁed respect.
For example, it seems plausible that the number seventeen is not modally ﬂexible with
respect to its status as a prime number  seventeen could not have been anything other
than a prime number. Likewise, the number sixteen is not modally ﬂexible with respect
to its factors  it is not possible for sixteen to have or to have had any factors other
than one, two, four and eight and sixteen. However, seventeen and sixteen are modally
ﬂexible with respect to other `extrinsic' or `relational' properties. Both numbers are
used as examples in this paragraph, but they might not have been. They could have
been diﬀerent in that respect. Similarly, if Kripke is right about the necessity of origin,
then because Barack Obama could not have had diﬀerent parents, Obama is not modally
ﬂexible with respect to his parents (Kripke, 1980, pp.110-115). However, he is modally
ﬂexible with respect to his height  he could have been taller or smaller.7
We can note here that this notion is a de re modal notion (Rohrbaugh, 2003, p.181).
To say that Obama could have been diﬀerent in some respect is not a de dicto claim
about possibly true sentences, but the claim that that very person could have been
diﬀerent. Furthermore, as we have seen, the issue is not one of simple logical possibility
(concerning the avoidance of logical contradictions) but rather is about metaphysical
possibility taking into account the very nature of the entity in question.
7Rohrbaugh (2003, p.181) argues that what we are interested in is modal ﬂexibility with respect to
intrinsic properties: something is modally ﬂexible if it could have been diﬀerent in and of itself.
However, it seems to me that appealing to an intrinsic/extrinsic distinction fudges the real issue.
We are interested, ﬁrstly, in whether or not an entity could have been diﬀerent in some respect,
and, secondly, whether or not our theory for those entities allows them to have been diﬀerent in
that respect. This appears to be a more precise way of handling the issue than bringing in an
internal/external distinction.
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How does all this relate to structural kinds? The apparent problem is that repeatable
artefacts seem to be modally ﬂexible with respect to certain structural properties; i.e.
they could have been diﬀerent structurally, at least to some degree. However, as stated
in 3.3, kinds are modally inﬂexible with respect to the properties required of instances.
Thus if repeatable artefacts are structural kinds, it would seem that they could not have
been diﬀerent structurally. First I will argue for the claim that repeatable artefacts are
modally ﬂexible in certain important respects, before going on to explain in more detail
why this causes problems for structural kinds.
The ﬁrst task is straightforward. Consider Austen's novel, Emma. Emma has a
particular word sequence. Let's say that Emma has word sequence S. But suppose that
when writing the novel, Austen had chosen one word diﬀerently; perhaps one instance
of `very' is replaced with `extremely'. Could she not have done this? And if so, would
that very same novel Emma not have had a very slightly diﬀerent word sequence, S*? It
seems straightforward to imagine that Emma could have had word sequence S* instead
of S and so, at least pre-theoretically, it is highly plausible that Emma is modally ﬂexible
(could have been diﬀerent) with respect to its word sequence. This doesn't mean that
Emma could have had any old word sequence. Too great a departure from S is surely
unacceptable. Emma could not have had the same word sequence as the rhyme Three
Blind Mice. However, this kind of limited ﬂexibility is commonplace for ordinary
objects. Mt. Everest could have been a few metres taller, but it  that very mountain
 couldn't have been a mole hill on Clapham Common.
Examples like Emma can easily be multiplied. Beethoven's Fifth could have been
a few bars longer it seems; the family photograph taken last winter could have had a
slightly more realistic colour balance; Peter Jackson's ﬁlm adaptation of The Lord of
the Rings could have been shorter, and could have stayed closer to the original novel.
If these statements are true then at least some repeatable artefacts are modally ﬂexible
with respect to structural properties.
To see why this is at odds with the thesis that repeatable artefacts are structural
kinds, we need to recall the characterisation of kinds set out in 3.3. I argued there
that the individuation principle for kinds, PIK, should be given a strong reading. Two
kinds are the same if and only if they require the same properties of their instances,
and this applies to both actual and possible kinds. Thus a kind could not have required
diﬀerent properties of its instances from those it actually does require. I noted in 3.3
that this condition for kinds (and a related condition for types) is widely assumed in
the literature, but that it is actually quite diﬃcult to show decisively why kinds must
be understood like that. The argument I did give involves understanding the intuitive
notion of two things being `of the same kind' as applying across possible worlds as well
as across times in the actual world. In other words, if two entities are instances of kind
K1 in virtue of having properties P1, then it is impossible that they could have been
instances of K1 without possessing properties P1, for had they failed to have properties
P1, they would not have been of the same kind as they actually are.
The consequences of this position for structuralism about repeatable artefacts is that
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if a structural kind actually demands that its instances have structure S (if the essence
of the kind is to have structure S), then every actual and possible instance of that
kind must have structure S. It is not possible for instances of that kind to have had
diﬀerent structural properties. Recall Austen's novel Emma. We noted that it seems
highly plausible that Emma could have had a diﬀerent word sequence, S*, instead
of the actual word sequence S. If this were the case then instances of Emma would
have had word sequence S*. However, this is impossible if Emma is a structural kind
that demands that its instances have word sequence S. The entities in the hypothetical
scenario with word sequence S* could not possibly be instances of Emma.
Consequently, either Emma is not a structural kind, or, contrary to our intuitions,
Emma could not have had a diﬀerent word sequence from the one it actually has.
This is the problem of modal ﬂexibility. We can generalise the problem in terms of an
inconsistent triad:
1. A particular repeatable artefact, A, could have been diﬀerent (is modally
ﬂexible) with respect to structural property P.
2. Artefact A is a structural kind and so property P is a property that A
demands of its instances (in that an object must have property P in order
to be an instance of A).
3. If A is a kind, A is modally inﬂexible with respect to the properties that it
demands of its instances.
One cannot consistently hold all three of these, and so one or more must be rejected. (1)
is based on our intuitions concerning ways that repeatable artefacts might have been;
(2) follows from the fact that many of these intuitions concern structural features of
the artefacts and from the assumption that the artefact is a structural kind; and (3)
follows from the claim that kinds are strongly individuated by the properties required
of instances.
It may be tempting to avoid the inconsistency by rejecting (3). After all, (3) relies on
a claim about the nature of kinds for which no conclusive argument has been oﬀered.
Should we not re-think the nature of kinds to allow for modal ﬂexibility? While I
think going down that route would constitute an interesting line of research, it would
involve a signiﬁcant overhaul of our understanding of the `same kind' relationship, and
mark a break with the traditional understanding of kinds. As such, I will continue with
commitment to modal inﬂexibility expressed in 3.2.8
What about rejecting (1)? To reject (1) is to reject our intuitions about what can
and cannot be an instance of a particular kind. It is to say that despite our intuitions
it is not possible for an entity with word sequence S* to have been an accurate instance
of Emma. Thus to reject (1) is to just insist that when we say that Bruckner's Ninth
8It is possible to view the conclusion of the next chapter as conditional on the modal inﬂexibility of
kinds. That is, if kinds are modally inﬂexible in the way discussed, then ﬁrstly this raises a problem
for structuralism and secondly that problem can be dealt with by appealing to a theory of copied
kinds as set out in the next chapter.
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Symphony could have been ﬁnished, or that Austen could have chosen a few diﬀerent
words `here and there', what we should really say is that Bruckner could have written a
distinct but very similar longer work, and that Austen could have penned a numerically
distinct but very similar novel. The structuralist can even say that this distinct but
similar novel would have gone by the name `Emma'. According to our best theory,
it might be claimed, we are shown to have been in error over the modal ﬂexibility of
works of art and other repeatable artefacts. So much the worse for those pre-theoretical
intuitions.
Gregory Currie, discussing the relationship between a literary work and its text, has
similarly argued that such talk of counterfactual variation is a poor guide to the truth.
He goes on to say:
It's up to the best theory of work identity to tell us which way of saying is
correct, and our unreﬂective talk about counterfactual divergence between
work and text cannot decide the issue. (Currie, 1991, p.327)
However, our intuitions regarding the application of kind terms cannot be so lightly
dismissed. The reason is the same as the one already given in response to the `bite the
bullet' Goodman-style answer to improperly formed instances. That is, our intuitions
regarding what a kind term would apply to in possible circumstances constitute an
aspect of the application and co-application conditions associated with that term. That
fact that we believe that instances of Emma could have had a diﬀerent word sequence
from that which they actually do have says something about which kind we are picking
out with the term `Emma'. As such, our intuitions which result in (1) should be taken
seriously.
That leaves (2) to be rejected: the problem of modal ﬂexibility gives us reason to
think that repeatable artefacts are not structural kinds.
5.4. The Problem of Temporal Flexibility
The ﬁnal component of the case against structuralism is the problem of temporal ﬂexi-
bility. If modal ﬂexibility pivoted on the intuition that repeatable artefacts could have
been diﬀerent in certain structural respects, then temporal ﬂexibility pivots on the intu-
ition that some repeatable artefacts can actually be diﬀerent from one time to the next
in certain structural respects. However, if repeatable artefacts were structural kinds,
this change would not be possible.
To begin with, we need to be clear about exactly what claim is being made regarding
change. The claim here is not that individual instances can change structurally over
time (though they may), but that successive instances of a kind can diﬀer structurally
from one another in a manner that appears to contradict the structuralist's claims.
This last clariﬁcation is needed because the structuralist can allow for some structural
variation among instances without any problem. Performances of a work of music may
allow a certain amount of leeway for the creative interpretation of the performer without
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the performance thereby departing from the required structure, the structuralist will
argue. Furthermore, some structural variations among instances are irrelevant to the
identity of the artefact, even on the structuralist account. For example, the exact size
of a copy of a novel and the colour of the cover are structural features of the instances
that are irrelevant to whether or not they are instances of a given novel.
The kind of structural variation we are interested in, then, is variation in structural
aspects that would otherwise be taken, by the structuralist, as being part of the essence
of the kind. Suppose, for example, that a literary work has word structure S, so that on
the structuralist account, having word structure S is part of the essence of that kind.
However, it seems that in some cases an author can make amendments to the original
word structure so that new instances of the work must have the new structure S*.
For example, consider an academic paper or thesis. When the work is sent away to
the reviewer or the examiner we normally speak of the reviewer as suggesting structural
changes to that very piece of work. Once the work is ﬁnalised and published, an editor
may say that changes can no longer be made, but this could easily be seen as a practical
limit imposed for the sake of the publication, rather than as a metaphysical claim. This
thought is especially forceful if we consider electronic publications. A lenient editor
might allow the author to make tweaks here and there after the initial publication, but
should surely prevent this for the sake of the readership (just as an art curator should
dissuade an artist from continually touching up their painting after the gallery is open
to the public).9
Stories also seem to provide good evidence of this kind of structural change. Folk
stories, passed on orally from generation to generation, seemingly get changed in small
and sometimes large ways as details are added or removed and as emphasis shifts. The
story that a veteran tells his granddaughter every time she visits may change over
the years as pieces are remembered, forgotten or invented. Novels and other artefacts
published serially also seem to undergo the change of getting longer as they are written.
Arguably this applies to all novels, given that their production takes time, but the
point is more obvious when the work is published along the way. In these cases we
can identify the story by identifying the published parts (the newspaper column or TV
drama episode) and then await the `rest of the story', which will be the next part of
that story. And it is no problem here that the next part of the story may not yet have
been written. In something like the same way that adding new bricks makes a wall
longer, as new instalments are written the story gets longer. In both cases the thing
being added to undergoes qualitative change.10
One ﬁnal example: digital post production makes easy the structural alteration of
photographs, or so it seems. When I remove the red-eye from a holiday snap our in-
tuitions tell us that I am making a structural change to that very photograph. Note
9Roman Ingarden thought this sort of change uncontroversial: No one, however, will dispute the fact
that it is possible to change a literary work in the event that the author himself, or the publisher of
a new edition, sees ﬁt to delete this or that passage and introduce another (Ingarden, 1973, p.11).
10Recalling the discussion in 4.3, we can note that the when talk of `parts' of the story, we are talking
in terms of kind parts.
130
5. Structuralism Rejected
that when I do this digitially I am not just altering a photograph token, but the photo-
graph type (the kind) itself. Any subsequent instances of the photograph will reﬂect the
change. Similarly if I crop the photograph I am changing how it  that very photograph
 looks.
The reasons that the phenomenon of temporal ﬂexibility causes problems for kind
structuralism are familiar from the discussion of modal ﬂexibility. Firstly we need to
note that all the apparent changes oﬀered in the examples amount to changes in the
ways that instances are structured. If an academic paper is changed in the light of
suggestions then any new copies of the paper must reﬂect this change if they are to be
accurate. Likewise with a photograph that is cropped or adjusted: after the changes any
accurate print of the photograph will have to reﬂect the new features. Now recall that
a structural kind requires that its instances have particular structural properties, and
that entities are of the same structural kind if they have the same structural properties.
There cannot then be a change in the structural properties required of the instances
without a numerical change of structural kind. Thus if repeatable artefacts do change
in the ways suggested by the examples above, repeatable artefacts cannot be structural
kinds.
There are two lines of objection to this that I want to consider here. The ﬁrst involves
questioning the strength and validity of our intuitions regarding change. This objection
can be brought out by noting that there is an ambiguity in our talk of change. If I say
that I changed my bike I could mean either that the bike that I had before, and which
I still have now, has undergone a change, perhaps of colour. I could also mean that I
have bought a new bike and abandoned the old one. With bikes, the ambiguity is easy
to resolve, but it might be thought that this is only because we have a relatively ﬁrm
idea of the ontological categories involved. When ontological matters are more puzzling
we might not be so sure of what we do mean. When the lawyer accuses the witness
of changing their story, do they mean that the same story has undergone qualitative
change or that the witness has oﬀered a numerically diﬀerent story?
These queries allow some room for supporters of kind structuralism (and related type
theories) to resist the phenomenon of change as a pre-theoretical mistake. Dodd, for
example, appeals to our understanding of diﬀerent `versions' of repeatable artefacts to
downplay the appearance of qualitative change:
It is quite true, for example, that we commonly describe works as being
`revised', but such talk is unreﬂective, and in any case, it is not obvious
that we should regard a revised work as a previous work that has changed,
as opposed to being a distinct work whose composition was based upon an
appreciation of the original one. (Dodd, 2007, p.87)
The argument here is straightforward. Although we might think that the photograph
or the paper (or the work of music) has been changed, it does not take a great deal of
conceptual revision to accept that each digital adjustment of the photograph (for exam-
ple) actually creates a numerically new version of the photograph, and this conceptual
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shift is easy to make because in some cases we do speak of diﬀerent versions as if they
are numerically distinct. Where our intuitions are unstable, they can be resisted.
However, while the point about the ambiguity in our talk of change is surely right,
it is our practices of re-applying the names for kinds in these situations that matter.
Though we may not be able to draw any ﬁrm ontological conclusions from phrases such
as `the novel has changed', what we can take seriously is our tendency to re-apply the
same name after some structural change has taken place.
As we have seen before, the structuralist will be tempted to bite the bullet on change
and re-interpret all our claims of change as identiﬁcations of new repeatable artefacts.
The paper or thesis that is returned with minor adjustments would not in fact be the
same paper or thesis, but rather a new artefact merely based on the old one. The removal
of red-eye would not be removal of red-eye from a photograph, but the replacement of the
photograph with a new very similar one. The structuralist will say that our ordinary talk
is ontologically opaque and, moreover, that practitioners are not interested in ontological
distinctions.
But revising our practices or applying terms in this way is precisely what the method
of conceptual analysis advises against. Modiﬁed structuralism seemed attractive be-
cause our practices at ﬁrst glance suggest that we apply the term `Emma' only if a
book copy has the right word structure. Once the phenomenon of change is brought to
light, so that what counts as `the right word structure' can change in some cases, we
should not stick dogmatically to our original assessment. If we want to give an accurate
assessment of the essences of the entities we are referring to, we had better take all our
understanding of application and co-application conditions seriously.
The second objection to consider questions the coherence of temporal change for
repeatable entities. The argument, presented again by Dodd, hinges on the thought
that if an entity undergoes genuine change, its previous state must be a thing of the
past, resigned to the past. Dodd puts the argument as follows:
if a work were to undergo genuine change once it has been `revised', it would
no longer exist in its earlier state, a corollary plainly contradicted by the fact
that an earlier version of the work may still be performable (if, for example,
the original score is recoverable, or if someone remembers it). (Dodd, 2007,
p.149)
The point can easily be made for digital photographs or word processed documents: `If
the academic paper had really undergone change,' Dodd would likely suggest, `it would
not exist in an earlier state and so it would not be possible to print out the very same
paper in its previous form.'
However, the reason that this argument is not conclusive against the structural change
of repeatable artefacts is that it relies too heavily on our common sense notion of change.
Dodd is perhaps right to point out that our ordinary notion of change raises a problem
for repeatable entities, because our ordinary notion requires that for an entity to have
genuinely changed at time t it must no longer exist after t in its pre-change state.
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However, the phenomenon we are trying to capture is the apparent temporal ﬂexibility
of repeatables as described above, and it may well be that this phenomenon does not
mesh perfectly with our ordinary notion of change. What we do need to account for is
the apparent fact that over time what counts as an accurate instance of a repeatable
artefact can change. Whether one regards this as a case of genuine (ordinary) change
for the artefact itself is, to some degree, beside the point.
Conclusion
So far I have discussed a number of problems for the view that repeatable artefacts
are kinds with structural essences. I suggested that simple structuralism, whereby
repeatable artefacts have only structural essences, has been rejected for good reason,
but also that modiﬁed structuralism faces problems from improperly formed instances,
and modal and temporal ﬂexibility. All of these arguments relied on taking our intuitions
about the application of a term seriously, guided by the belief that these intuitions are
indicative of precisely which entity is being picked out by a term. However, it will be
no good insisting that our theory should agree with these intuitions if, in attempting
to appease these intuitions, no coherent or remotely plausible theory can be produced.
As such, the argument against structuralism will only be complete after a coherent and
believable theory is produced that accords with these anti-structuralist intuitions.
With structuralism on the ropes, even in its modiﬁed form, kind theory faces its
biggest challenge. It will seem to many that a rejection of structuralism is tantamount
to a rejection of any kind or type framework.11 However, a central argument of this
thesis is that that is a mistake. With enough care and sensitivity to the evidence,
I argue, an entirely non-structural kind theory can be shown to resolve many of the
issues whilst maintaining both ontological clarity and solid explanation of repeatability.
Moreover, jettisoning structure from the essences of repeatable artefacts opens the door
to an unexpected consequence: many repeatable artefacts can be understood to have a
high degree of naturalness. Developing and defending this view will be the task of the
ﬁnal chapter.
11Similar arguments to those presented here have persuaded Rohrbaugh to suggest that repeatable
entities belong to an entirely new ontological category of `embodied individuals' (Rohrbaugh, 2003).
I consider some of the diﬃculties facing Rohrbaugh's suggestion in 6.5.
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We have good reason to think that repeatable artefacts are not kinds with structural
essences. Does this mean we have good reason to think repeatable artefacts are not
kinds? No. In this chapter I will argue that many repeatable artefacts have non-
structural essences. What is needed is a coherent and plausible account of these non-
structural essences; an account that ties in with the basic kind framework and that
does a better job of allowing for and explaining the apparent properties of repeatable
artefacts than the structural proposal. If this can be provided  and I will argue that it
can  the lack of structural essences does not provide a reason to reject the framework
of kinds. I will argue that repeatable artefacts are copied kinds. The essence of a
photograph or a novel or an academic paper  i.e. the group of properties required
for an entity to be an instance of that artefact  is, on this view, purely extrinsic and
relational. To be a print of a particular photograph, for example, the required property
is not that it look a certain way, but that it be related to other entities in the right way.
Giving up on structural essences entirely requires something of a paradigm shift in
how we think of essences. However, the move I am suggesting for repeatable artefacts
is not unprecedented. The ontological challenge generated by the absence of structural
essences has shaped debates about the nature of biological species over the last thirty
years (although the absence of structural essences has been apparent for much longer).
To prepare the ground for an account of repeatable artefacts as copied kinds, then, I
begin this chapter by setting out the debate over the ontological nature of species (6.1).
Assuming that a lack of structural essences is a lack of essences simpliciter, there has
been spirited and still popular move to deny that species are kinds at all. However, this
can be seen as an over-reaction to the absence of structural essences. An alternative
solution has also emerged: rather than throw out the baby of kinds with the bathwater
of structural essences, we merely need to look for essence elsewhere. It has been argued
that a kind theory can be retained once it is accepted that the essences of species are
purely historical and relational.
Drawing on this response in the species debate, I then set out the proposal that
repeatable artefacts are copied kinds (6.2). Crucially, the story I give allows for struc-
tures to play the central role that they do play despite not playing the role of essences.
In 6.3 I readdress the issues of modal and temporal ﬂexibility and of improperly formed
instances in the light of the new proposal. One of the most attractive features of the
copied kinds theory is its ability to handle intuitions about ways that artefacts could
have been and ways that they might be able to change through time. Moreover, copied
kinds allow for improperly formed instances as a natural consequence of the theory,
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rather than as a feature that must be shoehorned in once the bulk of the theory is in
place.
In 6.4 I address some possible objections to this theory of copied kinds, before ending
the chapter with a discussion of an alternative account proposed by Guy Rohrbaugh that
views repeatable artefacts as embodied individuals (6.5). I argue that although this
view rightly rejects structural essences, it fails to stand up to scrutiny as an ontological
proposal and should not be preferred over the theory of copied kinds.
6.1. The Ontological Status of Species
Biological species are commonly used as paradigm examples of natural kinds in philos-
ophy. We rely on scientists to tell us what species there are, and, for any particular
biological organism, which species it belongs to. Scientists, we presume, can also tell us
what the essence of a species is, in the same way that they have told us that water is
H20. However, this familiar view of species as natural kinds with discoverable essences
has suﬀered sustained criticism from both biologists and philosophers of biology. The
challenge to orthodoxy over the nature of species began perhaps most forcefully with
a series of publications by Michael Ghiselin (1966; 1969; 1974).1 According to this line
of thought, the modern biologist's concept of a species suggests that species are better
understood not as natural kinds, but as individuals. In what follows I will assess the
arguments for this revisionary conclusion, but show that rejecting a kind theory for
species can be seen as an over-reaction to the fact the species do not have structural
essences. We will see that a kind theory can be retained if the essences are understood
to be historical and relational.2
The Rejection of Species as Kinds
The concept of a kind at play in this debate is that of an abstract entity that lays down
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for its members. Though in this thesis I defend a
view of kinds as physically located entities, there is enough common ground in the view
that kinds have essences to make the debate over species entirely relevant. The most
inﬂuential reason for the rejection of species as kinds, and the one most important for
us, is that many take post-Darwinian evolutionary theory to have shown that species
do not have structural essences. Being a member of a biological species is not a matter
of possessing a set of necessary and suﬃcient characteristics, it is argued, as no such set
can be found that is possessed by all and only the members of that species, even if one
looks as far down as the genetic code.3 As Samir Okasha has forcefully put it:
The idea that species can somehow be deﬁned in terms of their DNA has
1See also Hull (1976).
2Here I draw out only the key points in the debate, emphasising that which is most relevant to the
ontology of repeatable artefacts. For a recent treatment of the issue and thorough bibliography, see
Crane (2004) and Rieppel (2007).
3Ghiselin (1974, pp.537 -540), Hull (1976, p.176), and Okasha (2002, pp.196-197).
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no basis in biological fact, despite what many non-biologists appear to think.
(Okasha, 2002, p.197)
It is important to see that the absence of structural essences is not being posited because
those essences have yet to be found, otherwise we might think that problem is just that
the microscopes are not powerful enough, so to speak. Rather the absence of such
essences seems to be built into the modern biologist's concept of a species. Decisions
among practising biologists about whether a particular organism belongs to a given
species do not appeal to facts about the internal structure of the organism. When
biologists name a species, and apply that name to organisms, it seems that what they
are emphatically not doing (to the extent that there is a consistent shared practice) is
applying the name because of some shared set of structural properties that constitute
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for membership in that species. Rather, modern
biology recognises species in terms of genealogical groups and evolutionary branches
(clades).4
Because being a member of a species is not understood in terms of an organism
satisfying some necessary and suﬃcient structural properties it has been assumed that
species lack essences entirely. In other words, it has been assumed that there are
no necessary and suﬃcient conditions for belonging to a given species. Since they
apparently lack essences, species cannot therefore be kinds.
This lack of structural essences also relates to two further characteristics of species
that, it has been argued, sets them apart from kinds. Firstly, species are things that
can evolve, which is to undergo change. They display what we have called temporal
ﬂexibility. On traditional understandings of kinds and their essences (where the essences
are understood to be structural) no such change would be possible. The motivations for
thinking this are just those we discussed in the previous chapter. Evolution represents
a change in structure of the member organisms and can occur at any structural level.
Thus if species had structural essences, member organisms at some later evolutionary
stage could not be instances of the same species as member organisms at an earlier
evolutionary stage. Taking the traditional view of kinds as having essences that cannot
change (the view defended in this thesis), and (crucially) assuming that if species are
kinds they have structural essences, it has been argued that species cannot therefore be
kinds.5
Secondly, it is argued that species supposedly diﬀer from kinds because species are
spatio-temporally restricted whereas kinds (it is claimed) are not (Hull, 1976, p.176).6
The notion of spatio-temporal restriction being appealed to here is best spelled out
using examples. The claim is that the kind gold is not spatio-temporally restricted
because something can be a sample of that kind irrespective of when and where it
4Roughly speaking, that is. There are currently around twenty proposed species concepts, each of
which individuates species according to diﬀerent criteria. See Griﬃths (1999, p.222).
5If species were not individuals, they could not evolve. Indeed, they could not do anything whatso-
ever. Classes are immutable, only their constituent individuals can change  (Ghiselin, 1987, p.129).
See also Wilson (1995, p.340).
6See also Hull (1978).
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exists. By contrast, species are spatio-temporally restricted because for an organism to
be a member of a species it must satisfy certain spatial and temporal restrictions. For
example, for something to be a member of one of our Earth species it must be born
into that species: No matter how similar to our terrestrial horses Alpha Centaurian
organisms may be, they are not members of the horse species (LaPorte, 2004, p.10).
This is because when an organism is assigned to a species it is not the structure of the
organism that matters, but rather the historical origins of the organism. Hull writes
that:
If a new species evolved that was identical to a species of extinct pterodactyl
save origin, it would still be a new, distinct species. (Hull, 1978, p.349)
Being a member of a species is not a matter of being a certain way structurally, but
instead depends on an entity's place in a genealogical chain. The assumption behind this
argument then seems to be that kinds do not have essences that involve restrictions on
when and where the instance exists. Since species membership does involve restrictions
on when and where the organism exists, species cannot be kinds.
Species as Individuals
Given that it appears that species lack essences, are spatio temporally restricted, and
can change through time, it has been claimed that they more naturally fall into the
ontological category of individuals. On this view of species as individuals, they are
chunks of the genealogical nexus or something similar - large `superorganisms' that
are the units of evolution and have the particular organisms with which we are more
familiar as their parts. The tiger in London Zoo is a member of its species not because
it is an instance of its species but because it is a part of its species. Likewise, you
and I are parts of Homo Sapiens.7 The proposal can be seen to be equivalent to the
scattered object hypothesis for repeatable artefacts encountered in 3.2.
Viewing species as individuals neatly explains the lack of necessary and suﬃcient
structural conditions for members of the species, since in general entities are not parts
of a whole in virtue of certain intrinsic properties had by the parts. As individuals,
species can also undergo change and will be spatio-temporally restricted by their very
nature.8
Unlike the counterpart hypothesis for repeatable artefacts, or for masses such as water
or gold, I will be be more hesitant in rejecting the species-as-individuals hypothesis. The
names for species as used by biologists are, to a degree, theoretical terms and must ﬁnd
a place within wider evolutionary theories. It may be that the entities most interesting
to broad evolutionary theories, and which receive names such as Equus Caballus (a horse
species) within those theories, can be understood as large scattered individuals. We can
7Ghiselin (1974, p.536), Hull (1976, p.174).
8Note that the view of species as individuals discussed here is neutral between the view that they are
`three dimensional' (or spatially continuous) entities and the view that they are `four-dimensional'
(spatially and temporally bound) entities. See Crane (2004) for a discussion.
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note that it is not so counter intuitive to think of a member of a species as a part of
that species, as it is to think of a print of a photograph as part of that photograph.
Moreover, we sometimes think of species as being spread out over certain geographical
regions.
However, my aim is not take sides on the species debate. What is most interesting to
us is that one need not accept the conclusion that species are individuals simply because
they lack structural essences. Instead such a move can be seen as an over-reaction that
failed to recognise perfectly viable alternative non-structural essences. If we re-conceive
what we assume the essences of a natural kind can be, the original theory of species as
kinds can be retained.9
Kinds With Historical Essences
Of the species concepts currently in favour, phylogenetic or cladistic concepts are dom-
inant. That is, species are understood in terms of reproductively connected organisms
that form evolutionary branches in the genealogical tree. Defenders of the view set out
above, that species are individuals, regard the names of species as referring to those
branches as single scattered objects with reproductively connected parts. However, it
has been suggested instead that phylogenetic concepts point in fact to kinds with phy-
logenetic rather than structural essences. In other words, rather than doing away with
essences, it can be argued that phylogenetic species concepts merely redeﬁne essences
in terms of relationships and historical origins.10 de Queiroz, for example, writes that
[i]n contrast with the situation under traditional deﬁnitions, the possession
of particular organismal traits [structural essences] is neither necessary nor
suﬃcient for an organism to be considered part of a taxon. What is both
necessary and suﬃcient is being descended from a particular ancestor. (de
Querioz, 1992, p.300)
So for every species we can recognise an essence, but the essence will make no reference
to the internal structure of member organisms. Instead it will be purely relational. On
this view there are species-speciﬁc essences but they consist of historical and relational
properties. Darwinian evolutionary theory, focusing on chains of decent and interbreed-
ing populations, has not ruled out species as kinds, but just forced a re-evaluation of
what species qua kinds require of their members:
These accounts do answer the question in virtue of what is my pet dog
Rover a member of Canis Familiaris?, but the answer does not cite intrinsic
aspects of Rover's genotype or phenotype, but rather his relations to other
organisms and/or to the environment. (Okasha, 2002, p.199)
9Here I agree with the conclusion of LaPorte who argues that [e]ven if it is granted in this way
that there is an individual whose parts are the organisms of a species, it is nevertheless the case
that there is a kind here, as well (2004, p.17). In other words, though one might be justiﬁed in
identifying a scattered individual, it does not follow, as we will see, that there is no species-as-kind.
10See, e.g., de Querioz (1992), de Querioz (1995), Griﬃths (1999), Millikan (1999), Okasha (2002), and
LaPorte (2004).
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By re-conceiving essences as historical and relational rather than structural, a theory of
species as natural kinds can be retained. What is more, this view can also make sense
of species evolving and being spatio-temporally restricted. Consider the worry about
species evolving. On the structuralist view, the problem is that members of species
may undergo structural change as they evolve, and so risk losing supposedly essential
structural properties in the process. But if the essential properties are not structural at
all then the successive members can change with respect to these structural properties
without ceasing to be members of that species. This is because, though successive
members may be structurally diﬀerent from one another, they all possess the necessary
and suﬃcient relational properties needed for being instances of that kind.
It might still be claimed that even understood with historical essences, strictly speak-
ing species as kinds can't undergo change and so contra biological theory species can't
(strictly speaking) evolve (since it is only the individual members that change). We will
meet this challenge with respect to the temporal ﬂexibility of repeatable artefacts later
in the chapter, but for now we can note that one way to respond to this worry is just to
say, as Joseph LaPorte does, that this fails for taking idioms too seriously. When we
say that species evolve, all we need to commit to is that successive members of a kind
gradually become diﬀerent from their ancestors (LaPorte, 2004, p.10). The evolution
of species is, on this view, the gradual change of successive organisms that fall under
that species kind, not a change in the essential properties of the kind itself. For LaPorte,
it doesn't matter that the kind itself is not strictly speaking changing, because all the
data can be explained perfectly well in terms of the successive diﬀerences in member
organisms.
The worry about species being spatio-temporally restricted also turns out not to be
pressing. The fact that the Alpha Centaurian organism is not a horse merely follows
from the fact that it will fail to possess the essential relational characteristics. Being
`restricted' in this way is simply a consequence of relational essences. In other words, it
was a mistake to think that kinds cannot place spatial and temporal restrictions on their
instances. There is certainly no theoretical reason why a kind could not be restricted in
this way; consider the kind which requires that its instances are people living on Earth
between 1900 and 1950. Unnatural as this kind may be, it is certainly spatially and
temporally restricted.
The most important result to be gleaned from this foray into the debate over the
ontological nature of species is already clear. Given the absence of structural essences,
theorists have recognised that viable kinds can be had from purely historical and re-
lational essences. In the previous chapter I argued that repeatable artefacts do not
have structural essences  in the next part of this chapter I will propose that a kind
theory can be maintained for repeatable artefacts by recognising purely historical and
relational essences.
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6.2. The Proposal: Repeatable Artefacts as Copied Kinds
The relationships that are relevant to the historical essences of species are almost ex-
clusively reproductive in nature. While repeatable artefacts do not reproduce in the
same biological sense, earlier instances of repeatable artefacts are nevertheless causally
responsible for later instances in an important respect and the language of reproduction
is still appropriate. The importance of this was brought to my attention in particular
by Charles Nussbaum (2003). Employing a notion from Ruth Millikan (Millikan, 1984,
p.23), Nussbaum has described instances of the same musical work (and by extension,
instances of other repeatable artefacts) as forming a reproductively established family
(Nussbaum, 2003, p.274). Entities belong to a single reproductively established fam-
ily just when they derive from a causal process of reproduction in virtue of which they
share reproduced characteristics. The claim that instances of a repeatable artefact form
a reproductively established family is, as Nussbaum stresses, neutral as to the ontologi-
cal nature of the repeatable artefact itself (Nussbaum, 2003, pp.274-275). However, the
plausibility of the claim points to the similarity between biological relationships within
a species on the one hand and the connections between instances of a single repeatable
artefact on the other. The connections between instances of a repeatable artefact can
be thought of as a non-biological form of reproduction. More speciﬁcally, we can note
that the relationships between instances of a repeatable artefact can be described as
ones of agent initiated copying.
This suggests the following proposal: the essences of many familiar repeatable arte-
facts are entirely non-structural and instead involve being historically related via a
suitable copying relationship to other entities. I will call this the claim that repeatable
artefacts are copied kinds.
Copied Kinds Described
Recall that all the entities that are instances of the same kind are the same in some way
 they have something in common; something because of which they are all instances of
that kind. If the entities are all instances of the same copied kind, so the proposal goes
in its most general form, then they all have the property of being related in the right
way to certain other entities, where this suitable relational property will be rooted in
the notion of causal history. What is more, how `related in the right way' should be
cashed out will vary from one sort of repeatable artefact to another.
The most straightforward example to begin with is perhaps the photograph. Recall
that naïve structuralism is the view that to be an instance of a particular photograph, a
print must just look a certain way. The modiﬁed structuralist view combines structural
properties with historical properties  the print must look a certain way and originate
from the right photo-taking action. The copied kind view takes this a step further by
taking structural properties entirely out of the essence of the kind. What we will see,
however, is that this doesn't involve a rejection of the importance of structure, nor a
rejection of the need for structural similarity.
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For example, for two or more prints to be prints of the same photograph, the essential
property is not that they look the same but that they are suitably produced from
the same causal origin. In this case the `suitably produced' will mean copied via an
acceptable photographic copying process  one that accurately and reliably reproduces
the photographic image (i.e. reproduces structure). Hence even though the possessing
of certain structural properties is not essential, it will be a consequence of the essential
relational properties that instances actually do possess, to varying degrees of accuracy,
the same structural properties. Thus structural properties are still very important to
whether or not a print is an instance of a given photograph, though a speciﬁed set of
structural properties no longer constitute the essence of the kind.
When asked if two prints are prints of the same photograph the natural response
is certainly to look at the prints carefully to see how closely their visual properties
match, but it follows from the copied kind view, and not implausibly, that in doing this
we are looking for evidence that the prints originate (in the right way) from the same
negative (or the same chunk of digital data). And it is this that decides whether or
not they are prints of the same photograph. Of course, in this case what it means to
originate `in the right way' will involve standards of structural reproduction, and thus
the historical and relational properties that constitute the essence of the kind are not
entirely independent of structural properties. Structure does matter, but its importance
derives from the essence, rather than the structure itself being the essence.
A similar story can be told for text-based artefacts, although here what counts as a
suitable copying process will be diﬀerent. To set out the position in as much detail as
possible, I will begin the account from the initial process of authoring: A poet types a
sequence of words, makes a few adjustments, and then declares the poem ﬁnished. Let's
suppose that she gives the poem the title `Poem No. 1'. The instance of the poem on
the computer screen is then part of a chain of copies which is so far very short. Being
the ﬁrst instance of the poem there are no other entities to which it can be suitably
related, which is what we would expect given that no other entity is an instance of
that poem kind. It is not the same poem as anything else yet. Suppose the poet then
both emails the text to a friend and prints a copy for herself. Because the email and
printing mechanisms are designed to generate word-sequence accurate copies, the text
displayed on the friend's computer and the poet's own printout will both be suitably
accurate copies of the original instance, and so they will both be instances of the same
poem. Furthermore, they are both instances of Poem No. 1 because that was the
name given to that copied kind in the naming process. From then on, for anything to
be an instance of Poem No. 1, an entity must have the property of being suitably
copied from previous instances. As before, the notion of being a `suitable copy' is a
notion that appeals to structural similarities and thus might be understood as itself
being a structural notion. However, the crucial point is that the essential property is
not itself a speciﬁc structure.
Beyond photographs and poems, we need to be a little more careful. If we consider
works of music, for example, we can draw a distinction between instances that involve
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reproduction in the more ordinary sense of copying, and those that involve interpretation
or realisation. For though there will often be cases where what matters is a process of
copying normally understood (performing a song from memory, or producing sound
events via CD or mp3 recordings, for example) there will also be instances that involve
an element of interpretation.
This is especially so for scored works of classical music, and scripted plays. Here,
generating an instance of the artefact can involve performers working hard to avoid
simply copying previous instances. Though previous instances will no doubt inﬂuence
their own performance, it would not be right to merely regard the performance as an
act of copying.
Do these cases of interpreted repeatables lie outside the copied kind theory? I think
not, if we are willing to interpret the notion of a copied kind broadly enough. What
matters here, and what justiﬁes including these interpreted repeatables under the same
analysis, is the role of causal history in conjunction with structural similarity. A perfor-
mance of Beethoven's Fifth may strive to bring something new to the piece, and as such
this will not be an exercise in mere copying, but it is still a performance that follows
a copied score and it must be an acceptable interpretation of that score, structurally
speaking, if it is to count as an instance. I would argue that the notion of `copying' still
makes sense in this context, even if it is not mere copying.
It is important to note that the claim that structural properties are not the essential
properties of a photograph or a poem is nevertheless compatible with the possibility that
the structural properties are the most important properties in other respects. We may
still value a photograph (to return to that example) principally for how it looks, and
the aesthetic appreciation of the visual properties may even be the primary motivation
for making further copies. Having a non-structural essence does not interfere with
structural value. However, it is also worth noting that we often (perhaps nearly always)
appreciate a photograph for properties that are not purely structural. Award winning
photographs are appreciated for a wide variety of reasons including such non-structural
properties as the technical skill required by the photographer and the signiﬁcance of
the subject matter. In both the case of non-structural and of structural appreciation,
it is a mistake to assume that what is valuable about a photograph must correlate with
what is ontologically essential. We may value a chicken for the eggs it lays, but it need
not be (and is not) the case that an ability to lay eggs is essential to being a chicken.
A further important point to make is that the copied kind theory allows for the fact
that so often an entity can fail to be an instance of a particular repeatable artefact
simply by failing to possess the required structural properties. This occurs, according
to the copied kind theory, because in failing to possess certain structural properties, an
entity can fail to be related in the right way to the relevant other entities. A musical
performance can fail to be an instance of the intended work of music if the majority of
the notes are wrong, not because the essence of the work is to have those notes, but
because in producing the wrong notes the performance will not be suitably related to
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previous instances of that musical work.11
This account of the essences of copied kinds is admittedly quite rough. There are
two challenges that we face if we attempt to be more precise. Firstly, though a general
relational account of essences may cover a great many repeatable artefacts, there is no
reason to think there won't be signiﬁcant variation in the precise details. What counts
as a suitable copy for one kind may not carry over to a diﬀerent kind, and so we should
not expect to be able to provide a precise and general account. Secondly we must take
into account the points made in 3.3: the essences of speciﬁc kinds may be vague in
the way described, meaning that it may not always be straightforward to say when a
given actual or hypothetical example satisﬁes the essence of the kind; and there may
be a degree of indeterminacy within a linguistic community as to exactly which kind is
being referred by a particular term.12
6.3. Overcoming Structuralist Problems
Having outlined the copied kinds theory, we can now return to three speciﬁc issues that
motivated the rejection of structuralism. The problems of modal ﬂexibility, temporal
ﬂexibility and improperly formed instances can be dealt with neatly by a copied kind
theory and this suggests that a theory of relational essences coheres well with our
intuitions regarding the use of names for repeatable artefacts.
Modal Flexibility
Taking ﬁrst the issue of modal ﬂexibility, recall that the conﬂict between modal ﬂexibil-
ity and kind structuralism arose out of the intuition that there are repeatable artefacts
that are such that they could have been diﬀerent with respect to certain structural
properties. Because of the nature of kinds, however, a kind cannot be modally ﬂexible
with respect to the properties it requires of its instances. Thus if a repeatable artefact
is a kind, and if these required properties are structural (as structuralism assumes) then
11Note that in one sense these `amount to the same thing' as far as the performance goes. However,
the distinction lies in the properties that constitute the essence. For example, contrast the property
`being a year older than Jill' where Jill is 45, with the distinct property `being 46 years old'.
12It should be noted that the notion of a `copied kind' appears previously in the work of Crawford
Elder (1996; 2007). Elder's concept of a copied kind is similar to the one being employed here. In
particular, Elder is recognising kinds, including kinds of artefacts, with historical essences centred
around processes of copying. However, Elder's account diﬀers both in application and in detail.
Elder's concern is not with the ontological status of the kind itself, but with the implications copied
kinds have for the ontological status of instances of the kind. He is concerned with defending
the view that individual screwdrivers and individual tables are real objects. He argues that many
(though not all) of our ordinary artefacts are members of copied kinds and that copied kinds are
suﬃciently natural to justify the claim that these ordinary artefacts are real objects. Elder seems
to be operating on the premise that for an entity to exist it must have essential properties that it
has in virtue of being a member of a suitably natural kind (Elder, 2007, p.39). By contrast, my
use of copied kinds aims merely to isolate an interesting class of kinds with historical essences. I do
not share Elder's worries about the reality of instances of kinds. Furthermore, Elder's notion of a
copied kinds is more restrictive that the one being employed here, making demands on instances of
copied kinds (that they share a `proper function' and `historically proper placement') that are not
relevant to our project (Elder, 2007, p.38).
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the repeatable artefact could not be modally ﬂexible with respect to those structural
properties.
The copied kinds theory thus needs to handle our intuitions about modal ﬂexibility
without falling foul of this basic constraint on the modal inﬂexibility of the essence of
the kind. It does so because our intuitions concern the structural properties of artefacts
but according to the copied kind theory, the essential properties of repeatable artefacts
are not structural properties. As such, Austen's novel Emma could have had a diﬀerent
word sequence, S*, instead of the actual word sequence S, because having word sequence
S is not part of the essence of the kind. `But', it will be objected, `having word sequence
S is not optional for copies of Emma. How then can it be optional for possible copies
of Emma?' To answer this I want to consider two examples of relational kinds. By
using hypothetical examples we can state quite precisely how the modal ﬂexibility of
structure relates to the non-ﬂexible relational essence of the kind.
Consider the rather unnatural kindAs Tall as the Eiffel Tower. By stipulation,
let us say that this is the kind that requires that all its instances have the purely
relational property of being as tall as the Eiﬀel Tower. Consequently, in the actual
world an object must be 325m tall to have the property of being as tall as the Eiﬀel
Tower (and hence to be a instance of that kind).
However, the Eiﬀel Tower is only contingently 325m tall. It could have been 330m
tall, for example (and it actually used to be 312m tall). Hence, in the actual world,
today, an object must have the property of being 325m tall to be instance of the kind
As Tall as the Eiffel Tower. Anything that is not that tall will not be as tall as
the Eiﬀel Tower and will not count as a instance. Nevertheless, because the tower itself
could have been 330m tall, the kind As Tall as the Eiffel Tower could have had
instances that were 330m tall, while still being that kind.
The key point is that the property of `being as tall as the Eiﬀel Tower' is not a rigid
designator of the height `325m' (to have the property `as tall as the Eiﬀel Tower' in
every possible world is not just to have the property of being 325m tall in every possible
world). Rather `as tall as the Eiﬀel Tower' is intended as a relational property  it
pertains to a height-wise relationship with the Eiﬀel Tower, rather than a height above
sea level.
Here is another similar example more closely analogous to repeatable artefacts. Con-
sider the kind KEiﬀel which is individuated by the requirement that its instances be
Eiﬀel Tower miniature facsimiles. Given the (contingent) fact that the Eiﬀel Tower
looks the way it does, say it has structural properties S, all of the instances of KEiﬀel in
the actual world must also look a certain way  have structural properties S  if they
are to count as properly formed instances. However, it is not part of the essence of the
kind that its instances have structural properties S, but only that they have the same
structure as the Eiﬀel Tower. It is a contingent fact that in the actual world having the
property of being a facsimile of the Eiﬀel Tower entails having structural properties S.
Hence it is possible for instances of KEiﬀel to have had diﬀerent structural properties (if
the Eiﬀel Tower itself had had diﬀerent structural properties) even though in the actual
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world, given how the tower actually is, they must have structural properties S.
It is true that Austen could have chosen a few diﬀerent words here and there when
writing Emma, and it is true that Emma could have had a slightly diﬀerent word
sequence (and that every copy of the novel Emma could have had a slightly diﬀerent
word sequence), because the essence of the kind Emma is not to have a particular word
sequence but to bear a suitable copying relationship (one that maintains word order
accuracy, in this case) to previous instances of Emma. Hence if the original ﬁnal draft
penned by Austen had had a slightly diﬀerent word order (as it might have done had
she chosen diﬀerently), every subsequent copy would also have had that word order.
Crucially both actual and hypothetical copies are of the same kind (are instances of the
same novel) because they all have the same property of being causally related to the
same initial manuscript.
An important consequence of this is that the degree of modal ﬂexibility allowed
remains unsettled. The theory does not oﬀer an answer to question of how diﬀerent
the novel Emma might have been. It seems plausible that some of the words could
have been diﬀerent and that it could have been a little longer or shorter, but not
plausible that every word could have been diﬀerent, or that it could have been a haiku.
According to the copied kind theory, the vagueness of these intuitions is a direct result
of the uncertainties in our intuitions about the modal ﬂexibility of ordinary objects.
When Austen wrote the manuscript for Emma, she produced an entity that was the
ﬁrst in a branching chain of copies. By linking the essence of the novel to the status of
ordinary non-repeatable objects, the question of how diﬀerent a novel could be becomes
eﬀectively the same as the question of how diﬀerent a non-repeatable object, such as a
painting, could have been while still being that same object. Matisse's painting The
Dance perhaps could have had one extra character in it, but it probably could not
have been a still life of an apple. Similarly, we judge that Emma couldn't have had
the same word sequence as the rhyme Three Blind Mice because a chain of copies
starting with a manuscript with that word sequence written on it would not count as
the same chain of copies with the same origin as that which we actually have.13
A related question pertains to the necessity of authorship. Could Emma have been
written by someone other than Austen? While there have been attempts to answer
this question for works of art in general,14 the important point here is that problem
about the authorship of repeatable artefacts can be reduced to the problem as it applies
to ordinary non-repeatable objects. The question of whether Emma could have had a
diﬀerent author reduces to the question of whether the chain of copies, beginning with
the original manuscript, could have been produced by someone else while still being
those same entities. The result then is that in many respects, the ways that repeatable
13We can note that these kinds of modal considerations may well be inﬂuenced by value judgements, so
that how diﬀerent an artefact could have been may depend on what we value about that artefact.
The view defended here  that the essences of repeatable artefacts are relational and historical,
also sits well with the idea that such artefacts are inherently historical and contextual  see, e.g.
Levinson (2007). Copied kinds are no less `historically embedded' than ordinary physical objects.
14See, for instance, Rohrbaugh (2005).
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artefacts could have been diﬀerent depends entirely on the ways that non-repeatable
particulars could have been diﬀerent.
Temporal Flexibility
The issue of temporal ﬂexibility is handled in a very similar manner. The problem,
recall, was that in certain cases we have the intuition that repeatable artefacts can
change through time, but it is also the case that if artefacts are structural kinds there
can be no change in structure without a numerical (rather then merely qualitative)
change in kind. However, because copied kinds do not have structural essence there can
be structural change without a change of essence. When an academic paper is altered
following the suggestions of a reviewer there are structural changes to the text but there
is no change in the properties that are required for an entity to be an instance of that
paper  before and after the structural change, it is still the same relational property
that matters.15
The fact that such change is possible tells us something important about that rela-
tional property because it is clear to see that the modiﬁed version of the paper will not
be a word order duplicate of a previous instance (since some of the words will have been
changed). Built into the requirements of a `suitable copy', then, must be the allowance
that certain people can, in appropriate circumstances, make structural changes and still
produce an entity suitably related to previous instances. Often this privilege will be
granted to the author or authors only, but changes are also made by editors (who, in
some technical sense at least, share in the authorship). In cases of unauthored artefacts,
such as folk songs and folk stories, small changes may be acceptably made by anyone
who produces an instance of that artefact.
It is clear to see that diﬀerent sorts of artefacts will warrant quite diﬀerent standards
of the copy-relationship, and which standards are adopted in any given situation will
depend on various social and cultural factors. The task of spelling out all of the diﬀerent
standards and practices would be a long one, and I am not going to undertake it here.
All we need to accept for the account to be plausible is that for any given repeatable
artefact, what sort of relational essence is relevant can be teased out by careful scrutiny
of the kind in question.
15One might object here that even though the same words are used to describe the conditions required
for instances before and after the change, the actual conditions themselves have changed. However,
such an objection could be mounted only if the existence of relational properties in general was
being denied. Recall the example of the property `being a year older than Jill'. If Jill is 45, then a
person will have that property if they are 46 years old. However, it does not follow that `being a
year older than Jill' and `being 46' name the same property. If a person has the property of being a
year older than Jill they will have that property in three years time, though they will no longer have
the property of being 46 years old. If one began with a principled rejection of relational properties,
they may insist that `being a year older than Jill' is a phrase that picks out diﬀerent properties each
year. However, short of an argument against relational properties, we have no reason to interpret
`being a year older than Jill' in that way. The more natural reading holds that the phrase picks out
the same property each year, though the age one must be to posses the property clearly changes
as Jill gets older. Similarly, short of a rejection of relational properties, we have no reason to think
that the relational essence of the kind changes before and after the structural change to the paper.
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Some clariﬁcation is needed at this point about exactly what is meant by the claim
that the kinds themselves can undergo change and that they could have been diﬀerent.
On the more traditional view of kinds as abstract entities  a view that I rejected in
Chapter 4  kinds are often understood to be unchanging and modally ﬁxed because they
are abstract. They are, in Joseph LaPorte's words, abstract objects with immutable
essences (LaPorte, 2004, p.9). Abstract kinds undergo neither modal or temporal
variation. A supporter of that view must say that even if artefact kinds have relational
essences the kinds themselves are not modally or temporally ﬂexible. Instead, the fact
that the essences are relational rather than structural allows for the fact that successive
instances of kinds can vary structurally, and that possible instances of kinds could have
diﬀerent structures. The variation is at the level of instances only. Accordingly, talk of
modal and temporal ﬂexibility is explained away rather than strictly speaking allowed
for. We say things like `Emma could have been diﬀerent' but all we can really mean here
is that instances of Emma could have been diﬀerent. This is the line that LaPorte takes
towards the evolution of species, as discussed in 6.1. However, since I have argued for
kind physicalism I am not restrained by the supposition that kinds, as abstract objects,
cannot undergo modal or temporal change. All that I am commited to in this respect is
the view that kinds cannot undergo modal or temporal change of their essences. That is,
they cannot change (and could not be diﬀerent with respect to) the properties that they
require of their instances. However, because kinds on my view are co-present with their
instances, and because the instances can be diﬀerent from one another in structural
respects, and also could have been diﬀerent from how they actually are, there is an
important sense in which the kind itself is liable to modal and temporal variation. The
kind itself, which is multiply located at every point at which the kind is instanced, will
show variation across times and places in (potentially) all but its essential properties.
As such, the kind theory defended here, combined with the thesis that many artefact
kinds have historical essences, does not explain away modal or temporal ﬂexibility but
embraces it. Repeatable artefacts really do change, and really could have been diﬀerent.
Improperly Formed Instances
In 5.2 I discussed possible ways that a kind structuralist could deal with the appar-
ent phenomenon of kinds with improperly formed instances. The norm-kind solution
worked by dividing the structural properties into normative and essential properties. All
instances must have the essential properties, but only properly formed instances have
the normative properties. I argued that this view faces the challenge of accounting for
a distinction between normative and essential properties, and also feels like a somewhat
purpose built and ad hoc amendment to a basic kind theory.
The copied kind theory allows for an alternative and simpler take on the issue. Be-
fore considering repeatable artefacts, it is interesting that Wolterstorﬀ and Dodd both
appeal to biological species to give examples of kinds with improperly formed instances
(Wolterstorﬀ, 1980, p.57; Dodd, 2007, p.33). But if we accept the view that species
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are kinds with historical essences then the idea of an improperly formed instance of
an animal species can be seen in a whole new light. We are inclined to say that a cat
with three legs is in some sense `improperly formed', and on the structuralist kind view
this was deemed to be because it lacks some of the properties required to be a cat. It
somehow `falls short' of ideal cat-hood. However, if species are kinds with historical
essences then the number of legs that the animal has has nothing to do with its being
a cat or not  that is something decided by lineage. The sense in which the cat is
improperly formed then becomes entirely about reproductive norms and expectations.
Because cats are normally born with four legs, a cat with three legs will represent a
divergence from this standard and so it will strike us that there is something wrong, or
merely out of the ordinary, about it.
The story for repeatable artefacts is similar. To be an improperly formed instance of
a repeatable artefact an entity will be copied from a previous instance but will break
certain of the norms of copying and thus be a (more or less) poor copy.16 However, the
diﬀerence here between artefacts and species is that the norm is not set by independent
biological processes and our subsequent expectations, but is directed by our desire to
reproduce structural properties with varying degrees of accuracy. Suppose that we print
oﬀ a number of copies of the same photograph, but in one of the prints the colour is
unbalanced because the red ink in the printer has run dry. The oﬀ-colour print will be
an instance of the photograph, but it will be a poorly formed instance because it will
not be as good a copy as we normally expect and intend for colour photographs.
Thus viewing repeatable artefacts as copied kinds not only allows for modal and tem-
poral ﬂexibility, but makes sense of the possibility of better and worse formed instances
of the kind without resort to ad hoc divisions in the essence of the kind. Normativity
on this view `comes for free' because normativity is built into the relational property of
being a suitable copy.
6.4. Objections
The theory of copied kinds has been outlined and I have described how it is able to
handle the key diﬃculties faced by a structuralist account. What remains is to defend
the account from some possible objections, before moving on to a more speciﬁc challenge
laid down by Guy Rohrbaugh. The ﬁrst possible objection is a technical one. It might
be thought that the proposal I have made falls foul of one of the basic axioms of S5
modal logic. The unique axiom of the S5 system of modal logic states that if it is possible
that p it is necessarily possible that p. This is logically equivalent to the claim that if
it is possibly necessary that p, it is necessary that p. However, it might appear that my
claim is that, as it happens, it is necessary that copies of Emma have structure S, but
16Of course, the evaluative terms `wrong' and `poor' will not always be appropriate for instances
that diverge from the norm. A performance of a work of music, for example, may be deliberately
produced so that it diverges from the norm. In this case we wouldn't describe the instance as being
`wrong' or `poor' in any way, and may commend a performer for producing an aesthetically valuable
or interesting inaccurate copy.
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that it is possible that they need not. In other words my claim could be interpreted as
implying that it is contingently (possibly) necessary that copies of Emma have structure
S. But according to the above axiom of S5 modal logic, if it is possibly necessary then
it is necessary simpliciter, and if it is necessary simpliciter then copies of Emma could
not have had a diﬀerent structure. Does my claim about how Emma could have been
therefore contradict S5 modal logic?
To see that it does not, we need to distinguish between a strong, or universal, sense
of modality, and a weak, or restricted, sense.17 In the universal sense, if it is necessary
that p then there is no world in which p is not the case. In the restricted sense, it can
be `necessary' that p where p is the case just if some other (not universally necessary)
facts obtain. For example, we can identify one sort of restricted necessity as physical
necessity. Something is physically necessary only if it must be the case in every world
at which the actual laws of physics hold. Though it is physically necessary that nothing
travels faster than the speed of light, it is presumably not a universal necessity. When
we say, then, that copies of Emma `must' have structure S, we mean this only in a
restricted sense as described. It is necessary given Austen's manuscript that subsequent
copies are as they are. It can therefore be possible in the unrestricted sense that
they have a diﬀerent structure, because it is possible that the original manuscript and
subsequent copies are diﬀerent. S5 is not violated because if it is unrestrictedly possible
that something is restrictedly necessary, it does not follow according to S5 that it is
unrestrictedly necessary.
The second objection I want to consider derives from the thought that the properties
considered here as constituting the essence of the kind  such as `having the same
structure as Austen's original manuscript'  are not genuine intrinsic properties and so
cannot be essential properties of the instances. There are two relevant issues that we
can separate. The ﬁrst is that it might be thought that kinds can only require intrinsic
properties of their instances. However, on the basic kind/instance theory set out here,
this thought is unmotivated. Why should it be the case that kinds can only make
requirements on the intrinsic properties of the instances? If kinds are individuated by
the properties that their instances must have to be instances of that kind there is no
conceptual or theoretical reason to put a restriction on what those properties may be.
Thus there is no barrier to regarding repeatable artefacts as kinds that demand that
their instances have only relational properties.
The second worry here is that the instances themselves cannot have relational prop-
erties as essential properties. However it is no part of kind theory that instances of
kinds are instances of that kind essentially or necessarily. Consider my physical copy of
Emma. That is an instance of the kind Emma, but (plausibly) it might not have been,
and it may not be in the future if it undergoes some sort of serious damage. Instances
need not be instances of their kind essentially, and so the properties they must have in
order to be instances of that kind can be any kind of property whatever.
17See Sherratt (2001, p.381) for a discussion of restricted modality.
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The third objection I want to consider is based on Peter Kivy's argument from the
Tristan Chord (Kivy, 1993, p.46). Kivy argues that the Tristan Chord is a certain
structure of pitches (a sound structure), and that there is no principled diﬀerence be-
tween the chord and Tristan and Isolde itself. Hence Tristan and Isolde cannot
be anything more than a more complicated sound structure  that is, it must be a kind
that demands only of its instances that they sound a certain way. But this argument is
not persuasive simply because there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the chord as kind
and the musical work as kind. Kinds are individuated by the properties they require of
their instances and so the proof of the diﬀerences between a chord and a work of music
lies in the diﬀerent kinds of properties that each requires of its respective instances.
Kivy's argument involves assessing this for a chord, and then extrapolating up to the
whole work of music, but that extrapolation is unjustiﬁed. When we identify the chord
it is very plausible that we are identifying a kind of sound event that requires its in-
stances have a certain sound structure and nothing more. However, when we identify
the work itself we seem to be identifying something quite diﬀerent, as evidenced by the
fact that we think the work could have had a slightly diﬀerent structure. Certainly
there is a kind such that it requires that its instances necessarily have only the sound
structure of the actual Tristan and Isolde, but why think that this is what we are
actually referring to when we talk about Tristan and Isolde? Our referential prac-
tices, including our intuitions that Tristan and Isolde could have been diﬀerent and
could have gone through a number of small changes in its early life, suggest that we are
not referring to a sound structure (or even a sound structure with a number of historical
and relational properties thrown in, as modiﬁed structuralism suggests).
6.5. Embodied Individuals Rejected
In the ﬁnal part of this chapter I want to consider and reject an alternative account of
the nature of repeatable artefacts presented by Guy Rohrbaugh (2003). The reason that
Rohrbaugh's proposal deserves particular attention is that, like the copied kind theory,
it is motivated by an insistence that repeatable artefacts are modally and temporally
ﬂexible. What is more, before presenting his positive proposal, Rohrbaugh considers
and dismisses a view very similar to the copied kind theory defended here. In what
follows I will argue ﬁrstly that Rohrbaugh's reasons for rejecting a copied kind theory
are ﬂawed, and secondly that his own positive proposal compares badly with the copied
kind theory.
Rohrbaugh's consideration of a position much like the one proposed here comes under
the heading `Neo-Type Theories'. Using the terminology of types rather than kinds,
Rohrbaugh suggested that a position may be forwarded according to which the types
to be identiﬁed with artworks have identity conditions that make reference only to
extrinsic, causal historical features of the tokens (Rohrbaugh, 2003, p.195). He goes
on to say that
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what would remain is the claim that photographs are types, but types whose
identity conditions are given almost exclusively in terms of the shared history
of the prints, their coming from a particular picture-taking in an appropriate
fashion. (Rohrbaugh, 2003, p.196)
Rohrbaugh then seems to have a number of issues with this move that I will address
in turn. Firstly Rohrbaugh claims that for this theorist it would be diﬃcult ...to deny
that structure, at least low level structure, is even partially constitutive of a work...
(Rohrbaugh, 2003, p.195). However, we can see that on the copied kinds theory, all
that is being claimed is that structure is not part of the essence of the kind. The visual
structure of a photograph, or the textual structure of a novel, for example, can still
be very important in other respects. The structure present in Emma is still a highly
important feature of that kind, and structure understood generally is a constitutive
feature of the kind in that it is necessary that instances have the same structure as
Austin's ﬁnal draft. So structure has not been ejected altogether from our concept of a
repeatable artefact. All that Rohrbaugh is expressing here is the unfounded assumption
that speciﬁc structure ought to be ontologically essential to repeatable artefacts.
Further down Rohrbaugh writes that to give such an account is still, I think, to have
missed the point, and this because he argued that photographs are subjects of change
and of certain modal potentialities, but causal-historical types are not subjects of change
or modal potentiality; they are types that are unchanging and necessarily generous
about what they count as their tokens (Rohrbaugh, 2003, p.196). However, this charge
is only eﬀective, if it is eﬀective at all, against a theory of kinds as abstract entities.
Rohrbaugh is assuming that a kind or type theory does not really allow for modal
and temporal ﬂexibility, but instead merely simulate[s] these phenomena (Rohrbaugh,
2003, p.196). Yet this is not the case according to kind physicalism. As I argued at
the end of 6.3, kind physicalism implies that kinds really are modally and temporally
ﬂexible in everything but essence, and thus Rohrbaugh's charge is not relevant.
Finally Rohrbaugh suggests that a theory of historical essences such as that defended
here ceases to have any appeal as a theory of artworks now that the essence is no longer
given in qualitative terms. He writes that
If we give up the task of attempting to provide a qualitative essence for a
work of art, what point is there in continuing to assume that it is a type of
thing for which we are giving identity conditions and not an individual in
its own right? (Rohrbaugh, 2003, p.196)
Rohrbaugh seems to be insisting that unless we understand the essences of a kind or
a type in structural (qualitative) terms, there is no point in regarding the entity in
question as a kind (or type) rather than a what he calls `an individual in its own right.'
Leaving aside what is meant by `an individual in its own right', we can respond here
by recalling that the kind theory was originally posited to explain repeatability. The
kind theory explains how the same word can appear twice in one display, how the same
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ﬁlm can be seen, in its entirety, at multiple times during the day, and how the same
photograph can be both on my fridge and on my parents' mantelpiece at the same time.
The kind theory provides us with an ontological category that allows for this, regardless
of what the essences of the kinds turn out to be. The lack of structural essence does
nothing to remove the central motivation for favouring a kind theory.
Rohrbaugh's brief reasons for rejecting a theory of kinds (or types) with historical
essences are unconvincing. However, to see what is meant by the claim that a repeatable
work of art is `an individual in its own right', we need to consider Rohrbaugh's own
positive proposal. I will argue that his account is ontologically obscure and crucially
makes no useful advances on a copied kind theory. Any moves we make to clarify the
position leave us with a theory that is in no useful way distinct from a copied kind
theory.18
The ﬁrst point to make is that now that the theory of copied kinds has been articulated
and defended in response to the lack of structural essences of repeatable artefacts,
Rohrbaugh's own account is unmotivated. Rohrbaugh argues that because entities such
as photographs are temporally and modally ﬂexible, they must not be types or kinds.
As such he proposes that they are what he calls `historical individuals'. But given that
a plausible kind theory can be oﬀered which allows for such ﬂexibility, as I have argued
it can, then one need not look elsewhere for ontological answers.
Being unmotivated, the obscurities of Rohrbaugh's proposal make it doubly unattrac-
tive. Firstly, Rohrbaugh articulates his position by stressing that the relation of a pho-
tograph to its copies should not be of the form `Fa', which he suggests is the relation of
instantiation, but should rather be of the form `Rab' where the photograph is related
to its print by the relation of `print of' where this is a speciﬁc case of the more general
`occurrence of' relation. However, other than in choice of terminology, this does not set
his view apart from a kind theory. According to the copied kind theory, the kind (an
entity) is related to its instances (also entities), and thus we also represent the relation
as `Rab' rather than `Fa'. It is not clear how the `occurrence of' relation that Rohrbaugh
favours is in this respect any diﬀerent from the instantiation relation of a mature kind
theory.
Rohrbaugh insists that the `occurrence of' relation is a special case of the relationship
of `embodiment'. The embodiments of a repeatable entity (the prints, performances,
copies) are those things on which [the repeatable entity] ontologically depends for its
continued existence (Rohrbaugh, 2003, p.198). The notion of ontological dependence
being appealed to is far from clear, but we need not enter into a discussion of its
complexities here.19 This is because merely stating that an entity ontologically depends
on its `embodiments' brings us no closer to understanding the relationship between a
repeatable artefact and its instances. Rohrbaugh's historical individuals seem to occupy
18Rohrbaugh's proposal receives a thorough critique in Dodd (2007, pp.143-166). As my positive
theory undercuts the central motivations for Rohrbaugh's account, we need only draw out the
central weaknesses of that view in what follows.
19For a recent survey of the topic of ontological dependence, see Correia (2008). Dodd discusses this
notion in the context of Rohrbaugh's proposal in Dodd (2007, pp.162-166).
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a hazy ontological middle ground between the scattered object hypothesis and a kind
theory that holds that kinds are abstract. Presumably Rohrbaugh rejects the scattered
object hypothesis because he ﬁnds it counter intuitive to say that the `occurrences' of
a photograph are parts of the photograph. Instead he prefers abstract entities that are
`sustained' by numerous physical objects that count as their `occurrences'. However, we
can ask here: in virtue of what is it the case that a particular entity is an embodiment of
a particular work of art? If the question is answered by citing historical and relational
properties, then it seems we do have a kind theory after all. If such properties are not
cited, the relationship remains mysterious.
Rohrbaugh further demarcates his view by stating that his `historical individuals' are
in the class of real entities. Recognising that `real' is a widely used term he attempts
to be more precise:
I think there is a common, possibly pre-philosophical, set of intuitions of
reality which attends the bulk of what one might call our ordinary ontology.
Photographs, species, words, rocks, tables, and persons are, in some primary
sense, equally real and I would trace their intuitive reality to their being
genuinely historical objects. Not only do these things exist in time, but
they all come into existence at some point in history and cease to exist at
a later one. They are more than merely temporal, for each has what you
might call `a life story'. They are all subject to change over time, and all,
had their life stories gone diﬀerently, could have been somewhat diﬀerent
than they in fact are. Further, while not all such objects must be particular,
physical, concrete, or basic for explanatory purposes, the existence of all
such items is rooted in the physical world. (Rohrbaugh, 2003, p.199)
This is all very well, but notice that this description does not exclude the physical kinds
defended here. Such entities ﬁt neatly into Rohrbaugh's understanding of the `real'
and account for all that Rohrbaugh insists we want to say about repeatable artefacts
without needing to posit notions of `embodiment' or `higher level' objects (Rohrbaugh,
2003, p.199).
In short, then, with a theory of physical copied kinds on the table, Rohrbaugh's
oﬀering is both unmotivated and unclear. To explain the nature of repeatable entities
we need not posit a new and ontologically hazy category of things. Rohrbaugh was
right to reject structuralism but ultimately wrong to move from this to a full rejection
of kind or type theories.
Conclusion
The challenge of this chapter has been to overcome the diﬃculties faced by structuralism
while still holding on to a kind theory. This has been achieved, I argue, by recognising
the role of historical and relational essences. The copied kind theory conforms with our
intuitions about the application and co-application of the names for many key repeatable
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artefacts, and shows how these can nevertheless be genuine kinds with essences. The
chapter began with a discussion of the ontological nature of biological species, and one
of the outcomes of this chapter is that novels, ﬁlms, plays and photographs (as well
as the less `artistic' logos, adverts, jingles, and essays) have more in common with
biological species than we might have thought. Insofar as one agrees that species are
kinds, both have essences that are historical and relational and involve mechanisms
of reproduction that `copy' characteristics from one instance to the next (bearing in
mind the role of interpretation for performed repeatables). The precise structure of
these entities is therefore contingent. It could have been somewhat diﬀerent, and it can
change through time. It has been suggested that these intuitions concerning modal and
temporal ﬂexibility are mistaken: that we are just wrong to think that such entities
could have been diﬀerent and can change through time. However, now that a theory is
available that allows for this ﬂexibility, there is no good motivation for regarding such
intuitions as in error.20
I have also argued that a signiﬁcant feature of the copied kind theory is that it still
allows for structure to play a central role in the nature of these artefacts. The essences
of these kinds require that the instances have certain aspects of their structure copied
from previous instances. We can now take this point further and note that it is because
structure matters for the appreciation, reproduction and identiﬁcation of these artefacts
that they can be copied kinds at all. Just as the passing on of structural traits is an
important part of reproduction and evolution in biology, so it is the structure  sonic,
visual or textual (or a combination of these)  that we wish to copy and that thus allows
for relational essences for these kinds. A care for structure and the copied kind theory
go hand in hand, for if we did not care for structure, we would not have the social
and cultural mechanisms in place to produce copies. This is an important observation
because it points towards a principle for collecting together those repeatable artefacts
that are copied kinds. So far I have given only indicative lists: we have been looking
at novels, photographs, works of music, etc. Now we can say that what these have in
common is the primary importance of structure. To be a copy is to be a structural copy.
The Naturalness of Copied Kinds: An Endnote
An answer to our opening question has been oﬀered. When we recognise the phe-
nomenon of repeatability, I have argued, we are contrasting the identity of the kind
with the distinctness of numerous instances of that kind. To recognise and identify a
novel is to identify a physical kind that can be multiply located, and is found wherever
and whenever the essence of the kind is satisﬁed.
In looking to give a broad account of those essences, at least for paradigmatic cases of
repeatable artefacts, I have drawn parallels with biological species. As structural traits
20This suggests a further shortcoming of such error theories: they lack any explanation for why we
held these beliefs. Why think that many repeatable artefacts are modally and temporally ﬂexible,
if in fact they are not? The copied kinds theory has quick answer: we think they are modally and
temporally ﬂexible because they are modally and temporally ﬂexible.
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of biological species are transferred via causal-historical mechanisms of reproduction,
so are the sounds, words and images, that we create and value, passed on via causal-
historical mechanisms of artefact reproduction. Moreover, in each case we can identify
kinds with essences that appeal directly to those causal histories. All that remains is
to point out a potentially surprising consequence of this view.
In 3.4 I defended the view that kinds can be understood as being more or less
natural and that naturalness comes in degrees. I said very little at that point about
speciﬁc criteria employed in judging naturalness. However, one intriguing consequence
of the account of copied kinds defended here is that repeatable artefacts turn out to be
signiﬁcantly natural.
Naturalness is commonly understood in terms of the processes of explanation and
induction. Explanation and induction allow us to know about, and understand, the
world we inhabit, and they rely on our ability to pick out projectable properties and
processes. We often aim to describe the world in terms of casual structures that ground
reliable inferences.21 Appealing to the work of Ian Hacking (1991) and Richard Boyd
(1991), Ruth Millikan has claimed that the term natural kind has commonly been
used to characterise kinds over which numerous reliable inductive generalisations can be
made (Millikan, 1999, p.49). Similarly Paul Griﬃths notes that [a] kind is minimally
natural if it is possible to make better than chance predictions about the properties of
its instances (Griﬃths, 1999, p.216).
Typical examples of kinds that fulﬁl this criteria are the kinds of physics and chem-
istry. The essences of these kinds correlate with law-like generalisations that hold irre-
spective of place and time. The essence of gold, we can assume, is to have the atomic
number 79, and it is argued that this essence is causally responsible, in accordance with
laws of nature, for the other properties that gold reliably has. Gold is a highly natural
kind, then, because if we know that some sample is gold  that it satisﬁes the essence
of gold  we can make reliable predictions about many of the other properties that
the sample will have. Because the causal laws that ground these inference are deemed
to hold irrespective of time and place, Millikan has called kinds such as these eternal
natural kinds (Millikan, 1999, p.50).
However, the kinds of physics and chemistry are not the only kinds that allow for such
generalisations and reliable inferences. Millikan contrasts eternal natural kinds with
historical natural kinds. Historical kinds  and here Millikan cites biological species  are
just those kinds whose essences refer to historical relationships among instances rather
than internal structure. Crucially, though, in historical natural kinds the relational
essences play the same role as the internal structural essences in grounding reliable
inferences to other properties of members of the kind. Moreover, the relational essences
allow us to explain the properties of instances, in the same way that knowing that a
sample is a sample of gold allows us to explain the fact that it has the melting point
that it does have. Millikan writes that for historical natural kinds:
21See, e.g., Boyd (1991, p.139), also Griﬃths (1999) and Hacking (1991).
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Inductions made from one member of the kind to another are grounded
because there is a certain historical link between members of the kind that
causes members to be like one another. (Millikan, 1999, p.55)
Thus we have story to tell about how the processes of biological reproduction that under-
pin the essence of species allow for species to be natural kinds. The relational essences
provide a causal mechanism  through the transfer of genes and taught behaviour  that
grounds reliable inductions and explanations about other (what are sometimes called
`surface level') traits in members of the species. The essence of the Polar Bear, for
example, is to be a product of a reproductive chain involving other polar bears, and it is
because of this essence that polar bears share a great many other properties (LaPorte,
2004, p.19). In identifying kinds with such essences we are therefore identifying kinds
that match the causal structure of the world and allow for induction and explanation:
we are identifying natural kinds.
We are now in a position to draw the crucial parallel with those repeatable artefacts
that are understood to be copied kinds. The key point here is that the causal mecha-
nisms found in historical essences that allow for reliable induction need not be limited to
human-independent mechanisms. Paul Griﬃths has argued that understanding the role
historical essences can have in providing reliable causal grounds for other co-occurring
properties breaks down the traditional distinction between natural kinds and kinds
generated by human agency (Griﬃths, 1999, p.218). The claim being forwarded, then,
is that our social and cultural practices can play the same role for many artefact kinds
as biological reproduction plays for species.
The essence of a copied kind, we have said, is to be historically related via a suitable
copying process to the relevant chain of previous instances. We can see, though, that
our social practices of desiring and producing suitable copies of instances will licence
reliable inferences to a great many other properties that instances of the same kinds will
possess. The copying process that we facilitate acts as a real causal mechanism that
grounds reliable inductions and explanations. If you go to see a ﬁlm that I have seen
already, I can tell you what to expect just because the copying processes that underpin
the essence of the ﬁlm allow us to make highly reliable inferences from one instance of
the ﬁlm to another. The underlying relationships of copying are eﬀectively the `hidden'
essence of copied kinds that are causally responsible for the many shared `surface level'
properties.
Many repeatable artefacts, if they are indeed copied kinds, are kinds that allow re-
liable induction and explanation from essences to other surface level properties of in-
stances of the kinds. They are, in an important respect, signiﬁcantly natural kinds.22
It does not follow that all repeatable artefacts are similarly natural, since it cannot be
22It might be objected that the terms `natural' and `artefactual' are mutually exclusive. However, the
notion of an artefact in use here was never clariﬁed in opposition to naturalness, and other than by
stipulation of the meanings of those terms, I see no reason not to understand those paradigmatic
examples of repeatable artefacts as being natural, as that term is understood here. After all, we
are part of the natural world. As Crawford Elder has remarked, we ourselves, with our intelligence
and our agency, are items which nature produced (Elder, 2007, p.40).
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assumed that all repeatable artefacts are copied kinds. However, by exploring the pos-
sibility of non-structural essences and by comparing repeatable artefacts with biological
kinds, we have reached a rather unexpected conclusion, one that seems to me to suggest
an interesting avenue of further research.
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